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I Abstract 
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I Abstract 
A presupposition is a phenomenon whereby speakers mark linguistically the information that 
is presupposed, rather than actually uttering it. The definite determiner (as in the banana) 
triggers the uniqueness-presupposition that there is a uniquely identifiable banana in the 
relevant discourse context. In contrast, the indefinite determiner (as in a banana) is associated 
with anti-uniqueness (that there are several bananas). The present dissertation investigates how 
this anti-uniqueness inference arises. Mouse-tracking studies (Study 1 and Study 4) provide 
evidence for the application of the Maximize Presupposition principle to the indefinite 
determiner. According to this principle the anti-uniqueness of the indefinite determiner results 
indirectly as an anti-presupposition from considering the uniqueness-presupposition of the 
definite determiner, which is then negated. This two-step processing results in increased 
processing difficulty for the indefinite determiner.  
Furthermore, the present dissertation investigate what cognitive resources are involved 
during presupposition processing. To answer this question, the Psychological Refractory Period 
(PRP) approach is combined with a reading task to apply the locus of slack-logic (Study 2 and 
Study 3). The data provide evidence for a capacity-limited processing that has its locus within 
the central stage of processing and limited cognitive capacities are required during 
presupposition processing. Consequently, presupposition processing is not automatic and thus 
cannot run in parallel to other tasks. In addition, evidence for an immediate use of 
presuppositional information (Study 4 and Study 5) was gathered. In cases where the context 
explicitly falsifies the presuppositional content processing difficulties arise as early as the 
presuppositional content is fully known. The present results support a semantic view on 
presuppositions where the additional meaning component is encoded into the lexical entry of 
the trigger.  
.
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II Zusammenfassung 
Eine Präsupposition ist eine Bedingung an den Kontext. Nur in Kontexten, die die 
Präsupposition beinhalten, kann ein Satz angemessen geäußert werden. Der definite Artikel 
(beispielsweise „die Banane“) löst die Einzigartigkeitspräsupposition aus, dass genau eine 
identifizierbare Banane im entsprechenden Diskurs existiert. Der indefinite Artikel 
(beispielsweise „eine Banane“) drückt eher Nicht-Einzigartigkeit aus, und deutet dadurch 
darauf hin, dass im Kontext mehrere Bananen existieren. Die vorliegende Dissertation 
beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie diese Nicht-Einzigartigkeitsinferenz entsteht. Mouse-
tracking Studien (Studie 1 und Studie 4) liefern Evidenz für die Anwendung des Prinzips der 
Präsuppositionsmaximierung (engl. Maximize Presupposition). Nach diesem Prinzip entsteht 
die Nicht-Einzigartigkeit des indefiniten Artikels indirekt als Anti-Präsupposition nach 
vorheriger Betrachtung der Einzigartigkeitspräsupposition des definiten Artikels. Die 
zweistufige Verarbeitung des indefiniten Artikels beinhaltet als erstes die Verarbeitung der 
Einzigartigkeitspräsupposition des definiten Artikels und negiert diese im zweiten 
Verarbeitungsschritt. Durch diese zweistufige Verarbeitung entstehen erhöhte 
Verarbeitungskosten für den indefiniten Artikel.  
Außerdem, untersucht die vorliegende Arbeit, welche kognitiven Kapazitäten während 
der Verarbeitung von Präsuppositionen beansprucht werden. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, 
wird das Paradigma Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) mit einem Lesezeitexperiment 
kombiniert um die Locus of slack-Logik anwenden zu können. Dieses Paradigma ermöglicht 
es herauszufinden, welche Verarbeitungsstufen beteiligt sind. Studie 2 und Studie 3 lieferten 
Evidenz für eine kapazitätslimitierte Verarbeitung von Präsuppositionen deren Ursprung in der 
zentralen Verarbeitungsstufe verortet wird. Es kann deshalb angenommen werden, dass die 
Verarbeitung von Präsuppositionen nicht automatisch stattfindet und dass diese Verarbeitung 
nicht parallel zu anderen Verarbeitungsprozessen ablaufen kann. Außerdem, konnte mit Studie 
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4 und Studie 5 Evidenz für eine schnelle Verarbeitung von Präsuppositionen geliefert werden. 
Wenn der Kontext die Präsupposition explizit falsifiziert, führt dies zu 
Verarbeitungsschwierigkeiten, die auftreten, sobald die Präsupposition dem Hörer bekannt ist, 
allerdings bereits vor dem Ende des Satzes. Die präsentierten Ergebnisse unterstützen einen 
semantischen Ansatz, wonach die zusätzliche Bedeutung, die durch Präsuppositionen 
ausgerückt wird im lexikalischen Eintrag des Präsuppositionsauslösers verankert ist. 
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1. Introduction 
Language and communication are omnipresent in everyday life and often speakers 
communicate more than they actually say. How listeners grasp the overall meaning of an 
utterance in a certain context is an important question in the study of language meaning. Besides 
the syntax, which is the appropriate structure of the sentence, and the correct semantics dealing 
with the intended meaning of the individual words, the pragmatic component of a sentence in 
the respective context is important for successful communication. In a situation with one pen 
and two pencils on the table it is absolutely okay to utter: “Please hand me the pen.” This request 
becomes odd, when the context is slightly modified and there are suddenly two pens on the 
table. This minimal change in the contextual setting causes a failure in communication. The 
listener is unable to fulfill the request because it is unclear which pen the speaker refers to. The 
present example shows that in situations where the presupposition of the definite determiner 
(which is existence and uniqueness (see e.g., Strawson, 1950)) is not satisfied, communication 
fails. To resolve this problem, the speaker is expected to use the indefinite determiner as in 
“Please hand me a pen”. While the definite determiner presupposes existence and uniqueness, 
the indefinite determiner is associated with anti-uniqueness. How those additional meaning 
components of the definite and indefinite determiner arise and which underlying processes are 
involved in the processing of such presupposition triggers is the question of the current 
dissertation. Although presuppositions have been a vital topic in the semantic and pragmatic 
literature throughout the last decades (for an overview see, e.g., Beaver & Geurts, 2012), there 
are many open questions, concerning the processing and interpretation of the definite and 
indefinite determiner. To gather experimental evidence for the account Maximize 
presupposition proposed by Heim (1991), I use mouse-tracking experiments and combine 
linguistic methods with a paradigm from cognitive psychology. The data provide novel insights 
in the underlying processes of presupposition processing from a linguistic and cognitive 
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psychology perspective. Before presenting the experimental results, I will introduce the 
theoretical background of presuppositions from a semantic and pragmatic perspective in 
Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 experimental methods with relevance for the present dissertation are 
explained and four important experimental results are discussed. In Chapter 4, I will make a 
brief excursus to the field of cognitive psychology to describe the Psychological Refractory 
Period (PRP) approach and the locus of slack-logic which was used in my own experiments to 
form hypotheses about the underlying processes of presupposition processing. Having covered 
all necessary theoretical background, I will lead to the research questions of the dissertation in 
Chapter 5. The conducted experiments and their results will be discussed in Chapter 6. In 
Chapter 7, I will discuss the results and I will show what implications those results have for the 
theories of presuppositions. Answers to the research questions are provided in Chapter 8. 
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2. Theoretical background of presuppositions 
In this Chapter, I will provide the theoretical background for presuppositions and 
introduce two major theoretical approaches. Presuppositions are ubiquitous in everyday life and 
they are a vital topic in the semantic and pragmatic literature (e.g., Beaver & Geurts, 2012, for 
an overview). To get a deeper understanding of this phenomenon, I want to give an overview 
on the general properties of presuppositions and first of all, answer the question of how a 
presupposition can be distinguished from the asserted meaning of a sentence.  
As a first approximation, presuppositions have been distinguished from assertions by 
the following test called „Hey, wait a minute “-test (e.g., Von Fintel, 2004):  
 Anna’s dog likes to go for a run. 
 Hey wait a minute, I didn’t know that Anna has a dog. 
The sentence in (1) contains the presupposition that Anna owns a dog. In contexts where 
this additional meaning component is not clear to the addressee the presupposition can be 
challenged with the response in (2). This test cannot be applied to an assertion like “Dogs like 
to play with tennis balls” because it would be odd to respond “Hey wait a minute, I didn’t know 
that dogs like to play with tennis balls.” The „Hey, wait a minute “-test can only be applied to 
presuppositions, but not to assertions and thus can be used to distinguish those two meaning 
components. 
Besides this test there is another feature that distinguishes presuppositions from 
assertions and from other pragmatic phenomena like implicatures. Presuppositions survive 
embedding under certain operators such as negation (e.g., Chemla, 2009), questions (e.g., 
Karttunen, 1973), conditionals (e.g., Karttunen, 1973), and modals (e.g., Langendoen & Savin, 
1971). This can be seen in the example in (3). All of the example sentences in (3a-e) presuppose 
that Isabel used to smoke. 
2. Theoretical background of presuppositions 
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 a. Isabel stopped smoking.          (simple sentence) 
b. It is not the case that Isabel stopped smoking.       (negation) 
c. Has Isabel stopped smoking?          (question) 
d. If Isabel stopped smoking, she would feel much fitter.  (conditional) 
e. Isabel might stop smoking.             (modal) 
This does not hold for implicatures or assertions as can be seen in the examples in (4-
5). While in (4a) some, but not all of Anna’s friends play soccer, the negation of the sentence 
changes the meaning of the sentence. These phenomena of presuppositions surviving under 
negation and questions is called projection. 
 a. Some of Anna’s friends play soccer.         (simple sentence) 
implicature:  not all of Anna’s friends play soccer   
b. It is not the case that some of Anna’s friends play soccer.     (negation) 
 no implicature 
c. Do some of Anna’s friends play soccer?         (question) 
 no implicature 
 a. Dogs like to play with balls.         (assertion) 
b. Dogs don’t like to play with balls.         (assertion) 
A second question that I seek to answer is: What causes presuppositions? The literature 
refers to presupposition triggers. Frege (1892) was the first one who used the term 
presupposition in his work on definite descriptions. This was the birth of the term 
presupposition trigger. Frege’s work lead to a famous argument between Russel (1905) and 
Strawson (1950) about meaning and use of determiners. Since then, many linguistic expressions 
and syntactic constructions have been argued to cause presuppositions to arise. In the following, 
I want to provide a list of so-called presupposition triggers following work by Beaver and 
Geurts (2012): 
2. Theoretical background of presuppositions 
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• Definite descriptions (Strawson, 1950)  
The national soccer team of Togo scored a goal. 
Presupposition: Togo has a (unique) national soccer team. 
• Iteratives (von Stechow, 1996) 
Anna scored a goal again. 
Presupposition: Anna scored a goal before. 
• Factives (Kiparsky & Kiparsky, 1970) 
Leopold knows that Anna plays soccer. 
Presupposition: Anna plays soccer. 
• Aspectual verbs (Simons, 2001) 
Anton stopped playing tennis. 
Presupposition: Anton used to play tennis. 
• Manner adverbs (Abbott, 2000) 
Anna ran quickly to the coach. 
Presupposition: Anna ran to the coach. 
• Temporal clauses headed by before, since, after, etc. (Beaver & Condoravdi, 2003) 
Anna talked to the referee before she took a free kick. 
Presupposition: Anna took a free kick. 
• Sortally restricted predicates of various categories (e.g., bachelor) (Thomason, 
1972) 
Julius is a bachelor. 
Presupposition: Julius is an adult male. 
• Cleft sentences (Delin, 1995) 
It was Peter who got a red card. 
Presupposition: Somebody got a red card. 
2. Theoretical background of presuppositions 
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• Quantifiers (Cooper, 1983) 
Anna passed to every player on the pitch. 
Presupposition: There are players on the pitch. 
• Names (van der Sandt, 1992) 
The coach is Theresa Merk. 
Presupposition: Theresa Merk exists. 
• Intonation (e.g., focus, contrast) (Geurts & van der Sandt, 2004) 
SHE scored a goal. 
Presupposition: Somebody scored a goal. 
As can be seen, the list of expressions and constructions that trigger presuppositions has 
grown tremendously and they comprise a very heterogeneous bunch of lexical and syntactic 
items. It seems therefore necessary to turn away from one theory that can treat all presupposition 
triggers the same. Work by Simons (2001), Abusch (2002), and Abrusán (2011) suggests to 
categorize the triggers and then evaluate different theories.  
2.1 Semantic presuppositions 
The central idea from a semantic perspective is thus that all presupposition triggers have 
the respective presupposition encoded into their lexical entry. The example in (6) can only be 
uttered felicitously in contexts that entail that Anna scored before yesterday. Otherwise the 
sentence is infelicitous.  
 Yesterday, Anna scored again. 
The relevant lexical entry for the trigger again can be seen in (7). again is one of the 
triggers that does not contribute anything to the assertive meaning of a sentence. The 
contribution is only on a presuppositional level.  
  [[again]] = λw. λt'. λP<s;<i;t>>.λt": t' < t" & P(w)(t')P(w)(t") 
2. Theoretical background of presuppositions 
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As a second argument again takes a time variable because again calls for a specific time 
interval in which the relevant proposition holds true and not just for any time interval. There 
seems to be a parallel between the behavior of again and too. Both do not contribute to the 
assertive meaning of a sentence. For the lexical entry, I followed a suggestion of Beck (2007) 
in (8). 
  [[ too ]] = λw. λP<s;<e;t>>.λx: ∃y[y ≠ x & P(w)(y)].P(w)(x) 
again and too are presupposition triggers that do not make an assertoric contribution and 
they are referential. 
Another group of presupposition trigger is still referential, but also makes a contribution 
to the assertion. The example in (9) shows that strange inferences can arise when taking the 
conventional view on the trigger stop. 
 John is cooking.  
He will stop (cooking) when tomorrow's football game starts. 
In this case, stop introduces a presupposition which requires that there is an event which 
lasts until just before the reference time of the sentence. The example in (9) however, makes 
clear that this event (or the running time of the event) is specific rather than existential. In (10) 
I provide the lexical entry for stop. Similar to again and too, stop also takes a variable as its 
second argument which will remain free in the course of the compositional interpretation. On 
the other hand, stop makes a meaningful contribution to the assertion. 
 [[stop]] = λw. λt'. λP<s;<i;t>>.λx. λt: t'∞ t & P(w)(t')(x).⌐P(w)(t)(x) 
The central assumption according to the semantic view is that the presupposition is 
encoded directly in the trigger and therefore, the additional meaning component is already 
available while reading the trigger. Following this approach (see Frege, 1892; Heim, 1982; 
2. Theoretical background of presuppositions 
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Russel, 1905), a presupposition is associated directly with the trigger word and thus 
immediately leads to awareness of the importance of context. This leads to the prediction that 
immediate processing of presuppositions starts already at the trigger word and evokes 
processing costs early before finishing the sentence (e.g., Bade & Schwarz, 2019b; Burkhardt, 
2006; Kirsten et al., 2014; Tiemann et al., 2011). 
2.2 Pragmatic presuppositions 
There is an alternative theoretical perspective on presuppositions which takes a more 
pragmatic approach (Levinson, 1983; Simons, 2001; Stalnaker, 1973). It assumes that 
presuppositions are not semantically encoded but are pragmatic, und thus arise through 
pragmatic reasoning, that is, only play a role after the sentence’s main meaning is computed 
and its integration into context is considered. According to this procedure, the trigger is not 
processed immediately, but only at the end of the sentence after the assertion.  
One observation by Simons (2001) that supports this view is contextual defeasibility of 
some presupposition triggers like change of state predicates and factives. 
 I notice that you keep chewing on your pencil.  
Have you recently stopped smoking? 
The example in (11) is taken from Geurts (1994) and illustrates that not all 
presuppositions seem to be inherently semantic. Usually, presuppositions survive questions. 
However, the example in (11) shows that the presupposition of stopped seems to “disappear” 
due to the explicit ignorance context that is created via expressing the previous sentence. In 
such a context the addressee knows that the speaker is ignorant about the proposition that would 
normally arise as a presupposition (in this case the smoking habits of the addressee). The 
addressee is aware that the speaker is ignorant about the current or prior smoking habits of her 
and thus cannot assume that she recently used to smoke. The utterance is interpreted as a non-
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presupposing question asking whether the addressee has undergone the relevant change from 
being a smoker to not being one (“Is it the case that you have recently been a smoker and have 
recently ceased to be one?”). The non-presupposing interpretation is preferred over the 
presupposing one. In explicit ignorance contexts the presupposition of change of state verbs fail 
to arise. When looking at the example in (12), one can see that this does not hold for 
presuppositions triggered by again. 
 # I don’t know if Anna scored before, but perhaps she’s scoring again. 
The ability of projection of the presupposition trigger again is still there in example 
(12), although the first part of the sentence asserts explicit ignorance. This causes the oddness 
of the sentence. When looking at scalar implicatures as in (13) one can see that the 
presupposition behaves similarly to implicatures in certain environments. In (13) the scalar 
implicature (that John has three children and not more) is canceled by the second conjunct. 
 John has three children and may have more for all I know. 
Simon (2001) observed that some presuppositions behave similarly and thus takes this 
as an argument for their pragmatic status. Another parallelism between presuppositions and 
implicatures that Simons observed is nondetachability. The examples in (15a-d) illustrate that 
implicatures do not arise because of specific lexical expressions, but they are caused by 
pragmatic reasoning. All the examples in (15) convey the implicature that Sonja does not want 
to go out for a drink. 
 Tom: Do you want to go out for a drink? 
  a.   Sonja: I have to finish writing my paper. 
b.   Sonja: I need to finish my paper. 
c.   Sonja: My paper needs to get finished tonight. 
d.   Sonja: I have to work on my paper. 
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By definition conversational implicatures are not conventionally associated with any 
expression. According to Simons (2001) the example in (16) illustrates that the same holds for 
change of state verbs and factives because the presupposition is not tied to a single lexical 
expression, but to the content expressed in the sentence. The synonyms in (16) give rise to the 
same presupposition, namely that Tom was a fool. That synonyms give rise to the same 
presupposition strongly suggests that presuppositions of change of state verbs and of factives 
are attached to the content and not to the lexical item itself.  
 Tom didn’t realize / come to know / become aware of that he was a fool. 
Contextual defeasibility and nondetachability are observations that brings Simons 
(2001) to the conclusion that presuppositions triggered by factives and change of state verbs 
have a conversational source and thus are pragmatic in nature. 
Further evidence for a pragmatic source of presuppositions comes from Abrusán (2011). 
According to her analysis, factive verbs, change of state predicates, emotives, and achievement 
verbs trigger presuppositions which are determined by the cognitive language system in a 
bottom-up process. This process determines which entailments of a sentence are not about the 
same time interval as the main clause predicate. Abrusán (2011) argues that it is precisely these 
entailments which end up as being presupposed. 
The crucial point in this assumption is that this process can only operate over sentence 
entailments and therefore the presupposition of a sentence can only be determined after the 
sentence’s truth conditions are established. For the processing of presuppositions this means 
that presupposition processing can only succeed the processing of the asserted meaning. An 
immediate processing of presuppositions already on the trigger is therefore impossible 
according to this pragmatic view. 
In the semantic and pragmatic literature, there is still a controversial debate about how 
presupposition arise (“the triggering problem”). One question that has arisen is whether there 
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actually is the need for a separate concept of presuppositions or whether the issue is better 
understood in terms of what is at-issue or raises attention versus what is non-at-issue/in the 
background (Abrusán, 2011; Tonhauser, Beaver, & Degen, 2018). Additionally, there is still an 
ongoing debate of how presupposition triggers can be classified and whether it is possible to 
make uniform predictions for all triggers or whether they have to be treated separately. 
2.3 (Anti-) uniqueness expectations of (in-) definite determiners 
The definite determiner is a classic example for a presupposition trigger. It introduces 
the presupposition of existence and uniqueness as can be seen in (17a). There exists a unique 
individual that has the property of the noun the definite determiner combines with, in this case 
the property of being the mother of the soccer coach. 
 a.    The mother of the soccer coach arrived at the stadium. 
b. # A mother of the soccer coach arrived at the stadium. 
c. A brother of the soccer coach arrived at the stadium. 
The theoretical literature claims that definite determiners have to be used if their presupposition 
is fulfilled by the context. (17b) shows that it is infelicitous to use the indefinite determiner in 
those contexts. As can be seen in (17c) using the indefinite determiner gives rise to the 
assumption that there exists more than one brother and thus the indefinite determiner is 
associated with anti-uniqueness.  
There are various theories explaining this effect. Following Kratzer (2005), the indefinite 
determiner comes with its own presupposition of anti-uniqueness (see also the discussion in 
Heim, 1991, 2011). Consequently, both determiners introduce their own restrictions on what is 
regarded as an appropriate context and thus they should not differ in processing. 
However, this attempt cannot explain why the indefinite determiner is inappropriate in 
contexts where it is common knowledge that the uniqueness-presupposition is met as in (17a). 
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Furthermore, Heim (1991) observed that the indefinite determiner in (18) can be uttered without 
being certain that there is more than one 20-ft-long catfish. The utterance is felicitous as long 
as the speaker is not sure that there is exactly one such catfish. 
 Robert caught a 20-ft-long catfish. 
To account for the anti-uniqueness effect in (17b and c) and the felicity of (18), Heim 
(1991) proposed to add another principle to Grice’s (1975) conversational maxims: Maximize 
Presupposition. This principle says: Presuppose as much as possible! (see also Chemla, 2009; 
Percus, 2006; Sauerland, 2008; Schlenker, 2012). It requires the speaker to always use the 
felicitous sentence with the strongest presupposition among a set of alternatives, as long as the 
speaker knows that these presuppositions are fulfilled. This can explain the oddness of the 
indefinite determiner in the example in (17b). The sentence in (17a) is an alternative, because 
the only difference is the used determiner. The definite determiner in (17a) introduces more 
presuppositions that are true in the context (since we know that people have a unique mother) 
and thus is the presuppositionally stronger alternative. When the speaker utters the 
presupositionally weaker sentence (17b), the listener assumes that the speaker must believe the 
presupposition of the stronger alternative to be false. This assumption is based on two 
prerequisites: First, the speaker obeys the conversational maxims including the Maximize 
Presupposition principle and second, the speaker is cooperative. Is this the case, the hearer can 
assume that if the speaker believed the presupposition of (17a) to be true s/he would have 
uttered this sentence because it triggers more presuppositions (existence and uniqueness). Since 
the speaker did not do that, s/he must believe that those presuppositions do not hold. This leads 
to the belief that the soccer coach has more than one mother, which is contrary to common 
knowledge and thus results in the oddness of (17b).  
As pointed out by the explanation of the oddness that arises in example (17b), the anti-
uniqueness of the indefinite determiner arises by considering the stronger alternative of the 
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definite determiner and a subsequent negation of its presupposition. This leads to the conclusion 
that the inferences that arise based on Maximize Presupposition are not presuppositions proper. 
Rather, they are referred to as anti-presuppositions in the literature (Percus, 2006). Following 
this approach, deriving the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite determiner is a two-step 
process. This process involves an initial consideration of the stronger alternative (the 
uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner) and its subsequent negation. 
Consequently, the processing of the indefinite determiner should be more complex than the 
processing of the definite determiner. 
An alternative theory regards the indefinite determiner as a scalar implicature because 
it is in competition with other quantificational terms like every or all (Chierchia, Fox, & 
Spector, 2012; Grønn & Sӕbø, 2012). The indefinite determiner and the quantificational terms 
can be ordered on a lexical scale (Horn, 1972). A scalar implicature arises when the speaker 
choses a weaker item from that scale (in this case the indefinite determiner). Assuming that the 
speaker obeys the conversational maxims and that s/he is cooperative, all items that are higher 
in the scale (and are thus stronger alternatives) become negated. For example, the implicature 
of “A girl scored” is that “Not all girls scored”. The competition of alternatives is on the level 
of assertion (not on the presuppositional level according to Maximize Presupposition). 
According to Magri (2009), the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite determiner is an 
implicature and follows from the general mechanism of exhaustification over alternatives (see 
also Schlenker, 2012; Singh, 2011). Following this approach, a faster processing of the 
indefinite compared to the definite determiner is predicted because implicatures are assumed to 
be processed faster than presuppositions (see Bill, Romoli, & Schwarz, 2018). 
In my own experimental investigation, I will focus on the anti-uniqueness account based 
on the Maximize Presupposition principle. Only Study 4 took the two other explanations into 
consideration. 
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 Important experimental results 
In the following section, I focus on four different important results regarding 
presupposition processing. I will briefly introduce general experimental methods and then 
elaborate on the results. Briefly, the four results of special interest for the present dissertation 
are: 
(I) Presupposition triggers induce additional processing costs compared to neutral 
words. Following a semantic approach, the presupposition is encoded in the lexical entry of the 
trigger itself. This additional meaning component has to be processed and this process causes 
processing costs. Therefore, the processing of presupposition triggers is more difficult than the 
processing of non-trigger words. Furthermore, due to the direct encoding in the trigger itself, 
processing of presuppositions starts immediately on the trigger. 
Presuppositions vary according to the present context. When the context supports the 
presupposition, a verification process has been successful. This verification process is started 
as soon as the presupposition is fully known. A failure of the verification process leads to 
additional processing costs, for example, in case of definite determiners a memory search for a 
corresponding referent has to be terminated without success. (II) Presupposition failure is 
more demanding than verification.  
Frege’s (1892) analysis of the definite determiner suggests that it comes with the 
presuppositions of existence and uniqueness, while indefinite determiners have none. As 
mentioned in section 2.3. there are different theoretical approaches towards the (anti-) 
uniqueness of the (in)definite determiner and their processing. In the following, experimental 
evidence is provided that shows a difference in processing between the definite and the 
indefinite determiner. (III) The processing of the definite and the indefinite determiner 
differs. 
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If the context neither supports the presupposition nor directly falsifies it, a rescue 
strategy is applied. In order to make sense of the sentence, the context gets updated with the 
information conveyed by the presupposition. This strategy is called accommodation. In case 
accommodation takes place, the process is even more demanding than the verification of a 
presupposition or the failure of this process. (IV) Accommodation of presuppositions is even 
more demanding than verification or falsification. 
 
3.1 Experimental methods  
In this overview, I will focus on four methodological approaches. In the following 
paragraph, I will briefly introduce the general approach of the different experimental methods 
and I will describe particular experiments providing evidence for the mentioned effects. 
 
3.1.1 Acceptability ratings 
Acceptability ratings of sentences in a given context offer a straightforward way to 
measure a core feature of presuppositions, namely that people take their content for granted. 
Therefore, participants have to read a context sentence and a test sentence and have to rate the 
appropriateness of the test sentence according to the presented context. This procedure is easy 
to carry out without much technical effort. It is a useful way to find out more about the 
relationship between presupposition triggers and context. It is often used and combined with 
other methods to get insight into the way participants understand the test sentences and to verify 
that participants interpret the sentences in the intended way. However, one can only get data 
about the final interpretation of a sentence (off-line) and no measures that can give insight in 
the time course of processing (on-line). 
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3.1.2 Reaction times 
Reaction time measures are frequently used to investigate comprehension processes. In 
psycholinguistics such measures are used to examine the relative time-course of a process. 
According to Rayner and Clifton (2002, p. 3), reaction time (RT) is defined as “the interval 
between the presentation of a stimulus and the onset of the subject’s subsequent response”. 
Nowadays, RTs are measured with a high degree of precision (e.g., in milliseconds). When 
examining the reader’s comprehension of sentences, characteristics of a text are manipulated 
and participants are instructed to read the sentence while reading times are recorded. In those 
experiments, participants are instructed to read a sentence or a whole paragraph while the 
elapsed time is recorded. With this method, researchers can infer selected attributes of 
comprehension processes.  
Sometimes overall reading times of a sentence are too imprecise, because one is 
interested in the time a subject takes to read a particular segment of a text. Then self-paced 
reading is applied. The self-paced reading paradigm goes back to Just, Carpenter, and Woolley 
(1982). Participants are instructed to read sentences and they can control via button presses the 
exposure duration of single segments of the sentence (the experimenter defines those segments 
in advance according to the experimental goal). The latencies of the button presses depend on 
the properties of the words being read and correlate with the time course of the cognitive 
processes during reading and text comprehension. The so-called moving-window technique is 
widely used in psycholinguistics and was identified to most closely resemble natural reading 
while measuring reading times for single words/sections is possible. In a moving-window self-
paced reading experiment, the test sentence is first displayed as a series of dashes on the screen, 
with each dash representing a word in the sentence. The length of the dashes correlates with the 
word length. When the participant first presses a button, the first word appears on the screen 
replacing the corresponding dash. Subsequent button pressing causes the previous word to 
disappear and to be replaced by a dash while the current word appears on the screen. Only one 
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word (or phrase) is visible at any given time, thus creating the impression of a moving window 
of words on the screen. Contrary to natural reading, regressions to previous words are 
impossible. Self-paced reading times help to get insight into the time course of processing of 
the interpretation of presuppositions, but on a coarse-grained level. In general, reading times in 
self-paced reading are slower than those in natural reading (according to Rayner & Clifton, 
2002, about the double time), which can facilitate the development of alternative 
comprehension strategies compared to natural reading. 
3.1.3 Eye-tracking 
Eye-tracking can be a more fine-grained method to study online processing, and is 
often used in combination with self-paced reading. It involves tracking of eye-movements and 
it is a non-invasive, sensitive tool that quantifies and measures eye-movements to describe an 
individual’s cognitive state. Findings by Rayner and Clifton (2002) reflect that the point at 
which readers look and the time they spend looking at a specific point is directly related to the 
difficulty of cognitive processing. Eye-movement data can be used to investigate lexical 
ambiguity, morphological complexity, or discourse processing. 
3.1.4 Electroencephalogram (EEG) 
In the past 40 years, electrophysiological measures have been developed to investigate 
cognitive processes and to get insight into the time course of cognitive activity within the brain. 
The fact that transmission of information in the brain involves the flow of ions is used to 
measure electrical activities of the brain. When ions flow across a neural membrane, a voltage 
field around each active neuron results. During invasive intracranial recordings the activity of 
a single neuron can be monitored. Furthermore, the electrical fields around neighboring neurons 
also produce a field that can be detected further away, even as far away as the scalp. 
The voltage fluctuation that is produced by a large population of neurons can be 
recorded by scalp electrodes. The recordings trace the voltage across time which is known as 
electroencephalogram (EEG). Any given tracing reflects the differences in electric potential 
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(i.e., voltage) between two recording sites. With developing computer technologies, it became 
possible to estimate the activity time-locked to a certain point, for example, the stimulus onset. 
Therefore, the electrical potential over a number of trails is averaged, the so-called event-
related potential (ERP). A major advantage is the more direct examination of the time course 
of language comprehension within the brain itself. A high amount of data makes it possible to 
track processes throughout the course of a sentence within a single subject. With appropriate 
stimulus material and coding, one can examine more than one issue within a single study. On 
the other hand, it is hard to identify what the direct source of the ERP activity is and which 
cognitive process is responsible. Furthermore, the interpretation of ERP can be complicated 
because multiple ERP components can occur in the same latency range. Another problem 
occurs during recording the EEG. Only little motor activity for the subject is possible because 
eye movements, activity of facial muscles, or tongue movements produce their own electrical 
artifacts that influence the EEG recording. This means that participants should stay relatively 
still during the recording which makes it more unnatural. 
Having introduced general experimental methods that are used to investigate the 
processing of presuppositions, I will present four major experimental results that are of interest 
for the present dissertation in more detail. 
3.2 Effect 1: Presupposition processing starts immediately on the trigger 
and is more difficult compared to neutral words 
The processing of presuppositions starts immediately on the word triggering the 
presupposition. This leads to additional processing costs for trigger words compared to neutral 
words. 
3.2.1 Reading times 
Tiemann et al. (2011) investigated the processing of presuppositions in a series of three 
self-paced reading experiments combined with acceptability ratings. They analyzed the 
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processing of presuppositions induced by different triggers (German wieder (‘again’), auch 
(‘also’), aufhören (‘stop’), wissen (‘know’), and definites in the shape of possessive noun 
phrases). In their first experiment, the focus was on the trigger itself and reading times of test 
sentences including a presupposition trigger (e.g., (19a)) were compared to grammatical 
sentences without a presupposition (e.g., (19b)), and with ungrammatical sentences (e.g., 
(19c)). 
 Context: Tina ist mit einer guten Freundin shoppen. 
Tina is shopping with a good friend. 
a. Sie kauft wieder rote Handschuhe. 
   She buys red gloves again. 
b. Sie kauft heute rote Handschuhe. 
   She buys red gloves today. 
c. *Sie kauft freundlich rote Handschuhe. 
   She buys red gloves friendly. 
The grammatical sentences without a presupposition were rated best, the sentences 
including the presupposition trigger were rated slightly worse, pointing to the fact that 
accommodation has to take place and the unacceptable sentences were rated worst. The reading 
times revealed that for the position of the trigger (or the corresponding neutral/unacceptable 
word), the trigger condition induced the longest reading times followed by the neutral condition 
and the unacceptable condition evoked the shortest reading times. This suggests that the trigger 
needs more attention because it alerts the reader to look back at the preceding context. The early 
effects support the idea of an immediate processing of presuppositions starting on the trigger 
itself. Unfortunately, reading times were not analyzed for individual presupposition triggers, as 
there were not enough items for each trigger to allow for strong conclusions. It is thus unclear 
whether the same pattern holds for all triggers.  
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Schwarz (2007) also reports self-paced reading results for the trigger also for both German and 
English. The presupposition was either satisfied or unsatisfied within the presented sentence. 
The data revealed longer reading times on the region containing also in the latter case. 
3.2.2 Eye-tracking 
Bade and Schwarz (2019b) provide further evidence for an immediate processing of 
presuppositions with a visual-world eye-tracking study in a picture selection task. Participants 
were instructed to identify an individual called Benjamin after they heard an auditorily 
presented test sentence like “The/A shirt in Benjamin’s closet is blue.” They had to select one 
of three pictures all of which depicted a boy with a closet. In one of the pictures the closet 
contained three shirts, one of which was blue (non-unique condition). Another picture showed 
only one blue shirt (unique condition), and in the third picture (distractor condition) no shirt 
was depicted. The results show that participants looked at the respective target picture (picture 
with a single shirt for the definite determiner, and picture with multiple shirts for the indefinite 
determiner) very early on upon hearing the noun. This suggests that the information about 
uniqueness or anti-uniqueness encoded in the determiners was used rapidly for interpretation 
of the test sentence, already while hearing the determiner itself. 
Further evidence for an immediate integration with the discourse context was provided 
by Schwarz and Tiemann (2012). Sentences in German with the trigger wieder (‘again’), in 
contexts that either are or are not consistent with its presupposition showed slowdowns in the 
earliest fixation measures (e.g., first fixation duration, first pass regression proportion) of the 
verb that immediately follows again, supporting the idea of immediate processing starting on 
the trigger.  
 
3.2.3 EEG 
Further support for an immediate processing of presupposition triggers comes from EEG 
studies by Kirsten et al. (2014). They investigated the processing of definite and indefinite 
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determiners in two types of context sentences (see (20 a) and b)): either introducing a single 
object (e.g., one polar bear) or multiple objects (e.g., some polar bears). The test sentences were 
similar except for used determiner (the/a, see (21a) or b)) and they were presented either in a 
matching condition where the context sentence introduced the noun phrase with a quantifier 
“ein/e” (Engl.: “a”) or in the mismatching condition which contained a quantifier such as 
“einige” (Engl.: “some”) or “viele” (Engl.: “many”).  
 a. Antje war gestern im Zoo in Düsseldorf und besuchte einen Eisbären im  
    Bärengehege. 
    Antje visited the Düsseldorf zoo yesterday and saw a polar  
    bear in the bear enclosure. 
b. Antje war gestern im Zoo in Düsseldorf und besuchte einige Eisbären im  
    Bärengehege. 
    Antje visited the Düsseldorf zoo yesterday and saw some polar bears in the  
    bear enclosure. 
 
 a. Antje beobachtete, dass der Eisbär sehr aggressiv war. 
    Antje noticed that the polar bear was very aggressive. 
b. Antje beobachtete, dass ein Eisbär sehr aggressiv war. 
     Antje noticed that a polar bear was very aggressive. 
The data revealed that participants recognized the mismatching condition already when 
reading the determiner. For the indefinite determiner, the mismatching effect became visible 
within the N400 and the P600 time window. The N400 was interpreted as a semantic mismatch 
(Kutas, Van Petten, & Kluender, 2006) and the P600 as an index for a subsequent reanalysis 
process (Kuperberg, 2007; Van de Meerendonk, Kolk, Vissers, & Chwilla, 2008). Due to the 
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early effects, Kirsten et al. (2014) concluded that presupposition processing begins as soon as 
the presupposition trigger is perceived. 
Furthermore, general differences between the definite and the indefinite determiner 
were observed, namely that the definite determiner evoked an enhanced negativity compared 
to the indefinite. Burkhardt’s (2006) ERP study further supports the idea of early processing of 
presuppositions by revealing an N400 effect on the trigger position when the existence 
presupposition of the definite determiner was not satisfied. 
 
3.3 Effect 2: Presupposition failure is costly 
Failure of the verification process leads to additional processing cost: infelicitous use is 
more difficult than felicitous use. 
3.3.1 Reading times 
Although Altmann and Steedman (1988) wanted to test Frazier's (1978) Minimal 
Attachment Hypothesis, their results turn out to be very relevant for a theory of presupposition 
processing. In a self-paced reading study, they investigated how sentences with a definite 
determiner are processed if the uniqueness-presupposition is not satisfied and they observed 
effects before the end of the sentence. Test sentences were presented in two different contexts. 
Context 1 (see (22)) introduced two candidates as referent (a safe with a new lock and a safe 
with an old lock) while Context 2 (see (23)) introduced exactly one candidate as referent (a safe 
with a new lock). 
 Context 1: A burglar broke into a bank carrying some dynamite. He planned to 
blow open a safe. Once inside he saw that there was a safe with a new lock and 
a safe with an old lock. 
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 Context 2: A burglar broke into a bank carrying some dynamite. He planned to 
blow open a safe. Once inside he saw that there was a safe with a new lock and 
a strongbox with an old lock. 
In the test sentences in (24), the prepositional phrase with the new lock modified the safe 
and therefore the uniqueness-presupposition is satisfied even if the sentence is presented in a 
context like (21), whereas this is not the case for the test sentence in (25). The test sentence in 
(24) can only refer to the single safe mentioned in the context in (23) otherwise (in context (22)) 
the reader does not know which safe was blown open. 
 The burglar / blew open / the safe / with the new lock / and made off / with the 
loot. 
 The burglar / blew open / the safe / with the dynamite / and made off / with the 
loot. 
The results of this experiment revealed that reading times differed during the 
disambiguating region (i.e., the prepositional phrase with the new lock or with the dynamite). 
Test sentences with an unsatisfied uniqueness-presupposition as in (25) were read slower than 
test sentences in (24). Thus, when the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner is 
not satisfied people experience processing difficulties quite early, that is before the end of the 
sentence. However, the experiment showed that participants did not determine the unsatisfied 
presupposition immediately on the trigger itself. It seems as if the processing of the 
presupposition is delayed until later. This could be an artefact of the experimental design 
because during the experiment a strategy of a delayed presupposition verification turned out to 
be useful since it was always the case that the presupposition verification was possible at the 
region following the noun phrase. If this was not the case earlier effects already on the trigger 
itself could be expected. Nevertheless, the experiment revealed that unsatisfied presuppositions 
cause processing difficulties. 
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 Van Berkum, Brown, Hagoort, and Zwitserlood (1999) also investigated referentially 
ambiguous noun phrases and observed early effects when the uniqueness-presupposition was 
not met. Later on, they replicated their findings with an EEG study and did not observe a 
delayed verification of the presupposition as Altmann and Steedman (1988) did.  
Tiemann et al.’s (2011) second experiment focused on the verification process of 
presuppositions. Their design made it possible to compare the same test sentence under a 
verified and a falsified presupposition and found increased reading times in case of unsatisfied 
presuppositions. Two different context sentences (see (26) and (27)) were paired each with two 
test sentences (a and b) in such a way that the presupposition of the test sentence was verified 
(see (26a) and (27a)) or falsified (see (26b) and (27b)) by the corresponding context. In case 
the presupposition was verified by the first context it was falsified by the second context or vice 
versa.  
 Context: Susanne hat dieses Jahr bereits rote Handschuhe gekauft. 
Susanne has already bought red gloves this year.  
a. Heute hat Susanne wieder rote Handschuhe gekauft und sie gleich angezogen. 
Today, Susanne bought red gloves again and put them on right away.  
b. Heute hat Susanne wieder keine roten Handschuhe gekauft und ärgert sich. 
Today, Susanne didn’t buy red gloves again and is very upset.  
 
 Context: Susanne hat bisher nie rote Handschuhe gekauft. 
Susanne had never bought red gloves until now.  
a. Heute hat Susanne wieder keine roten Handschuhe gekauft und ärgert sich. 
Today, Susanne didn’t buy red gloves again and is very upset. 
b. Heute hat Susanne wieder rote Handschuhe gekauft und sie gleich angezogen. 
Today, Susanne bought red gloves again and put them on right away. 
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The data revealed higher ratings in the verifying than in the falsifying condition. The 
reading times on the critical word (the region where the presupposition is known) were 
significantly longer in the falsifying compared to the verifying condition. This indicates that a 
verification process is started as soon as the content of the presupposition is known and that it 
takes longer in case this process does not succeed. 
Further evidence for presuppositions triggered by auch (Engl.: ‘too’) comes from 
Schwarz (2007). He observed that reading times were slower in contexts that did not satisfy the 
presupposition compared to contexts that satisfied it.  
3.3.2 EEG 
Van Berkum, Brown, and Hagoort (2003) replicated previous findings by van Berkum 
et al. (1999) with two event related potential (ERP) studies and auditory stimuli. The data 
revealed that definite noun phrases evoked early ERP effects when the uniqueness-
presupposition was not met. In both experiments, they presented discourses that either 
introduced a unique referent (one salient girl as in (28a)) or multiple referents (two equally 
salient girls as in (29a)). In the test sentence, a particular noun phrase (e.g., the girl) either 
uniquely referred to a single referent mentioned in the discourse before (see (28b)) or to one of 
the two introduced referents (see (29b)). Only after the disambiguating relative clause („…that 
had been on the phone… “) it becomes clear which referent is meant. 
 a.  David had told the boy and the girl to clean up their room before lunchtime.  
     But the boy had stayed in bed all morning and the girl had been on the  
     phone all the time.  
b. David told the girl that had been on the phone to hang up. 
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 a. David had told the two girls to clean up their room before lunchtime. But  
     one of the girls had stayed in bed all morning and the other girl had been on  
     the phone all the time.  
b. David told the girl that had been on the phone to hang up. 
In both experiments, the definite noun phrase evoked early ERP effects when the 
uniqueness-presupposition was not met. Those effects arose already on the noun girl. Therefore, 
van Berkum et al. (2003) suggested that referential ambiguity is detected very early during 
sentence processing. From a pragmatic point of view, this can also be interpreted as unsatisfied 
presuppositions of definite determiners that lead to early effects in ERP. In contrast the data 
reported by Altmann and Steedman (1988), the processing of the presupposition was not 
delayed, but instead participants verified the presupposition in the context as early as they 
heard/read the noun, although they knew that there were also sentences where the unsatisfied 
presupposition was resolved by the following discourse. The ERP data suggests that the 
presupposition of the definite determiner (the) is checked as soon as possible and does not 
depend on the following discourse. Furthermore, the data shows that people realize the 
presupposition failure of a definite noun phrase immediately on the noun phrase itself and that 
this process is more difficult than the verification of the presupposition. 
Additional evidence from ERP studies comes from Burkhardt (2006). A test sentence 
with a definite noun phrase (like in (31)) was presented in different contexts that either explicitly 
introduced the mentioned individual (given condition, see (30a)), made it easy to infer the 
mentioned individual (bridged condition, see (30b)) or made it impossible to infer the 
mentioned individual (new condition, see (30c)). The given condition explicitly satisfies the 
existence presupposition of the definite determiner, while this is not the case for the other two 
conditions (although it can be easily inferred in the bridged condition). 
 a. Tobias visited a conductor in Berlin. 
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b. Tobias visited a concert in Berlin. 
c. Tobias talked to Nina. 
 He said that the conductor was very impressive. 
The ERP data revealed an N400 in the new condition, while this effect was less 
pronounced in the bridged condition. The results are parallel to van Berkum et al. (2003) and 
support the idea that when the existence presupposition of the definite determiner is not given, 
an N400 emerges. In cases where the relevant individual can be easily inferred, the effect is less 
strong.  
Furthermore, Burkhardt (2006) found a late positive effect (P600) in the new and in the 
bridged condition, but not in the given condition. This can be interpreted as a full integration of 
the respective discourse units at this point. The independent discourse referent is already 
identified to be stored and maintained in discourse representation. From a pragmatic point of 
view, this could be regarded as presupposition accommodation. 
Results observed by Kirsten et al. (2014) revealed further evidence for additional 
processing costs in case of infelicitously used determiners in a word-by-word reading 
experiment. Their EEG data revealed that participants recognized the mismatching condition 
already when reading the determiner. The infelicitous use of the determiners resulted in an 
N400 which is interpreted as an index for a semantic mismatch, followed by a P600 (after noun 
onset). The authors interpreted the P600 as the evaluation of possible alternative sentence 
interpretations. 
Hertrich et al. (2015) used similar text material as Kirsten et al. (2014), but presented 
the stimuli auditorily via headphones and conducted cross-correlated analysis of 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) signals. Furthermore, Hertrich et al. (2015) also investigated 
the existence presupposition of the definite determiner and the novelty assumption of the 
indefinite determiner. They additionally constructed contexts that introduced a single item (e.g., 
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“somebody has a house”) or a non-existing item (e.g., “somebody has no house”) and combined 
it with test sentences that either referred to an existing item (existence presupposition of the 
definite determiner as in “Somebody painted the house”) or introduced a new item with an 
existence-creating verb (novelty presupposition of the indefinite determiner as in “Somebody 
built a house”). The combination of the definite determiner in contexts introducing a single item 
or the indefinite determiner in the non-existing contexts resulted in matching conditions. By 
contrast the combination of the definite determiner in the non-existing condition resulted in 
mismatching condition (same for the indefinite determiner in the existing context). The 
acceptability rating yielded low acceptability ratings in the mismatching conditions. The MEG 
data revealed context-matching effects as early as 50ms after syllable onset following the 
presupposition trigger. In the mismatching condition the latencies for the M50c deflection were 
larger compared to the matching condition. The authors interpreted this observation as an 
indicator for an inhibition of automized phonological/lexical processes in cases where discourse 
coherence is violated. Furthermore, there was a bi-phasic time course of alpha suppression in 
mismatching conditions visible which might reflect an immediate processing of the 
presupposition trigger and a subsequent semantic re-interpretation due to the discourse 
incoherence. This re-interpretation does not take place in the matching conditions and thus the 
infelicitous use of determiners comes with additional processing costs (see also Jouravlev et al., 
2016, for evidence for the trigger again).  
 
3.4 Effect 3: Indefinite determiners are more difficult in processing than 
definite determiners 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, there are several possible explanations, how the anti-
uniqueness of the indefinite determiner arises. The experimental literature provides evidence 
for the anti-presupposition account which suggests that while a sentence with a definite 
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determiner presupposes uniqueness directly, the anti-uniqueness of the indefinite determiner 
arises only indirectly. According to the Maximize Presupposition principle (Heim 1991) anti-
uniqueness results in a two steps: (i) the evaluation of the uniqueness-presupposition of the 
definite determiner and (ii) the subsequent negation of exactly this presupposition. This means 
that encountering an indefinite determiner is associated with additional processing costs 
compared to the evaluation of the definite determiner through the additional step of negating 
the uniqueness-presupposition. 
3.4.1 Reading times 
One of the first studies investigating the processing of references was run by Murphy 
(1984), in which participants read stories sentence by sentence. In his first experiment, he 
focused on the novelty aspect of indefinite determiners and compared noun phrases in contexts 
that only differed with regard to the used determiner (definite vs. indefinite determiner; e.g., 
“Later, George was passed by a/the truck, too”). The reading times of the indefinite determiner 
were significantly longer than those of the definite determiner, supporting the idea that finding 
an antecedent for a definite reference is easier than establishing a new referent in the discourse 
model. The effect was replicated in his second experiment that used pronouns (e.g., “Sandy 
rode a bicycle and I rode it, too.” vs. “Sandy rode a bicycle and I rode one, too.”) and contrasted 
the indefinite pronoun “one” with the appropriate definite pronoun.  
Further evidence was provided by Clifton (2013) who reported in two of four experiments 
more processing difficulties for indefinite than for definite determiners. Participants were 
presented with context sentences that established whether there are one or multiple of the 
relevant items (e.g., “In the kitchen …” vs. “In the appliance store…”) and the following test 
sentence contained either a definite or an indefinite determiner (“The stove…” vs. “A 
stove…”). Reading times in contexts that stereotypically provided a single possible referent for 
the definite determiner phrase or multiple possible referents for an indefinite determiner phrase 
were shorter than when context and type of determiner did not match (e.g., definite determiner 
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in a context providing multiple items). It is noteworthy that these results were only obtained 
when participants were required to perform an additional simple arithmetic task in between 
reading the sentence and answering a question about it (Exp. 2 and 4). By this additional task, 
Clifton forced the participants to comprehend the sentence to a deeper level, because he 
prevented rehearsing the sentence until the question was presented. 
3.4.2 Eye-tracking 
The idea of an anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite determiner arising in a two-
step process based on Maximize Presupposition is supported by an eye-tracking experiment of 
Bade and Schwarz (2019b). These authors observed differences between both determiners in a 
picture selection task. Participants heard test sentences like “A/the shirt in Benjamin’s closet is 
blue” and saw three different pictures of a boy with a closet. Participants were asked to choose 
the picture they thought was corresponding to the sentence, and indeed they looked at the 
respective target picture (picture with a single shirt for the definite determiner, and picture with 
multiple shirts for the indefinite determiner) very early on upon hearing the noun. Inferences 
based on the use of the indefinite determiner were drawn to a much lesser degree than those 
evoked by the use of the definite determiner, as demonstrated by fewer target choices for the 
indefinite than for the definite determiner. Further differences between the determiners were 
observed in eye-tracking patterns for the cases where the target was chosen.  
 
3.4.3 EEG 
Kirsten et al. (2014) additionally revealed general differences between the definite and 
the indefinite determiner, namely that the definite determiner evoked an enhanced negativity 
compared to the indefinite determiner. Test sentences either used a definite or an indefinite 
determiner and both were combined with context sentences that either satisfied the uniqueness-
presupposition of the definite determiner or left it unsatisfied. The data suggest that the 
3. Important experimental results 
31 
underlying processes between the two determiners differ. Similar results were obtained in an 
MEG study with auditorily presented test sentences (Hertrich et al., 2015). 
 
3.5 Effect 4: Presupposition accommodation is demanding 
The accommodation process of presuppositions starts as soon as the content of the 
presupposition is known and is more demanding than the verification of presuppositional 
content. 
3.5.1 Reading times 
Haviland and Clark (1974) provided evidence for processing costs of accommodation. 
They investigated the comprehension of sentences introducing a new item in comparison to 
already known information. In a reading experiment participants were instructed to read 
sentences in different contexts. The target sentence always contained a definite noun phrase. In 
one condition the context explicitly mentioned the existence of the noun phrase (see (32a)), 
while this was not the case in the second condition (see (33a)).  
 Direct Antecedent 
a. Context: We got some beer out of the trunk. 
b. Target sentence: The beer was warm. 
 Indirect Antecedent 
a. Context: We checked the picnic supplies. 
b. Target sentence: The beer was warm. 
Participants were instructed to press a button as soon as they understood what the target 
sentence means. As predicted, the comprehension time of the target sentences in the direct 
antecedent condition was faster than the comprehension time in the indirect antecedent 
condition, because in the direct antecedent condition there is a direct referent available in the 
memory. This is not the case in the indirect antecedent condition. The listener searches the 
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memory for a suitable referent, but this process fails and the new information has to be 
integrated into the memory. To comprehend the sentence, it is necessary to accommodate the 
new information which takes additional time. With a second experiment, they excluded the 
possibility of a facilitating effect of repetition and observed the same results. In a third 
experiment, they replicated the results with other presupposition triggers including still, either, 
again, and too. 
Domaneschi and Di Paola (2018) also investigated processing of presupposition 
accommodation in a self-paced reading experiment. While one context satisfied the 
presupposition, another one was neutral towards the presupposition. Besides definite 
descriptions, they included change of state verbs, iterative expressions and focal particles in the 
experiment (conducted in Italian). They observed longer self-paced reading times already on 
the presupposition trigger in contexts where the presupposition is not yet known. Furthermore, 
they concluded that accommodation is more difficult than satisfaction across triggers.  
 
3.6 Summary 
In the present chapter, I introduced important experimental methods that are used to 
investigate presupposition processing. So far, acceptability ratings, reading time experiments, 
eye-tracking studies, and EEG experiments were used to investigate presupposition processing. 
For this dissertation, four experimental results are of special interest: First of all, the processing 
of presuppositions starts immediately, which means already on the trigger. This leads to 
additional processing costs for presupposition triggers compared to neutral words. Second, 
failure of the verification process of the presupposition content leads to additional processing 
cost and thus infelicitously used presupposition triggers evoke additional processing difficulties 
compared to felicitously used ones. Third, processing indefinite determiners is more difficult 
than processing definite determiners, because the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite 
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determiner arises in two steps which involve considering the uniqueness-presupposition of the 
definite determiner in its first step and its subsequent negation in a second step. Finally, the 
accommodation of the presuppositional content starts as soon as it is known and this process is 
more difficult than the verification of a presupposition. 
In the following chapter, I will introduce a paradigm from cognitive psychology: The 
Psychological Refractory Period approach. The combination of this paradigm and self-paced 
reading experiments made it possible to investigate the nature of cognitive processes involved 
in presupposition processing. 
 
 Psychological Refractory Period Paradigm 
The Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) approach has been widely used in cognitive 
psychology and has its origin in dual-task research (Pashler, 1984, 1994; Telford, 1931). In 
combination with the locus of slack-logic (going back to Schweickert, 1978) it is an accepted 
way to determine whether a process is automatic or requires limited capacities.  
In a PRP experiment, participants perform two independent tasks in each trial. The two 
tasks require separate responses (R1 and R2) that have to be given in a predetermined order. 
The critical manipulation is the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), the time between the two 
stimuli (S1 and S2). With a short SOA the two tasks temporally overlap, whereas with a long 
SOA there is no or only little temporal overlap. Typically, SOA has no (or only little) influence 
on the response time in Task 1 (RT1), but the response times in Task 2 (RT2) increase, when 
SOA decreases, thus reflecting dual-task interference. This is the so-called PRP effect (Telford, 
1931) which can be quantified as the difference between RT2 at the long and at the short SOA. 
Welford (1952) and Pashler (1994) explained this effect with the central bottleneck model 
(CBM) (see Figure 1 for an illustration). According to this model, a task is divided into three 
stages: i) a pre-central stage, ii) a central stage, and iii) a post-central stage (see Figure 1 (a)). 
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The pre-central stage has often been related to perceptual processing and the post-central stage 
to motor processing and execution. The core assumption of this model is that while the pre- and 
the post-central stage can be processed in parallel with other stages, only one central stage can 
be processed at any time because it is conceived capacity-limited and thus it constitutes a 
bottleneck. As a consequence, with a short SOA the central stage of Task 2 has to be postponed 
until the central stage of Task 1 is processed. The resulting waiting time is called cognitive slack 
and leads to an increase in the corresponding RT2. In case of a long SOA, there is no (or only 
little) cognitive slack, because the central stage of Task 1 is already processed and thus 
processing of Task 2 is not interrupted, resulting in shorter RT2s (see Figure 1 (a)). 
The PRP paradigm can be used to investigate at which stage of processing a certain RT 
effect emerges. One way to do so is using the locus of slack-logic (Schweickert, 1978). It allows 
to distinguish whether a particular process that is responsible for an RT effect can run in parallel 
before the bottleneck (in the pre-central stage) or whether this process runs in the central or 
post-central stage. In case the effect arises during the central stage and thus requires limited-
capacities, the effect becomes visible in RT2 at both long and short SOAs to the same degree.1 
Consequently, the manipulation (that affects the central stage of the second task) and SOA 
should combine additively (see Figure 1 (b)). In case the effect results from parallel processing 
during the pre-central stage, it can run in parallel to the central stage of Task 1 and thus it can 
already be processed even with a short SOA. Thus, the manipulation affects the pre-central 
stage and its effect on RT2 varies with SOA. With a sufficiently short SOA, the effect is 
absorbed in the cognitive slack and the expected difference between conditions in Task 2 cannot 
                                                 
 
1Strictly speaking, the same additive pattern is observed when the effect arises from the post-central motor 
stage. However, identifying whether the locus of the effect is in the central or post-central stage of processing is 
impossible with the introduced setting. In case it can be ruled out that the effect has its locus in the pre-central 
stage, the effect propagation-logic can be applied (e.g., Durst & Janczyk, 2018; Janczyk, Humphreys, & Sui, 2019; 
Miller & Reynolds, 2003). This logic allows to differentiate between the locus originating in the post-central stage 
or in an earlier stage. Combining those result makes it possible to identify the locus of the effect under investigate. 
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be observed any longer. In case of a long SOA, the central stage of Task 1 is already processed 
and there is no (or only little) cognitive slack. The processing of the effect prolongs RT2s and 
the RT effect between conditions in Task 2 becomes visible (see Figure 1(c)). Consequently, 
the manipulation and SOA interact underadditively. 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of the CBM (a) and the predictions of the locus of slack-logic (b) and (c). 
 
There also other approaches to explaining the PRP effect with other models than the 
CBM. For example, Navon and Miller (2002) and Tombu and Jolicoeur (2003) have suggested 
capacity sharing models that allow for parallel processing of the central stage. Their approach 
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also assumes a capacity-limitation: While parallel processing is possible, the available capacity 
must be divided between tasks leading to performance decrements in turn. Tombu and Jolicoeur 
(2003) determine the exact proportion by a sharing parameter in their model. When all capacity 
is first devoted to Task 1 processing, their model mimics the CBM. Nevertheless, predictions 
for Task 2 are similar to those made by CBM, even in less extreme scenarios. To reduce 
complexity, I derive and illustrate predictions only from the previously introduced CBM. The 
predictions that can be derived for the first task are indeed different depending on the applied 
model, but the main focus of the conducted experiments is on the performance of Task 2. 
These methods have been used in many studies on different topics, for example the 
origin of the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935). The Stroop effect means longer RTs in color naming 
the ink color in incongruent conditions (e.g., blue printed in red ink), compared to congruent 
condition (e.g., red printed in red ink). For instance, Fagot and Pashler (1992) concluded that 
the Stroop effect arises during the central stage of response selection and thus requires limited 
capacities. Piai, Roelofs, and Schriefers (2014) applied the locus of slack-logic to investigate 
picture-word interference (PWI) where participants are instructed to name the pictures and to 
ignore the distractor that can have a, for example, semantic or phonological relation to the word. 
A series of experiments revealed additive effects of SOA and stimulus type on picture naming 
RTs. The authors argued according to the observed data against a locus at the pre-central stage 
of the semantic interference (e.g., Ayora et al., 2011; Dell’Acqua, Job, Peressotti, & Pascali, 
2007).  
The automaticity of the learning process during study of implicit learning (artificial 
grammar learning; AGL) was investigated by Hendricks, Conway, and Kellogg (2013). In a 
dual-task setting they investigated the contribution of automatic and capacity-limited processes 
involved in AGL. According to the data, some aspects of learning in AGL are relatively 
automatic and therefore can run in parallel to the central stage of another task, but the expression 
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of grammatical information and the learning of grammatical patterns appear to require central 
capacities. 
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 Research questions 
In Chapter 3, I presented relevant literature concerning presupposition processing. In 
Chapter 4, the PRP method and its use in cognitive psychology was introduced. In the present 
chapter, I will motivate the three questions that were investigated the current dissertation. 
First of all, I compared processing of definite and indefinite determiners and 
investigated how the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite determiner arises. Secondly, I 
applied the PRP paradigm to delineate the nature cognitive processes required for 
presupposition processing, especially for presuppositions triggered by determiners. Due to the 
interdisciplinarity of the present research project, I decided to take an unconventional path and 
combined the PRP paradigm with self-paced reading. This novel approach made it possible to 
investigate the required capacities and it sheds light on the underlying processes involved in 
presupposition processing. Finally, I validated previous results with larger sample sizes and 
focused on the question when presupposition processing, especially triggered by determiners, 
takes place. With five experimental studies, I provided data that allow to preliminary answer 
these questions.  
The main question of the present dissertation was: What are the underlying processes 
of presupposition processing? This question can be broken down into three sub-questions: 
Q1: How does the anti-uniqueness interference of the indefinite determiner 
arise? 
Q2: What cognitive resources are involved during presupposition processing? 
Q3: When do presuppositions unfold their impact? 
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Figure 2 visualizes the interplay of the five studies and the sub-questions addressed in 
this dissertation. In the following chapter, I will summarize the five studies and their results. 
Figure 2: Illustration of the research questions and studies that provide evidence for each question. 
 
What are the underlying processes of presupposition processing? 
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 Studies 
 
6.1 Study 1: Anti-uniqueness of the indefinite determiner arises in two 
steps2 
In this study, I conducted two mouse-tracking experiments to compare processing of 
definite and indefinite determiners and to gather evidence for the anti-presupposition theory 
based on the Maximize Presupposition principle. 
Before going into detail about the present experiment, I will introduce the method of 
mouse-tracking in general. Hand movements have been shown to be very sensitive to reveal the 
temporal dynamics of cognitive states (Song & Nakayama, 2009; see also Freeman, Dale, & 
Farmer, 2011). Recording movements of the computer mouse on its way to a particular goal-
location representing a certain decision is an easy way to gather the required continuous data, 
and has become increasingly popular in cognitive psychology and experimental linguistics. In 
a standard mouse-tracking task, participants are presented with an image, letter, string, sound, 
video (or a combination of these) and then make a response via moving the cursor to options 
that (usually) appear in the top left or top right corner of the computer screen. While participants 
move the mouse cursor, the x- and y-coordinates of the cursor en route to the response are 
recorded. Typically analyzed measures are the area under the curve (AUC) (Freeman & 
Ambady, 2010), which is the area between the observed trajectory and an idealized straight line 
from the start to the end point. Xneg is the amount of horizontal deviation toward the competitor 
(i.e., toward the non-target response) and is measured as the maximum x-coordinate reached by 
                                                 
 
2Based upon: Schneider, C., Schonard, C., Franke, M., Jäger, G., & Janczyk, M. (2019). Pragmatic 
processing: An investigation of the (anti-)presupposition of determiners using mouse-tracking. Cognition, 193, 
104024 
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the mouse as it veers away from the target response (Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 2013). As 
temporal measures one can analyze the movement time which is the time from stimulus onset 
until the cursor reaches the response box (Kieslich & Henninger, 2017) and turn towards target 
(TTT) which is the time when participants finally make their decision and turn towards the 
target response without any subsequent reversals (Roettger & Franke, 2019). Figure 3 illustrates 
the analyzed dependent variables.  
Figure 3: Illustration of the dependent variables AUC, Xneg, and TTT  
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The aim of Study 1 was to analyze the unfolding of processing of the definite and the 
indefinite determiner during a mouse-tracking experiment. In both experiments participants 
were instructed to judge the appropriateness of test sentences in a given context. The context 
consisted of a box (the “shopping basket”) with three pieces of fruit additionally described by 
a sentence (e.g., “Jan’s mum was shopping. She bought one banana and two pears.”). 
Furthermore, there was a picture of Jan on the screen.  
Figure 4: Illustration of the task in Study 1. 
To start a trial, participants had to move the mouse cursor into the start box. Then, Jan 
received one piece of fruit from the shopping basket. As soon as the mouse cursor was moved 
into the upper direction the test sentence appeared on the screen (e.g., “Of these Jan received a 
pear.”). Participants had to judge the test sentence according to the presented context as “true” 
6. Studies 
43 
or “false” by moving the mouse in the corresponding response box into the upper left or upper 
right corner of the screen (for an illustration of the procedure, see Figure 4). 
Six conditions were used in the experiment and they resulted from crossing the two 
determiners (definite and indefinite) with three sentence types (false, felicitous, and 
infelicitous) (for more information see Figure 5). The false conditions were integrated to create 
a baseline. 
Figure 5: Examples for the six different conditions of Study 1. 
Following the anti-presupposition theory, the anti-uniqueness interpretation of the 
indefinite determiner is derived indirectly in a two-step process, by first assessing the 
uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner and then negating it in a second step. For 
the conditions in which the presupposition matters (condition 3-6) this leads to the predictions 
of larger AUC and longer MT in the indefinite compared to the definite conditions. Most 
importantly, the two-step model of processing of the indefinite determiner requires an initial 
consideration of the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner and its negation in a 
second step thus predicting larger Xneg values for the indefinite relative to the definite 
determiner. To explain this prediction in more detail, consider first the definite determiner. In 
the felicitous condition the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner is supported 
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by the context and the mouse-cursor directly heads towards the expected “true” response. In the 
infelicitous condition the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner is not supported 
by the context and thus the mouse movement directly heads towards the expected “false” 
response. For the indefinite determiner a different pattern is expected. In the felicitous condition 
the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner is expected to be initially activated, 
but it is not supported by the context and thus a bias towards the “false” response is expected 
before the expected “true” response is selected. In the infelicitous condition, uniqueness is 
supported by the context and due to the initial activation of the uniqueness-presupposition a 
bias towards a “true” response is expected, even when finally, the “false” response is given. 
This initial bias towards the unselected response leads to higher Xneg values for the indefinite 
compared to the definite determiner. 
In the first experiment, participants were provided with error feedback throughout the 
whole experiment, while in the second experiment error feedback was only provided during a 
practice phase. Across both experiments, the indefinite determiner was associated with more 
processing difficulties which was reflected in longer MTs, larger AUC, and larger Xneg values 
for the indefinite determiner. The larger Xneg values support the evaluation of the anti-
uniqueness of the indefinite determiner according to the Maximize Presupposition principle 
(Heim, 1991). According to this principle, the anti-uniqueness of the indefinite determiner is an 
anti-presupposition and thus arises in two steps: first the uniqueness-presupposition of the 
definite determiner is considered, which is negated in a second step and thus leads to anti-
uniqueness. This initial consideration of the uniqueness-presupposition leads to a bias to the 
nontarget response in case of the indefinite determiner and is thus reflected in larger Xneg values 
in felicitous and infelicitous conditions. It is important to point out that the initial bias towards 
the nontarget was also observable in the infelicitous condition although the context facilitates a 
“false” response. One has to point out that this initial consideration of the uniqueness-
presupposition is an unconscious process during sentence processing. 
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Both experiments provide experimental evidence for the psychological reality of the 
Maximize Presupposition principle and the assumed two-step processing of the anti-uniqueness 
inference of the indefinite determiner. Processing difficulties of infelicitous conditions were 
observed in Experiment 1, but were only replicated for MTs in Experiment 2. The included 
false conditions might have influenced this result and thus the unclear findings were further 
investigated in Study 2.  
 
6.2 Study 2: Capacity-limited processes are involved during the anti-
uniqueness interpretation of the indefinite determiner3 
The second study aimed at replicating the increased processing difficulties for the 
indefinite determiner and to clarify the inconsistent results observed for the infelicitous 
conditions in the previous study. Furthermore, I expanded the research question and asked 
whether processes involved during the interpretation of the indefinite determiner can either run 
in parallel with the central stages of another task or whether they are capacity-limited and 
require the central bottleneck itself. This is of interest because when treating the anti-uniqueness 
of the indefinite determiner as an anti-presupposition, it is expected that processing of the 
indefinite determiner takes longer because it involves the evaluation of the uniqueness-
presupposition of the definite determiner and its subsequent negation. Previous research has 
shown that the process of linguistic negation is a “resource dependent process (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004, p. 227; see, e.g., Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009, Exp. 
3; Foerster, Wirth, Berghoefer, Kunde, & Pfister, 2019; Wason, 1959). In case negation is 
involved in the process of interpreting the indefinite determiner, this process cannot run in 
                                                 
 
3 Based on Schneider, C., & Janczyk, M. (accepted). Capacity limitations of processing presuppositions 
triggered by determiners. Acta Psychologica. 
6. Studies 
46 
parallel to other central stages. To investigate this question, I used the same test sentences as in 
Study 1 except for the false conditions, and employed the Psychological Refractory Period 
(PRP) approach and the locus of slack-logic. As Task 1, participants were instructed to perform 
a tone discrimination task before reading the determiner. The sentence was completed after a 
short SOA (100ms) or a long SOA (1200ms) and as Task 2 participants had to evaluate the 
appropriateness of the sentence against the presented context. Both tasks were performed with 
button presses with the left and right index and middle finger (see Figure 6 for an illustration 
of the task).  
Figure 6: Illustration of an example trial in in Study 2. 
In case the processing of the indefinite determiner requires an additional capacity-
limited process (compared to the definite determiner), that is negation, I expected to observe a 
difference between the definite and the indefinite determiner with a short and a long SOA (i.e., 
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an additive combination of SOA and the determiner variable). In case the processing does not 
require limited capacities and can run in parallel to the central stage of the tone discrimination 
task, I expected to observe a difference between the two determiners only in case of a long 
SOA, but not with a short SOA (i.e., an underadditive interaction). With the short SOA the 
effect is absorbed in the cognitive slack and thus not visible in RT2. Such a result would be not 
in line with the Maximize Presupposition principle. 
The data clearly revealed two main effects of determiner and sentence type which is 
well in line with the hypotheses. Processing of the indefinite determiner took longer than 
processing of the definite determiner and responding in felicitous conditions was faster than in 
infelicitous ones. Both effects combined additively with the SOA manipulation which fits well 
with the anti-presupposition account based on the Maximize Presupposition principle (Heim, 
1991). The anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite determiner arises in two steps, namely 
the evaluation of the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner and its subsequent 
negation. In terms of the locus of slack-logic one or both of these processes require the central 
bottleneck and are thus capacity-limited. As negation is regarded as a capacity-limited process 
(e.g. Deutsch et al., 2009; Foerster et al., 2019; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wason, 1959) it is a 
viable candidate and thus the results provide experimental evidence for the Maximize 
Presupposition principle. 
However, determiner and sentence type interacted: In infelicitous sentences the RTs for 
definite and indefinite determiners were almost the same. This might be the result of a speed-
accuracy tradeoff (e.g. Liesefeld & Janczyk, 2019), because the error rates were larger for the 
indefinite compared to the definite determiner across all conditions. Furthermore, the infelicity 
of the definite determiner might be perceived larger than for the indefinite determiner, because 
the definite determiner is even more implausible in a context with multiple objects than the 
indefinite determiner is in a context with a unique object. This infelicity effect might mask the 
expected RT difference between the two determiners in the infelicitous condition.  
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Although the sentence type RT effect was larger for the definite compared to the 
indefinite determiner, the data revealed that infelicitous uses take longer than felicitous uses 
and thus this clarifies the somewhat inconsistent results observed in the first study.  
In short, Study 2 revealed that during processing the indefinite determiner, a capacity-
limited process is involved which is not involved in the evaluation of the definite determiner 
(namely negation). Study 3 compared the processing of presupposition triggers to other 
(neutral) words and investigated the question whether presupposition processing itself requires 
limited cognitive capacities which are not involved during the processing of neutral words.  
6.3 Study 3: Presupposition processing is a capacity-limited process4 
Study 3 investigated determiners, and included a second trigger, namely again which is 
characterized to belong to another class of presupposition triggers than the definite determiner. 
Experiment 1 was conducted to replicate early effects already on the trigger and to support the 
need of separate analyses of the different triggers. In a self-paced reading experiment, 
participants were instructed to read sentences sectionwise and to rate their appropriateness in a 
given context. I compared sentences including a presupposition trigger (either definite 
determiner or again), with sentences including a neutral word that was grammatically 
acceptable, but did not trigger a presupposition, and sentences with an unacceptable word 
making the sentence ungrammatical. The analysis revealed early effects already on the trigger 
and thus the experiment replicated previous findings by, for example, Tiemann et al. (2011). 
Nevertheless, the data also showed that separate analyses are necessary because the processing 
pattern differed between the two triggers. For both triggers reading times at the trigger position 
were longer for the condition including a presupposition trigger compared to the unacceptable 
                                                 
 
4 Based on Schneider, C., Bade, N., & Janczyk, M. (2020). Is immediate processing of presupposition 
triggers automatic or capacity-limited? A combination of the PRP approach with a self-paced reading task. Journal 
of Psycholinguistic Research, 49, 247-273. 
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sentence. The neutral sentences of the again sentences had the longest reading times whereas 
for the determiner sentences the neutral sentences were similar to those of the unacceptable 
condition. 
 In Experiment 2, I combined the previous experiment with the PRP approach to answer 
the question of capacity-limited or automatic processing of the two presupposition triggers. I 
thus included a tone discrimination task before participants read the respective word at the 
presupposition triggering position. Similar to Study 2, participants were instructed to perform 
a tone discrimination task after the first part of the sentence (all words preceding the trigger 
position). The word at the trigger position of the sentence was revealed after a short SOA 
(100ms) or a long SOA (1200ms). As Task 2, participants had to read the rest of the sentence 
section wise. Responses to the tone discrimination task were made with the left index or middle 
finger, the self-paced reading task was performed with the right index finger. This procedure 
allows to investigate whether presupposition processing requires limited-cognitive capacities 
that are not involved in the processing of other (neutral) words. If presupposition processing 
requires limited capacities and thus can only start once the central stage of the (preceding) tone 
discrimination task has finished, I expected to observe similar differences between the 
conditions as in the first experiment, which should be of the same size with both the short and 
the long SOA. In case processing the trigger position can run in parallel to other capacity-
limited stages, it extends into the cognitive-slack with a short SOA and thus no difference 
between the different conditions is observable for the short SOA, but only for the long SOA. 
The data analysis revealed a similar pattern of differences between the conditions with 
the long SOA and thus successfully replicated previous findings. Furthermore, these differences 
were not absent or smaller with the short SOA5. Consequently, the results contradict the notion 
                                                 
 
5 In fact, the differences were even larger with a short SOA. This was not predicted by the CBM, but it is 
discussed in the manuscript in the appendix. 
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of an automatic processing of presuppositions triggered by definite determiners and again. The 
findings are in line with the assumption that presupposition processing immediately starts a 
context search for a suitable referent. In case of the definite determiner, an appropriate referent 
is searched, and in case of again, the search for a suitable previous event is immediately started 
when reading the trigger word. In the current setting, this search process cannot be successful, 
because the context provided before the test sentence did not explicitly verify the following 
presupposition. There is no clear referent for the definite determiner introduced in the context, 
nor is there a previous event mentioned that again could refer to. To make sense of the test 
sentence participants have to accommodate the presupposition, which is likely to be the case as 
suggested by high ratings in the acceptability rating. This accommodation process is assumed 
to be a process of enriching the context with the presupposed information (as long as it is 
contextually feasible, which was the case in the present study). For the preparation of 
accommodation, cognitive resources like working memory play a role. Previous results by 
Anderson and Holcomb (2005) also suggested a link between the processing of the uniqueness-
presupposition of the definite determiner and working memory.  
In sum, the experiment provided evidence for an immediate processing of presuppositions 
starting already on the trigger. Furthermore, the data suggests that this processing requires 
limited cognitive capacities in case the presupposition has to be accommodated and is not 
directly satisfied in a previous context (this topic is part of Study 5).  
6.4 Study 4: Anti-/Uniqueness inferences arise early while reading6 
While Study 2 and 3 focused on the cognitive capacities that are involved during 
presupposition processing this study addresses whether participants actually use the relevant 
                                                 
 
6 Based on Schneider, C., Bade, N., Franke, M., & Janczyk, M. (2020). Presuppositions of determiners 
are immediately used to disambiguate utterance meaning. Psychological Research, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-020-01302-7. 
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meaning components of the definite and indefinite determiner (anti-/uniqueness) to form 
expectations already while reading it. Furthermore, I wanted to clarify how the anti-uniqueness 
assumption of the indefinite determiner arises. While the definite determiner clearly conveys a 
uniqueness-presupposition, the status of the anti-uniqueness inference associated with the 
indefinite determiner is less clear. As mentioned in Chapter 2, there are, according to the 
literature, three possibilities: (1) The presupposition theory suggests that the indefinite 
determiner comes with its own presupposition and thus presupposes anti-uniqueness (see 
Kratzer, 2005, or the discussion in Heim 1991, 2011). From a processing perspective, no 
processing differences between the two determiners are then expected. According to the (2) 
anti-presupposition theory, the anti-uniqueness of the indefinite determiner is derived by 
considering the (stronger) alternative with the definite determiner and then negating its 
presupposition. The inferences, which are the result of pragmatic reasoning based on Maximize 
Presupposition, are not proper presuppositions, but are referred to as anti-presuppositions 
(Percus, 2006). Because the anti-uniqueness inference is derived in two steps, the processing of 
the indefinite determiner should thus be more complex than processing the definite determiner. 
(3) The implicature theory assumes that the indefinite determiner triggers an implicature due to 
its competition with other quantificational terms, for example, "every/all" or "another" 
(Chierchia, Fox, & Spector, 2012; Grønn & Sӕbø, 2012). Those quantificational terms form a 
lexical scale with the indefinite determiner (Horn, 1972). An implicature arises when the 
weaker item on such a scale is chosen, in this case the indefinite determiner. All items that are 
higher in the scale (items that trigger stronger alternatives) get negated. Following this account, 
the indefinite determiner should come with an implicature, which has shown to be processed 
more rapidly (at least if certain conditions are met) than presuppositions (Bill et al., 2018; but 
see also Chemla, 2008), thus the indefinite determiner should be processed faster than the 
definite determiner.  
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The experiment comprised two parts in which a shelf with ten compartments was visible 
in the upper part of the screen. In the left- and rightmost compartment one or two objects (the 
same within one compartment, but different objects in the shelf) were visible on the screen. The 
first part of the experiment was a forced choice production task where participants were asked 
to produce a sentence which appropriately described a given situation. This task was used to 
identify participants that were not aware of the uniqueness/anti-uniqueness associated with the 
two determiners and therefore were replaced with new participants.  
The second part was a mouse-tracking experiment with the aim to test whether listeners 
rapidly integrate potential cues about uniqueness or anti-uniqueness and use this information 
for disambiguation (even before hearing the lexically disambiguating referent). Furthermore, I 
compared the processing of definite and indefinite determiners. Similar to Study 1 participants 
initiated a trial via moving the mouse out of the start box, but in contrast to the previous 
experiment in Study 1 the test sentence was played via headphones. Participants were instructed 
to keep on moving the mouse to the left- or right most compartment of the shelf where the 
corresponding item was displayed (; see Figure 7 for an illustration of a trial).  
Figure 7: Example of the stimulus setup for a trial in the mouse-tracking task. 
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The experimental conditions are visualized in Table 1. Participants were divided into 
two groups: The reliable group only saw items from Conditions 1-4, participants in the 
unreliable group additionally saw items where the determiners were used infelicitously 
(Condition 5 and 6). Furthermore, the variable disambiguation indicates whether already the 
determiner can be used to disambiguate the sentence meaning (early) or whether this is only 
possible after reading the noun (late). For the mouse-tracking task, I analyzed the dependent 
measures AUC, MT, and TTT. 
Table 1: Summary of the experimental conditions for the mouse-tracking task. The target in this example is always 
"green apple", and "green umbrella" is the competitor Participants in the reliable group only received trials of 
Conditions 1-4, the unreliable group received additional trials of Condition 5 and 6. 
 determiner dis-
ambiguation 
felicity sentence #target #competitor picture 
1 definite early felicitous Give me the 
green apple! 
1 2 
 
2 indefinite early felicitous Give me a 
green apple! 
2 1 
 
3 definite late felicitous Give me the 
green apple! 
1 1  
4 indefinite late felicitous Give me a 
green apple! 
2 2 
 
5 definite early infelicitous Give me the 
green apple! 
2 1 
 
6 indefinite early infelicitous Give me a 
green apple! 
1 2 
 
 
The data revealed in the reliable group smaller AUC values and shorter MT and TTT 
values for the early disambiguation conditions (Conditions 1-2) compared to the late 
disambiguation conditions (Conditions 3 - 4). This suggests that participants use the 
information encoded in the determiner to disambiguate sentence meaning as soon as possible, 
that is, on the determiner. Further, the number information appears to be encoded in both 
determiners and is rapidly accessible. However, this was not the case for the unreliable group. 
It seems as if occasionally infelicitously used determiners made participants stop using the early 
cues.  
The results regarding the origin of the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite 
determiner were less clear though. Overall, the data do not support the implicature theory 
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according to which the processing of the indefinite should be fast compared to the processing 
of the definite determiner. Regarding AUC and error rates in the production task, there was no 
significant difference between the two determiners, which supports the presupposition theory 
where the indefinite determiner comes with its own presupposition of anti-uniqueness. In 
contrast, for the time base measures MT and TTT, I observed longer times for the indefinite 
compared to the definite determiner. This supports the anti-presupposition theory according to 
which the indefinite determiner causes more processing difficulties than the definite determiner 
due to the additional reasoning processes involved in deriving its inference. In sum, the data 
support the idea of a rapid use of the inferences in case of felicitously used determiners. 
Participants are aware of the uniqueness/ anti-uniqueness inference associated with the definite 
and the indefinite determiner. The origin of the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite 
cannot be clarified conclusively, but the data clearly do not support the implicature theory. The 
used method in the experiment made it hard to distinguish whether the anti-uniqueness 
inference of the indefinite determiner results as a presupposition itself, or more indirect as an 
anti-presupposition. The setup of the experiment made clear that the definite and the indefinite 
determiner were in competition and that the number of items played a role. Furthermore, 
participants were directly addressed by the speaker with an order which made clear what the 
knowledge state of the speaker was. This might increase the possibility of a parallel treatment 
of the two determiners as predicted by the presupposition account, but it cannot be ruled out 
that it is due to the setting. 
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6.5 Study 5: Falsified presuppositions evoke processing difficulties – scalar 
implicatures behave differently7 
Study 5 investigated the validation of presuppositions in a given context. Furthermore, 
scalar implicatures (arising from the Horn scale <some, all>) were included to contrast the 
processing of two pragmatic phenomena. The aim of the experiment was to replicate previous 
findings by Tiemann et al. (2011) suggesting an early processing of presuppositions starting 
already on the trigger. Furthermore, two triggers that are assumed according to the literature to 
belong to different classes were compared. In addition, the processing of scalar implicatures 
was investigated and the time-course of processing presuppositions and scalar implicatures was 
compared. 
Two context sentences (A and B) were constructed for each item. Each context sentence 
was paired with two test sentences in such a way that one context verified the 
presupposition/scalar implicature of the test sentence and the other context falsified it. Each 
participant saw each item only in one context condition (but in the verifying and in the falsifying 
condition). This procedure allows a comparison of exactly the same test sentence in both 
conditions (verifying and falsifying). In the following there is an example item for definite 
determiner. The items for again were similar to those of determiners and can be found in the 
manuscript in the appendix. Sentences with scalar some (German einige) were used for the 
implicature condition. As a control, sentences with all (German alle) were included, because 
they are already most informative no implicature can arise and they can be only literally true or 
false (an example item can be found in the manuscript in the appendix). 
                                                 
 
7 Based on Schneider, C., Janczyk, M., & Bade, N. (submitted). Verifying pragmatic content in context: 
An experimental comparison of presuppositions of again and the definite determiner with scalar implicatures. 
Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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Example item for definite determiner: 
(A) Manuel hat ein Ticket für ein Baseballspiel gekauft. 
      Manuel bought a ticket for a baseball match. 
1. Manuel holt das Ticket und freut sich. 
  Manuel collects the ticket and he is happy. 
2. Manuel holt die Tickets und freut sich. 
Manuel collects the tickets and he is happy. 
 
(B) Manuel hat mehrere Tickets für ein Baseballspiel gekauft. 
     Manuel bought several tickets for a baseball match. 
3 Manuel holt die Tickets und freut sich. 
Manuel collects the tickets and he is happy. 
4 Manuel holt das Ticket und freut sich. 
Manuel collects the ticket and he is happy. 
Participants were instructed to read the sentences in a word-by-word self-paced reading 
manner and to rate their acceptability according to the given context afterwards. Following 
previous results by Tiemann et al. (2011), I expected that the falsification of a presupposition 
causes higher processing difficulties than its verification, thus longer reading times in the 
falsifying condition compared to the verifying condition are expected. Furthermore, I assumed 
that the processing of the presupposition triggered by definite determiners and again differs 
because they belong to separate classes. For the trigger again a smaller effect of context 
condition is expected because again can be ignored without making the sentence entirely 
senseless. For the definite determiner this is not possible because assertion and presupposition 
are dependent on each other. For scalar implicatures processing difficulties are expected 
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depending on the theoretical approach, these difficulties are expected to appear in different 
conditions (a detailed discussion of different theoretical approaches for scalar implicatures can 
be found in the manuscript in the appendix). Following Bott and Noveck (2004) a slower and 
delayed processing of scalar implicatures is expected, whereas for presuppositions an early 
processing starting already on the trigger (see e.g., Bade & Schwarz, 2019a) is assumed. 
As expected, the acceptability ratings were high in the verifying condition and quite low 
in the falsifying condition supporting the idea that participants perceived the inappropriateness 
of a context that explicitly falsified the presuppositional/implicated content of the test sentence. 
Reading times were analyzed as reading times per letter. The results revealed significant 
differences between the four sentence types for all analyzed positions. For the determiner 
sentences, longer reading times were observed in the falsifying condition compared to the 
verifying condition before the end of the sentence which suggests an immediate processing of 
presuppositions. A failure of this verification process results in additional processing costs. For 
the trigger again this difference between the two conditions could not be observed, which 
highlights that different triggers are processed differently and thus require separate analyses. 
For the implicatures longer reading times were observed in the verifying condition compared 
to the falsifying condition, which suggests that processing the implicature is more difficult than 
ignoring it in case it is not supported by the context. Those processing difficulties occurred 
quite early while reading the sentence and thus suggest that implicatures are immediately 
available (see also, Foppolo & Marelli, 2017). Although the processing of scalar implicatures 
also starts early, the processing differs from the processing of presuppositions because the effect 
of context condition persists until the end of the sentence. While the processing of scalar 
implicatures is a long-lasting process, presupposition processing seems to be completed before 
the end of the sentence.  
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A possible explanation for the absence of an effect between the verifying and the 
falsifying condition for the sentences with the trigger again could be that the verifying context 
was not sufficiently specific. More precisely, the presented context did not mention a specific 
event. It only said that, for example, Lukas has ordered pizza sometime before the utterance, 
but not exactly when this event took place, like in Last Saturday, Lukas ordered pizza…. This 
could complicate the situation, because the addressee struggles identifying the exact event 
which could lead to a failure of the verification process at the evaluation word. The current 
study provided evidence for an immediate verification process, for presuppositions triggered 
by definite determiners starting as soon as the content of the presupposition is known. In case 
of failure, this process evokes longer reading times than in a successful verification. According 
to the current data, this cannot be claimed for presuppositions triggered by again. This 
strengthens the claim that different presupposition triggers need to be analyzed separately. 
Although the processing of presuppositions and of scalar implicatures start quite early, the two 
processes differ because for scalar implicatures the effect of context condition persists till the 
end of the sentence. In summary, the evaluation process of scalar implicatures seems to be a 
long-lasting process which is not the case for presuppositions.  
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 General Discussion 
The question of how listeners process the meaning of an utterance in a certain context 
is important for the study of natural language. Speakers often communicate more than they 
actually say. Those additional meaning components can be distinguished from the pure 
assertion, but how do they arise? When does the listener process this additional meaning 
component? The present dissertation investigated the role of presuppositions with a focus on 
presuppositions triggered by definite determiners and contrasts this classical presupposition 
trigger with indefinite determiners. The mouse-tracking methodology provides evidence for a 
two-step processing of the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite determiner. Furthermore, 
the combination of classical self-paced reading experiments with the PRP paradigm from 
cognitive psychology made it possible to investigate the underlying processes and to gather 
evidence for a capacity-limited processing of presupposition triggers.  
 
7.1 Summary of results 
In Chapter 5, I formulated three research questions that were investigated in the present 
dissertation. Before discussing the results in detail, I will provide an overview of which study 
investigated those research questions and the preliminary answers that can be given according 
to the respective data. Table 2 sums up the results at a glance. The following sections focus on 
the three questions separately and discuss the results in more detail.  
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Table 2: Overview which study provides evidence to answer the three research questions. 
 Q1: How does 
the anti-uniqueness 
inference of the 
indefinite determiner 
arise? 
Q2: What cognitive 
resources are 
involved during 
presupposition 
processing? 
Q3: When do 
presuppositions 
unfold their impact? 
Study 1 Maximize 
Presupposition  
capacity-limited immediately 
Study 2 Maximize 
Presupposition 
capacity-limited  
Study 3  capacity-limited immediately 
Study 4 Maximize 
Presupposition 
 immediately 
Study 5   immediately 
 
7.1.1 How does the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite determiner arise?  
The status of the definite determiner as a presupposition trigger, triggering existence 
and uniqueness, is undoubtedly clear. This is not the case for the indefinite determiner, which 
is associated with an anti-uniqueness inference.  
Study 1 supports the anti-presupposition theory, because for all dependent variables 
larger values were observed for the indefinite compared to the definite determiner. Especially 
the Xneg results provide evidence for an initial activation of the uniqueness-presupposition of 
the definite determiner when processing the indefinite determiner. This result was only 
predicted by the anti-presupposition theory based on the Maximize Presupposition principle 
(Heim, 1991). Following this idea, anti-uniqueness is derived in a two-step process. First the 
stronger alternative of the definite determiner is considered, and secondly, the uniqueness-
presupposition of the definite determiner is negated. Using mouse-tracking is a great 
opportunity to visualize this initial activation of the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite 
determiner. The mouse trajectory initially deviates towards the later not-selected response 
option, reflecting its brief activation. This deviation is reflected in Xneg scores and the data 
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clearly revealed larger Xneg scores for the indefinite compared to the definite determiner. The 
presented data clearly supports the idea that the anti-uniqueness associated with the indefinite 
determiner is neither a presupposition nor an implicature, but results from the Maximize 
Presupposition principle.  
Further evidence is provided by RT data of Study 2. RTs for the sentence evaluation 
task were longer for sentences including an indefinite determiner compared to sentences with a 
definite determiner. This again suggests that processing indefinite determiners is more difficult 
and thus may require an extra processing step compared to definite determiners. The application 
of the PRP paradigm helped to minimize potential candidates for this additional processing 
step. It revealed an additive combination with SOA, thus processing the indefinite determiner 
requires central capacities. As assumed by the Maximize Presupposition principle negation is 
involved during the processing of the indefinite determiner and negation has been suggested to 
be a capacity-limited process in previous research (e.g. Deutsch et al., 2009; Foerster et al., 
2019; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wason, 1959).  
Study 4 revealed that participants are aware of the additional meaning components of 
uniqueness and anti-uniqueness of the definite and indefinite determiner. Participants use those 
components to disambiguate sentences as early as possible as long as the determiners are used 
felicitously. The results regarding differences between the two determiners were less clear. The 
time-based measures revealed longer times for the indefinite compared to the definite 
determiner, supporting the anti-presupposition theory. However, no significant difference 
between the two determiners was observed for AUC, thus supporting the idea that both 
determiners trigger their own presuppositions proper. In this case, no processing difference 
would be expected from a theoretical point of view. Although not significant, the descriptive 
pattern still revealed larger AUC values for the indefinite compared to the definite determiner 
which is in line with the anti-presupposition theory. 
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One factor that may have caused those less clear results concerning the expected 
difference between the two determiners in Study 4 might be that definite and indefinite 
determiners were presented in a contrastive way. Previous work by Bade and Schwarz (2019a, 
2019b) suggest that target choices for indefinite determiners are boosted when participants are 
also faced with alternatives (the definite determiner). For example, the production task 
administered before the mouse-tracking task in Study 4 helped to stabilize the anti-uniqueness 
inferences of the indefinite determiner, but this procedure makes it harder to distinguish 
between definite and indefinite determiners. It is a challenge to construct experiments in such 
a way that participants easily get the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite determiner 
without putting too much focus on it so that participants still interpret the determiners in a 
natural way. The presented experiments can function as a starting point, but further research is 
necessary. 
 
7.1.2 What cognitive resources are involved during presupposition processing?  
To achieve a deeper understanding of the processes involved in processing 
presuppositions and to further distinguish the (anti-)uniqueness inferences associated with the 
two determiners, I investigated capacity limitations during the processing of presuppositions 
triggered by definite and indefinite determiners.  
To do so, in Study 2 and 3, I combined a reading task and the PRP approach and applied 
the locus of slack-logic. This procedure pursued the goal to evaluate whether presupposition 
processing is automatic and thus can run in parallel to other tasks or whether it is capacity-
limited and has its locus within the central stage of processing. Study 2 compared the definite 
and the indefinite determiner. As suggested by the Maximize Presupposition principle, the 
longer RTs for the indefinite determiner are the result from negating the uniqueness-
presupposition of the definite determiner. Previous research argued that negation is a capacity-
limited process (e.g., Deutsch et al., 2009; Foerster et al., 2019; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; 
7. General Discussion 
63 
Wason, 1959), and Study 2 revealed that one (or more) processes involved in processing the 
indefinite determiner requires limited cognitive capacities. Thus, the data is in line with the 
anti-presupposition theory that suggests that the anti-uniqueness inference associated with the 
indefinite determiner arises in a two-step process due to the Maximize Presupposition principle. 
The first step of the evaluation of the indefinite determiner is evaluating the uniqueness-
presupposition of the definite determiner and secondly negating it. The knowledge of the 
process being capacity-limited reduces the number of possible candidates that can explain this 
procedure and negation seems a viable candidate, but Study 2 could not answer whether limited-
cognitive capacities are required by other presupposition triggers (e.g., again) in comparison to 
neutral words. This was the focus of Study 3. 
Study 3 focused on the immediate processing of presuppositions and investigated 
whether this process is automatic or capacity-limited. Again was included as another 
presupposition trigger. Similar to Study 2, the PRP approach was combined with a self-paced 
reading task. The central question of this study was, What kind of cognitive capacities are 
required for presupposition processing in comparison to the processing of neutral words? 
According to the data, automatic processing of presupposition triggers appears unlikely. When 
encountering a presupposition trigger a context search starts immediately. In case of the definite 
determiner, this is the search for an appropriate referent, for again a suitable previous event has 
to be found in the context. This search process likely involves repeated selection and deselection 
of working memory items which can be considered as possible referents or relevant previous 
events. According to Janczyk (2017), selecting working memory items is a capacity-limited 
process which can explain why the processing of presupposition triggers requires limited 
cognitive capacities.  
The required capacities can provide further insight into the processing differences of 
different pragmatic phenomena. While it is assumed that presuppositions are processed 
immediately, Study 5 suggests that the processing of implicatures seem to be a long-lasting 
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process. With the PRP paradigm and the locus of slack-logic the underlying processes that are 
involved in the processing of scalar implicatures can be investigated. As negation is also 
involved in the processing of implicatures (e.g. some, but not all), I expect that the processing 
is capacity-limited and not automatic. As the data in Study 5 suggested, processing scalar 
implicatures persists till the end of the sentence. Applying the PRP approach to different 
positions in the sentence might reveal where capacity-limited processes are involved and thus 
can narrow down when negation unfolds its impact. To investigate this question, several 
experiments are necessary because the PRP paradigm can only be applied to one position in a 
sentence in one experiment. An investigation of scalar implicatures with the presented paradigm 
could shed light on this interesting question in future research. 
7.1.3  When do presuppositions unfold their impact? 
Finally, I turn to the question dealing with the temporal dynamics of processing that 
asked: When do presuppositions unfold their impact? Previous results suggested an immediate 
processing of presuppositions starting already on the trigger (e.g., Bade & Schwarz, 2019b; 
Kirsten et al., 2014; Tiemann et al., 2011). This could also be concluded from the Xneg results 
in the mouse-tracking data of Study 1. Additional evidence was provided by the self-paced 
reading data of Experiment 1 of Study 3. The reading times of trigger words (definite determiner 
and again) were longer than the reading times of an unacceptable word at the relevant position. 
These results speak for an immediate processing of the presupposition trigger. The data of Study 
4 also support this idea because it revealed early effects before the end of the sentence, which 
suggests that participants use the additional meaning component triggered by definite and the 
indefinite determiner as early as possible. Study 5 was dedicated to distinguish presuppositions 
that were explicitly verified by the context from presuppositions that were falsified by the 
context. The data also revealed effects as soon as the presuppositional content was known to 
the participant for presuppositions triggered by determiners. The data did not reveal this effect 
for the trigger again. Thus, Study 5 also supports the idea of immediate processing of 
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presuppositions triggered by definite determiners. However, one has to point out that the 
additional meaning component of the definite and indefinite determiner in Study 4 were only 
used to disambiguate the sentence in case the determiners were used felicitously. In the 
unreliable group this effect was not observed. This suggests that participants stopped using the 
additional meaning component as they were faced with inappropriate or infelicitous uses. In 
case the context explicitly falsifies the presupposition, processing the definite determiner is 
prolonged, as can be seen in Study 5. This does not seem to be the case for the trigger again. 
One has to confess though, that the unclear results for the trigger again might be due to the used 
items. As discussed in the manuscript, it might be that the context used for the trigger again 
was not explicit enough. To clarify this suggestion further research is necessary.  
7.2 Implications for theories of presuppositions 
The definite determiner is a classic example for a presupposition trigger (e.g., Frege, 
1892). The status of the additional meaning component of anti-uniqueness associated with the 
indefinite determiner is, however, controversially discussed in the literature. Three theories 
were discussed in this dissertation. First of all, as suggested in Kratzer (2005), the indefinite 
determiner presupposes anti-uniqueness and thus is a presupposition trigger, similar to the 
definite determiner (see also Heim, 1991, 2011 for a discussion). A second explanation goes 
back to Chierchia et al. (2012) and Grønn and Sæbø (2012) who treat the anti-uniqueness of the 
indefinite determiner as an implicature. Finally, the anti-uniqueness of the indefinite determiner 
can be explained as an anti-presupposition (Percus, 2006) resulting from pragmatic reasoning 
based on the Maximize Presupposition principle (Heim, 1991). Studies 1, 2, and 4 provided 
evidence for a more complex processing of the indefinite compared to the definite determiner 
and thus support the idea of anti-uniqueness of the indefinite determiner arising as an anti-
presupposition. Especially Study 1 provided interesting insight into the processing of the 
indefinite determiner and suggests that this processing runs in two steps. The mouse-tracking 
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data can make the initial activation of the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner 
visible and thus provides experimental evidence for the psychological reality of the anti-
presupposition theory. 
 Study 2 provided further evidence for this theory. According to the two-step model 
derived from the Maximize Presupposition principle the processing of the indefinite determiner 
requires as a first step the evaluation of the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite 
determiner, and its negation in a second step. Study 2 applied the locus of slack-logic and the 
data revealed additivity with SOA, which means that one (or more) processes involved in 
processing the indefinite determiner require limited cognitive capacities. Previous research 
(e.g., Deutsch et al., 2009; Foerster et al., 2019; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Wason, 1959) assume 
that negation is a capacity-limited process. The presented results thus replicate previous 
findings of a more complex processing of the indefinite compared to the definite determiner 
(see, e.g., Bade & Schwarz, 2019a; Hertrich et al., 2015; Kirsten et al., 2014), and furthermore, 
it helps to delineate to nature of the additional process that causes longer RTs for the indefinite 
determiner. The two-step model with negation of the uniqueness-presupposition is a viable 
candidate to explain this difference. The presented experiments, thus clearly support the anti-
presupposition theory and provide experimental evidence for the Maximize Presupposition 
principle. 
Furthermore, the investigation of the implicated processes during presupposition 
processing revealed that those processes are capacity-limited in general (see Study 3) and thus 
cannot run in parallel with other ongoing processes. Those findings are in line with previous 
research that assumes that when a presupposition trigger is encountered an immediate context 
search for an appropriate referent is started. This search is likely to involve repeated selection 
and de-selection of working memory items which are potential candidates as referents. Janczyk 
(2017) showed that selecting working memory items is a capacity-limited process. 
Additionally, when the search process is successful, a referential assignment of the noun phrase 
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to an antecedent is necessary. This referential assignment requires encoding of information in 
working memory, which has been shown to be capacity-limited (Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 
1998). The presented data thus supports previous findings on presupposition processing with 
data from another perspective. This account is also promising to shed light onto the still unclear 
processes that are required in case of accommodation. 
However, the presented experiments also revealed that different presupposition triggers 
might require separate analyses, because the underlying processes differ in difficulty and it is 
possible that additional processes are involved only in processing some triggers. To generalize 
this future research with other presupposition triggers is necessary.  
 
 
7.3 Limitations and future extensions 
The probably clearest limitation of the presented work is the focus on only one language, 
namely German. Future research has to take other languages into account to clarify whether 
processing of presupposition triggers is generally a capacity-limited process. Furthermore, the 
dissertation mainly focused on one presupposition trigger, namely definite determiners. Study 
3 and 5 already revealed that presupposition triggers likely differ in their processing and future 
research should consequently address other triggers as well. To further strengthen the idea of 
the Maximize Presupposition principle, “both” and “exactly 2” seem to be interesting 
candidates. Focusing only on one (or at most two) trigger(s) do(es) not allow to transfer the 
results to presupposition triggers in general, but it has the great advantage to increase the 
number of items which allows separate meaningful analysis. Study 5 tried to integrate other 
pragmatic phenomena like implicatures. The comparison of different pragmatic phenomena is 
an interesting and fruitful field as well. The integration of the PRP approach and the locus of 
slack-logic can be used to shed further light on the underlying processes and improve 
understanding the processing of scalar implicatures.  
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 Conclusion 
The main question of the present dissertation was how presuppositions are processed 
with a focus on the definite and the indefinite determiner. The data revealed that presuppositions 
are processed immediately (see also, Bade & Schwarz, 2019b; Burkhardt, 2006; Kirsten et al., 
2014; Tiemann et al., 2011). Furthermore, the data provide experimental evidence for a more 
difficult processing in case of infelicitously used triggers and thus replicates previous results 
by Tiemann et al. (2011), (see also, Hertrich et al., 2015; Van Berkum et al.,1999; Van Berkum 
et al.,2003). In addition, the presented work tried to answer the question whether the definite 
and the indefinite determiner are both presupposition triggers. Data from study 1,2 and 4 are 
not in line with this assumption and thus, I do not regard the indefinite determiner as a 
presupposition trigger, but instead support the anti-presupposition theory based on the 
Maximize Presupposition principle. The experimental data provide evidence for a more 
complex processing of the indefinite compared to the definite determiner which results from a 
two-step processing of the indefinite determiner that includes the evaluation of the uniqueness-
presupposition of the definite determiner in a first step and its negation in a second step. 
Furthermore, the application of the locus of slack-logic in PRP experiments provide further 
evidence for this theory because the data revealed that for the indefinite determiner a capacity-
limited process is involved. Previous research on negation reflected that this is a capacity-
limited process (see e.g., Deutsch et al., 2009; Foerster et al., 2019; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; 
Wason, 1959) and thus the anti-presupposition theory is strengthened. Comparing the 
processing of presupposition triggers and other neutral words revealed that the processing of 
presuppositions is a capacity-limited process which cannot run in parallel with other ongoing 
processes. Including another presupposition trigger made clear that different presupposition 
triggers require separate analyses to make adequate statements due to the underlying processes 
during the presupposition processing.  
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The dissertation brought together experimental pragmatics and cognitive psychologist’s 
(chronometric) tools. This novel combination made it possible to investigate the underlying 
processes that are involved in presupposition processing and it revealed that presupposition 
processing requires limited cognitive capacities. It also demonstrates that interdisciplinary 
investigations are a fruitful enterprise. 
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A B S T R A C T
A presupposition is a condition that has to be met in order for a linguistic expression to be appropriate. The
definite determiner (as in the banana) triggers the uniqueness-presupposition that there is a uniquely identifiable
banana in the relevant discourse context. The indefinite determiner (as in a banana) is similarly associated with
anti-uniqueness (that there are several bananas). Application of the Maximize Presupposition principle to the
indefinite determiner suggests that this latter effect results indirectly as an anti-presupposition from considering
the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner, which is then negated. This results in increased pro-
cessing difficulty. We utilized mouse-tracking to compare processing of definite and indefinite determiners when
used felicitously and infelicitously in a particular context. First, processing of the indefinite determiner was
associated with more processing difficulties compared with the definite determiner. Second, we also observed
evidence for an initial temporary activation and evaluation of the uniqueness-presupposition, just as derived
from anti-presupposition theory and the Maximize Presupposition principle.
1. Introduction
How listeners grasp the overall conveyed meaning of an utterance in
a certain context is an important question in the study of natural lan-
guage meaning. Previous work in philosophy of language and linguistic
semantics has put forward that several levels of meaning can be dis-
tinguished. On the one hand, there are the literal truth conditions, on
the other hand, there are presuppositions and conversational im-
plicatures. The present paper focuses on presuppositions—a vital topic
in the semantic and pragmatic literature throughout the last decades
(see Beaver, 2012). Specifically, we investigate the interpretation of
definite and indefinite determiners by means of two mouse-tracking
experiments. The results provide novel empirical evidence for a more
difficult processing of indefinite determiners and their anti-pre-
supposition, which is derived from a negation of the uniqueness-pre-
supposition of the definite determiner, as predicted by theoretical ac-
counts that rely on the Maximize Presupposition principle (Heim, 1991).
The article is structured as follows: We begin by introducing pre-
suppositions in general and those of determiners in particular (see
Hawkins, 1978, for an overview or the discussion in Heim, 1991, 2011),
including a brief presentation of general predictions derived from
different theoretical accounts. The next section reviews previous ex-
perimental investigations of presuppositional content relevant to the
current research. This is followed by an introduction of the metho-
dology of mouse-tracking and the experimental task we use, plus the
predictions derived from the adopted theoretical framework of anti-
presupposition theory.
1.1. The presuppositions of determiners
A presupposition is a condition that has to be met in order for a
linguistic expression to be appropriate (Heim, 1991; Heim & Kratzer,
1998; Stalnaker, 1973). As an illustration, consider the following ex-
amples:
(1a) Context: There is one pen and one pencil on the desk.
Please hand me the pen.
(1b) Context: There are three pens and one pencil on the desk.
# Please hand me the pen.
The examples in (1a) and (1b) show that certain linguistic expressions
trigger appropriateness conditions, that is, the presupposition; the
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expression imposing the appropriateness condition is called a pre-
supposition trigger.
1.1.1. The definite determiner
In Example (1), the definite determiner “the” triggers two pre-
suppositions: that (i) there exists an entity of the type denoted by the
noun phrases (“pen”) and (ii) that this entity is unique (exactly one
pen). Thus, the triggered presuppositions are referred to as existence and
uniqueness. Because of the uniqueness-presupposition in Example (1),
using the definite determiner is appropriate, that is, felicitous, against
the context provided in (1a). In contrast, with the context provided in
(1b), the uniqueness-presupposition is not met, and consequently the
sentence is inappropriate, that is, infelicitous (rather than true or false;
Heim & Kratzer, 1998).
Importantly, presuppositions are context dependent and their in-
terpretation varies according to the domain of discourse in which they
are interpreted. Generally, presuppositions have to be evaluated against
the background of knowledge or beliefs shared by the speaker and the
audience. Therefore, the domain of discourse in which a presupposition
is evaluated can be just a small subset of the overall existing entities in
the world, given by what speaker and listeners currently attend to as the
relevant domain of discourse.
1.1.2. The indefinite determiner
The definite determiner has a competitor, namely the indefinite
determiner, which seems to have its own felicity conditions. The ex-
amples in (2) and (3) show that the indefinite determiner is associated
with anti-uniqueness (see also Heim, 2011; Percus, 2006), that is, the
reverse of what is introduced by the definite determiner.1 Accordingly,
using the indefinite determiner is infelicitous if it is known that there is
exactly one entity of the described kind in the relevant context of dis-
course, as in the Examples (2) and (3). For instance, in Example (2) “a
sun” presupposes that there is more than one sun which conflicts with
our common knowledge.
(2) # A sun is shining.
(3) # A weight of our tent is under 4 lbs. (Heim, 1991)
However, Heim (1991) observed that—under certain circumstances—it
is possible to utter the sentence in Example (4) felicitously without
being certain that there are at least two 20 feet long catfish:
(4) Robert caught a 20ft. long catfish. (Heim, 1991)
The sentence in this example is indeed appropriate if the speaker is not
sure that there is exactly one catfish of that size. To account for the
felicity of Example (4) and also the typical anti-uniqueness effect, Heim
(1991) proposed adding another principle to Grice’s (1975) conversa-
tional maxims: Presuppose as much as possible! (see also Chemla, 2009;
and, for further discussions, Alonso-Ovalle, Menéndez-Benito, &
Schwarz, 2011; Percus, 2006; Sauerland, 2008; Schlenker, 2012). More
precisely, this Maximize Presupposition principle requires speakers to
always use the felicitous sentence with the strongest presupposition
among a set of alternatives, if the speaker knows that these pre-
suppositions are fulfilled. In this way, Maximize Presupposition ac-
counts for the fact that indefinite determiners of the form “a X”
(where X is a noun phrase) are infelicitous when it is common ground
that there is exactly “one X”, such as in Examples (2) and (3). The lis-
tener in Example (3), for instance, assumes that the speaker wants to
convey that the presupposition of the stronger alternative (i.e., that
there is a unique weight of the tent) is not met, since the speaker did not
obey Maximize Presupposition. Because this contrasts with common
knowledge (everything has exactly one weight), it therefore leads to the
oddness of (3). Inferences that result from pragmatic reasoning based
on Maximize Presupposition have special properties and thus must be
distinguished from literal semantic meaning, ordinary presuppositions,
and conversational implicatures: They are weak inferences which can
be cancelled, similar to implicatures, but different from semantic
meaning and presuppositions. Further, similar to presuppositions, they
are projective content (Sauerland, 2008), meaning that they survive
when embedded in, for example, negations or questions. As a con-
sequence, they have been given special names; we will adopt the term
“anti-presupposition” (Percus, 2006) here and speak of the “anti-pre-
supposition theory” of indefinite determiners in the following.
In sum, Maximize Presupposition accounts for anti-uniqueness via
preventing use of a sentence (sometimes referred to as ‘blocking a
sentence’) by a cooperative speaker, when there is a competing sen-
tence that presupposes more and otherwise communicates the same.
For example, the definite determiner “the” is presuppositionally
stronger than the indefinite determiner “a”, because “the” triggers ex-
istence and uniqueness, whereas “a” does not presuppose anything. In
situations where there is exactly one object of a specific kind, it is then
felicitous to use the definite determiner and Maximize Presupposition
blocks the use of the indefinite determiner. In contrast, when the in-
definite determiner is used, it can be reasoned that the speaker was not
in a position to use the definite determiner instead.
1.1.3. Processing predictions from anti-presupposition theory
The previous section introduced the indefinite determiner as a
competitor of the definite determiner. However, it is an open question,
what the relevant cognitive processes are by which the meanings of
determiners are computed and evaluated. Current theories suggest two
different possibilities for how the anti-uniqueness of the indefinite de-
terminer arises: On the one hand, if we do not adopt the anti-pre-
supposition theory of indefinite determiners, but instead assume that
both definite and indefinite determiners presuppose (in a standard
sense) uniqueness and anti-uniqueness, respectively (see Kratzer, 2005,
and the related discussions in Heim, 1991, 2011), only very weak
predictions are possible: Their processing might in fact be different, but
it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict which determiner is more
difficult to process. Thus, predicting no processing difference between
definite and indefinite determiners would be most straightforward.
On the other hand, when adopting the anti-presupposition theory of
indefinite determiners based on the Maximize Presupposition principle,
more precise and testable predictions can be formulated. Specifically,
while a sentence with a definite determiner presupposes uniqueness,
the indefinite determiner leads to anti-uniqueness only indirectly, fol-
lowing a two-step model: (1) the evaluation of the uniqueness-pre-
supposition of the definite determiner and (2) the subsequent negation
of exactly this presupposition. In other words, anti-presupposition
theory predicts that encountering an indefinite determiner is associated
with additional processing costs compared to the evaluation of the
definite determiner through the additional step of negating the un-
iqueness-presupposition. Because of the first step, we expect the un-
iqueness-presupposition to be activated initially (at least temporarily),
but it is important to note that the two steps proceed serially and the
uniqueness- and the anti-uniqueness consideration are not active at the
same time. As will become obvious in a later section, this approach
makes surprising predictions, and here we aim to provide experimental
evidence for them. We will now continue with presenting previous
work speaking to this issue.
1Heim (1983, 2011) also points out that the competition between the definite
and the indefinite determiner can also invoke familiarity versus novelty. More
precisely, the indefinite determiner can also be used to introduce an entirely
novel object to the current context. A more thorough discussion of this is be-
yond the scope of the present paper, though it has to be kept in mind when
designing experiments in a way that put anti-uniqueness into focus, while
preventing issues of novelty as much as possible.
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1.2. Previous experimental investigations of presuppositional content
In this section, we first summarize previous studies on the proces-
sing of determiners. The section closes with a short summary of work in
the field of scalar implicatures, largely because these studies employed
a similar methodology as we will use in our experiments.
By now, many studies have investigated the processing of pre-
suppositions (for a recent review, see Schwarz, 2016a). Regarding de-
finite and indefinite determiners, one of the first studies was run by
Murphy (1984), in which participants read stories sentence by sentence.
Experiment 1 focused on the novelty aspect of indefinite determiners
and compared noun phrases in contexts that only differed in the use of
the definite or indefinite determiner (e.g., “Later, George was passed by
a/the truck, too”). Reading times were significantly longer for the in-
definite compared to the definite determiner, supporting the idea that
finding an antecedent for a definite reference is easier than establishing
a new referent in the discourse model. Experiment 2 investigated the
difference between definite and indefinite references by using pronouns
(e.g., “Sandy rode a bicycle and I rode it, too.” vs. “Sandy rode a bicycle
and I rode one, too.”) and contrasted the indefinite pronoun “one” with
the appropriate definite pronoun. The effect of Experiment 1 was re-
plicated. (Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated further that sentences
comprising singular items are read faster than those with plural items.)
Altmann and Steedman (1988) ran a self-paced reading experiment
and demonstrated processing costs associated with violating the pre-
suppositions of determiners, focusing on the uniqueness-presupposition
of the definite determiner. Therefore, they presented test sentences in
two different contexts: Context 1 introduced two candidates for the
referent (e.g., a safe with a new lock and a safe with an old lock), while
Context 2 introduced exactly one candidate as the referent:
(5a) Context 1: A burglar broke into a bank carrying some dynamite. He planned to
blow open a safe. Once inside he saw that there was a safe with a new lock
and a safe with an old lock.
(5b) Context 2: A burglar broke into a bank carrying some dynamite. He planned to
blow open a safe. Once inside he saw that there was a safe with a new lock
and a strongbox with an old lock.
In the test sentence in (6), the prepositional phrase with the new lock
modified the safe and therefore the uniqueness-presupposition is met,
even when the sentence is presented in a context like (5a). This is,
however, not the case for the test sentence in (7).
(6) The burglar/blew open/the safe/with the new lock/and made of/with the
loot.
(7) The burglar/blew open/the safe/with the dynamite/and made of/with the
loot.
The results of this experiment revealed larger processing costs
during the disambiguation region (i.e., the underlined prepositional
phrase in (6) and (7)), when the uniqueness-presupposition of the de-
finite determiner is not met. Thus, people experience these processing
difficulties already before the end of the sentence. A similar conclusion
results from the studies by van Berkum, Brown, and Hagoort (1999)
with written language and van Berkum, Brown, Hagoort, and
Zwitserlood (2003) with spoken language. In both studies, event related
potentials (ERP) of the EEG were analyzed and the definite determiner
evoked early ERP effects when the uniqueness-presupposition was not
met (for further evidence, see Burkhardt, 2006; Haviland & Clark, 1974;
Schumacher, 2009).
Tiemann et al. (2011) reported evidence for an immediate proces-
sing of presuppositions and longer reading times in falsifying versus
supporting contexts from three acceptability ratings and self-paced
reading studies on different presupposition triggers (German “wieder”
(English “again”), “auch” (English “also”), “aufhören” (English “stop”),
“wissen” (English “know'”), and definites in the shape of possessive
noun phrases). First, sentences with an unfulfilled presupposition, that
is, an infelicitous use of the presupposition trigger, were rated as less
acceptable than sentences without a presupposition trigger, but more
acceptable than ungrammatical sentences. Second, reading times for
the word following the trigger in sentences with presuppositions were
longer than in the corresponding grammatical condition without a
presupposition, but shorter than in the ungrammatical sentences. Thus,
an evaluation of a presupposition seems to be initiated upon en-
countering the trigger. Third, when the authors compared sentences
with a presupposition when the given context explicitly verified versus
falsified the presupposition, reading times were significantly longer in
the falsifying than in the verifying condition in the region where the
content of the presupposition was known (i.e., in the disambiguation
region). Because reading time analyses did not distinguish the different
presupposition triggers, it remains unclear though whether the results
are valid for all triggers or were driven by a subset of them.
The studies mentioned so far focused on, or at least included, the
definite determiner. Other studies directly compared the definite with
the indefinite determiner and provided evidence that readers are aware
of the semantics and pragmatics of (in)definite determiners and as-
sociate the definite determiner with uniqueness and the indefinite de-
terminer with anti-uniqueness. For example, two experiments of Clifton
(2013) reported more processing difficulties for indefinite than for
definite determiner phrases. Participants were presented with context
sentences that established whether there are one or multiple of the
relevant items (e.g., “In the kitchen …” vs. “In the appliance store…”)
and the following test sentence contained either a definite or an in-
definite determiner (“The stove…” vs. “A stove…”). Reading times in
contexts that stereotypically provided a single possible referent for the
definite determiner phrase or multiple possible referents for an in-
definite determiner phrase were shorter than when context and type of
determiner did not match (e.g., definite determiner in a context pro-
viding multiple items). It is noteworthy that these results were only
obtained when participants were required to perform an additional
simple arithmetic task in between reading the sentence and answering a
question about it (Exp. 2 and 4). By this additional task, Clifton forced
the participants to comprehend the sentence to a deeper level, because
he prevented rehearsing the sentence until the question was presented.
Kirsten et al. (2014) also investigated the uniqueness-presupposition
of the definite determiner and the anti-uniqueness associated with the
indefinite determiner. The authors constructed sets consisting of two
types of context sentences (see Examples (8a) and (8b)) and two types
of test sentences that were similar except for the used determiner (“the/
a”; see Example (9)). Both test sentences were combined with both
possible contexts: Using the definite determiner in a test sentence
matched with the context in Example (8a), but mismatched with the
context in Example (8b); in contrast, using the indefinite determiner
matched with the context in Example (8b), but mismatched with the
context in Example (8a).
(8a) Antje visited the Duesseldorf zoo yesterday and saw a polar bear in the bear
enclosure.
(8b) Antje visited the Duesseldorf zoo yesterday and saw some polar bears in the
bear enclosure.
(9) Antje noticed that the/a polar bear was very aggressive.
In their self-paced reading experiment, Kirsten et al. (2014) re-
corded EEG and observed processing differences between both de-
terminers in ERP amplitudes but not in their latencies. In addition, the
data indicate similar processing costs for both determiners in mis-
matching (i.e., in infelicitous) sentences, where the uniqueness/anti-
uniqueness condition of the determiner is not met. Nonetheless, the
authors suggested qualitatively different underlying processes for both
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determiners, for example, an increased impact on working memory in
case of the definite determiner. Similar results were obtained in a
magnetoencephalography (MEG) study with auditorily presented test
sentences (Hertrich et al., 2015).
In sum, the reviewed studies suggest that a presupposition trigger is
processed immediately or briefly after encountering it (e.g., Kirsten
et al., 2014; Schwarz, 2007; Tiemann et al., 2011). Furthermore, pro-
cessing seems to be more difficult when the presupposition is not met
by the context, that is, in infelicitous compared with felicitous sentences
(e.g., Burkhardt, 2006; Kirsten et al., 2014; Tiemann et al., 2011), al-
though this may depend on additional cognitive load (Clifton, 2013).
Finally, processing of the definite and indefinite determiner appears to
differ (e.g., Kirsten et al., 2014; van Berkum et al., 1999, 2003), but
experimental studies investigating the time-course and the reasons for
these differences are rare. Importantly, to the best of our knowledge, no
study so far directly demonstrates that the indefinite determiner indeed
implicates the initial activation of the uniqueness-presupposition of the
definite determiner, as is suggested by anti-presupposition theory. From
a cognitive psychologist’s point of view, one would expect that the
assumed activation should leave measurable traces on human behavior;
this is what the present study aims to demonstrate.
We will close this section by briefly turning to the field of scalar
implicatures where two-step models are also discussed. These studies
provide the methodological background for our experiments, although
it is important to note that the two processing steps for scalar im-
plicatures differ from those we suggest for the indefinite determiner:
Implicatures involve the pragmatic enrichment of truth conditional
semantic content, while anti-uniqueness of the indefinite determiner
involves negation of presuppositional semantic content. Nevertheless,
we expect those underlying processes to leave similar traces in the
mouse-tracking data. For instance, Tomlinson, Bailey, and Bott (2013)
used mouse-tracking to distinguish a one-step model, where the im-
plicature is evaluated directly in only one step, and the two-step model
of processing implicatures (see also Bott & Noveck, 2004). Participants
were asked to judge sentences like “Some elephants are mammals “as
“true” or “false”. Importantly, such sentences can be evaluated in a
logical way (“some and possibly all”) suggesting a “true” response, or in
a pragmatic way (“some, but not all”) suggesting a “false” response.
Participants were to move the mouse cursor to response boxes in the
two top corners labeled as “true” or “false”, and the two-step model
predicts initial deviations toward the “true” response before then
changing direction toward the “false” response for the pragmatic, but
for the logical, interpretation. For example, in Experiment 1, Tomlinson
et al. used a training phase with error feedback (see also Bott & Noveck,
2004) to bias participants into interpreting the sentences in either the
logical or the pragmatic way. The data revealed the predicted pattern,
and this result supports the suggested two-step processing of scalar
implicatures, that is, people first access a truth conditional semantic
content meaning and then enrich this meaning pragmatically with the
scalar implicature (Tomlinson et al., 2013). Similar results were ob-
tained by Huang and Snedeker (2011) in an eye-tracking study, further
corroborating this conclusion.
In sum, these experiments showed that the methodology of mouse-
tracking is suited to demonstrate evidence for a two-step model in-
volved in processing scalar implicatures. In the present study, we
adopted this methodology to investigate a two-step model of processing
the indefinite determiner. Importantly though, the two steps suggested
for implicatures and anti-presuppositions are different ones: The two
steps for processing scalar implicatures are (1) evaluation of the truth
conditional semantic content meaning, followed by (2) the pragmatic
enrichment, whereas for the indefinite determiner they are (1) con-
sideration of the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner
and (2) the negation of this presuppositional content. Hence, although
both are pragmatic phenomena, the assumed processing steps clearly
differ.
1.3. The present study
We compared the unfolding of processing the interpretation of de-
finite and indefinite determiners in two mouse-tracking experiments. In
the following, we first introduce this particular method, then we ex-
plain the setup and idea of our two experiments, and finally relate our
hypotheses to the variables obtained from mouse-tracking.
1.3.1. Mouse-tracking as a method
Hand movements have been shown to be very sensitive to reveal the
temporal dynamics of cognitive states (Song & Nakayama, 2009; see
also Freeman, Dale, & Farmer, 2011). Recording movements of the
computer mouse on its way to a particular goal-location representing a
certain decision is an easy way to gather the required continuous data,
and has become increasingly popular in cognitive psychology and ex-
perimental linguistics in recent years.
One of the first applications of this method to language processing
used mouse movements to probe whether phonologically similar words
are activated during sentence processing (Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich,
2005). Participants were presented with one picture in the upper left
and another one in the upper right corner of the screen. In one condi-
tion, the depicted words were similar in their initial phonemes (e.g.,
“candle” vs. “candy”), while in another condition they were not (e.g.,
“candle” vs. “summer”). Participants started a mouse movement in the
lower center of the screen and listened to an auditorily presented sti-
mulus sentence, for example, “Click the candle!”. When the initial
phonemes of the words were similar, the trajectories of the movements
towards the correct upper corner showed an attraction of the compe-
titor. Thus, while processing the target word, competing phonological
representations appear active and influence the exact way the hand
moves. Similar approaches have since been applied to, for example,
social cognitive questions (Freeman & Ambady, 2011), conflict tasks
(Scherbaum, Dshemuchadse, Fischer, & Goschke, 2010), the effects of
irrelevant stimulus variation on action execution (Janczyk, Pfister, &
Kunde, 2013), or the influence of action consequences on action ex-
ecution (Pfister, Janczyk, Wirth, Dignath, & Kunde, 2014; Wirth,
Pfister, Janczyk, & Kunde, 2015). Mouse tracking has also been used to
study conversational implicatures (Sauerland, Tamura, Koizumi, &
Tomlinson, 2015; Tomlinson & Bott, 2013), predictive disambiguation
based on early intonational cues (Roettger & Franke, 2018; Roettger &
Stoeber, 2017), and sentence negation (Dale & Duran, 2011). Here, we
apply this method to presupposition processing with the particular aim
of providing evidence for the two-step processing of indefinite de-
terminers.
While the mere trajectories already provide information about on-
going cognitive processes, several parameters are usually extracted
from the trajectories for further statistical analyses. We here focus on
the following parameters: (1) Area under the curve is the area between
the empirical trajectory and the ideal path from the starting point to the
end point of the trajectory, and is thought to provide a general measure
of processing difficulty (see Freeman & Ambady, 2010): the more dif-
ficult the task the larger becomes the area under the curve. (2) Move-
ment time is the time from stimulus onset until the cursor hits a re-
sponse box. (3) Xneg is the amount of horizontal deviation toward the
competitor (i.e., toward the non-target response) and is measured as the
maximum x-coordinate reached by the mouse as it veers away from the
target response. This measure is particularly useful for detecting two-
step processes, in which the second step involves a negation of the first
step and is therefore expected to trigger a reversal in mouse direction
(cf. Tomlinson et al., 2013, for an example with implicatures).
1.3.2. General approach and procedure
The mouse-tracking task we used in our experiments is illustrated in
Fig. 1. Participants were asked to judge the appropriateness of test
sentences in the context of a short visualized story (see Fig. 2 for ex-
amples). Each trial of the experiment began with a context (see Fig. 1.1)
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which contained a box (the “shopping basket”) with three pieces of fruit
in the upper part of the screen (the context relevant fruit) and was
described with two sentences, for example, “Jan's mother was shopping.
She bought one banana and two pears.” (German original: “Jan’s Mutter
war einkaufen. Sie hat eine Banane und zwei Birnen gekauft.“). Below
was a picture of Jan. Participants were then to move the mouse cursor
into the start box (centered at the lower part of the screen) to initiate
the next part of the story where Jan received one piece of the three
context fruit (see Fig. 1.2). The additional visualization with an arrow
highlighted that this particular fruit was transferred from the shopping
basket to Jan. To further emphasize that Jan actually received one of
the three fruit, the transferred fruit was removed from the shopping
Fig. 1. Illustration of the task we used in the two experiments (see text for more information).
Fig. 2. Examples for the six different
conditions resulting from combining
the three sentence types (false vs. feli-
citous vs. infelicitous) with the two de-
terminers (definite vs. indefinite). The
color of the word indicating the ex-
pected response refers to the color of
the respective response box. The words
“true” and “false” were not presented
on the screen. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure legend,
the reader is referred to the web version
of this article.)
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basket. All these measures were taken to make clear that Jan received
one of the three initially introduced context fruit, instead of, for ex-
ample, a novel one.2 Participants then started their movement into the
upper direction and the test sentence appeared below Jan, for example,
“Of these, Jan received a pear.” (German original: “Davon hat Jan eine
Birne bekommen.”; see Fig. 1.3). This dynamic starting procedure was
recommended by Scherbaum and Kieslich (2018), because a static
starting condition might lead to less consistent mouse movements. Fi-
nally, participants judged the test sentence against the background of
the context as “true” or “false” by moving the mouse into the corre-
sponding response box located at the top left and top right corners of
the screen (see Fig. 1.4). The boxes were colored in green and red to
indicate a “true” and a “false” response. In the example depicted in
Fig. 1, a “true” response was appropriate.
Six conditions resulted from crossing the two determiners (definite
vs. indefinite) with three sentence types (false vs. felicitous vs. in-
felicitous; see Fig. 2 for examples of the following). In false sentences,
Jan was depicted receiving a different fruit than the one named in the
test sentence and a “false” response can be given without processing
(anti-)uniqueness of the determiner. In felicitous sentences, the context
satisfied (anti-)uniqueness associated with the determiner used in the
test sentence. Thus, for definite determiners, the story depicted Jan
receiving the unique piece of fruit (the banana), and for indefinite de-
terminers, Jan received one of the non-unique pieces of fruit (a pear). In
infelicitous sentences, the context violated the (anti-)uniqueness of the
determiner. Thus, for definite determiners, the story depicted Jan re-
ceiving one of the non-unique pieces of fruit (a pear), violating the
uniqueness presupposition. For indefinite determiners, Jan received the
unique piece of fruit (the banana), violating the anti-uniqueness asso-
ciation of the indefinite determiner. The expected response was “false”
for both the infelicitous and false sentences, and “true” for the felicitous
sentences (see Fig. 2). Stimulus sentences were of the form “Of these,
Jan received [determiner: ‘the’ or ‘a’] [fruit].” Seven kinds of fruit were
used (banana, lemon, orange, pear, pineapple, plum, and strawberry),
all in conjunction with the feminine determiner to avoid the possibility
of early disambiguation and to keep the sentences as parallel as pos-
sible.
Test sentences started with the word “Davon” (English ”Of these,
…“) to emphasize that Jan received a fruit from the three initial fruit of
the shopping basket. This facilitates an interpretation of the test sen-
tences and evaluation of the determiner according to the presented
local context (i.e., the shopping basket) instead of a more global context
(e.g., all available fruit of the world). According to Singh (2011), it is
then maximally likely that participants interpret the determiner in the
restricted local context where anti-uniqueness and novelty completely
coincide.
Because the German word “eine” can also be used as a numeral,
participants received error feedback based on the intended pragmatic
interpretation of this word in felicitous and infelicitous sentences as an
indefinite determiner. (In false sentences, accuracy can be determined
on logical grounds and respective error feedback was presented as
well.) In Experiment 1, this feedback was provided throughout the
experiment; in Experiment 2, it was only provided during a practice
phase, but not in the subsequent test phase (for a similar approach to
bias interpretations of scalar implicatures, see Tomlinson et al., 2013,
and others). It might be true that we induce the indefinite determiner
interpretation of the German word “eine” with this feedback. However,
this seems necessary to us with respect to our research question, that is,
whether we can observe empirical evidence for the psychological rea-
lity of the two-step model of processing the indefinite determiner, as
suggested by anti-presupposition theory, if participants interpret the
word “eine” as the indefinite determiner.
Labeling the responses as “true” and “false” was chosen to stay in
line with previously published work in the field of scalar implicatures
(Bott, Bailey, & Grodner, 2012; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Tomlinson et al.,
2013). Note though that these words did never appear on the screen,
where the response boxes were simply colored green and red.
1.3.3. Research questions and hypotheses
We were interested in two research questions: (1) Are there pro-
cessing differences between the definite and the indefinite determiner?
and if so (2) What causes these differences? The studies reviewed above
suggest that the answer to question (1) is ‘yes.’ As for question (2), anti-
presupposition theory claims that the anti-uniqueness interpretation of
the indefinite determiner is derived only indirectly, because it relies on
a two-step process as described above. By first accessing and then ne-
gating the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner, a
longer and more complex processing signature for the indefinite de-
terminer is predicted. The overarching question we thus ask is: Is there
evidence for the psychological reality of this two-step processing of
indefinite determiners? In the next section, we describe how the pre-
dictions map onto the measures obtained through mouse-tracking.
The most interesting predictions for our purposes relate to differ-
ences between the definite and the indefinite determiner in those
conditions where the presupposition-component matters, that is, in the
felicitous and the infelicitous conditions. First, anti-presupposition theory
predicts greater processing difficulty for the indefinite relative to the
definite determiner, which we predict will lead to an overall larger area
under the curve and longer movement times for the indefinite relative
to the definite determiner. Second, and most importantly, anti-pre-
supposition theory predicts that the anti-uniqueness associated with the
indefinite determiner results from initially considering the uniqueness-
presupposition of the definite determiner and then negating it. This, we
predict, will lead to larger Xneg values for the indefinite relative to the
definite determiner. More precisely, consider first the definite de-
terminers (see Fig. 2 for examples). In a felicitous sentence, the un-
iqueness-presupposition is supported by the context and mouse move-
ments directly head toward the expected “true” response. In an
infelicitous sentence, the uniqueness-presupposition is not supported by
the context, and mouse movements directly head toward the expected
“false” response. In both cases, low Xneg values are expected. For the
indefinite determiners we assume an initial activation of the unique-
ness-presupposition as well. In case of a felicitous sentence, the initial
activation of the uniqueness-presupposition is not supported by the
context, and participants are expected to first show a bias towards a
“false” response even when they eventually select the “true” response.
In infelicitous sentences, uniqueness is supported by the context, and
participants are expected to first show a bias towards a “true” response,
even when they eventually select the “false” response. This would be
reflected in high Xneg values. In sum, anti-presupposition theory pre-
dicts larger Xneg values for the indefinite compared with the definite
determiner for the infelicitous sentences, but surprisingly, also for the
felicitous sentences (see also the Online Supplement for a more detailed
description).
Predictions are different though for the false control sentences,
where the presented picture and the fruit mentioned in the test sentence
do not match. Because these sentences can be falsified without
2With the description of the context in form of a sentence that introduces
exactly one banana with the indefinite determiner, the indefinite determiner in
the following test sentence cannot be used to refer to the same banana again.
For a further illustration consider the following example:
(a) Last weekend Jan had a view of a new flat.
(b) #A flat was very expensive.
Here, “a” cannot refer to the same flat in (a) and (b). The use of “a” in (a)
introduces a flat and with the use of "a" in (b) one expects there to be a second
expensive flat. Thus, our procedure worked as much as possible against the
introduction of a novel fruit by the participants, in addition to the ones men-
tioned in the context. Note that this emphasized the infelicity of the indefinite
determiner in infelicitous sentences and thus facilitates a “false” response.
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processing the (anti-)presupposition, they are expected to cause the
least processing problems (compared with the felicitous and infelicitous
sentences; see Schwarz, 2016b, for such observation) and no differences
are expected between the two determiners in this case.
Further, we expect more difficult processing in the infelicitous than
in the felicitous conditions as suggested by results from previous studies
(see Burkhardt, 2006; Haviland & Clark, 1974; Schumacher, 2009; van
Berkum et al., 1999; but see Clifton, 2013). We predict this to result in a
larger area under the curve and longer movement times.
In sum, we expect a larger area under the curve and longer move-
ment times for the indefinite than for the definite determiner in feli-
citous and infelicitous sentences, but not in false sentences. The re-
spective values are also expected to be smallest for the false sentences,
intermediate for felicitous and largest for infelicitous sentences. The
theoretically most interesting prediction concerns Xneg values: if pro-
cessing of the indefinite determiner indeed implicates a temporary ac-
tivation of the uniqueness-presupposition, larger Xneg values are ex-
pected for the indefinite determiner in the felicitous and infelicitous
sentences. This prediction is derived from anti-presupposition theory
against the background of the Maximize Presupposition principle, but,
importantly, is not made by competing theories of the indefinite de-
terminer (e.g., that the indefinite determiner has its own presupposi-
tion; see Kratzer, 2005, and the related discussions in Heim, 1991,
2011).3 It should further be noted here that two thirds of the trials
required a “false” response, and only one third required a “true” re-
sponse. This unequal distribution might induce a slight bias toward the
“false” response box. As a consequence, Xneg values would be enlarged
for the felicitous sentences (i.e., an overestimation of Xneg would be
observed), while for infelicitous sentences, this bias reduces the Xneg
values (which are thus underestimated). While this works against ob-
serving processing costs for infelicitous sentences, it is important to
note that such a bias does not affect the important differences between
definite and indefinite determiners.
2. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, participants performed the task introduced above.
Accuracy feedback was provided in all conditions throughout the ex-
periment to encourage participants to evaluate test sentences based on
their relevant pragmatic components, that is, whether the sentences’
uniqueness or anti-uniqueness meaning components are met in the
context or not.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
The intended sample size was n=20. Data were collected from
twenty-two native speakers of German, of which two participants were
excluded because of more than 30% mouse errors (stops or turns) (final
sample: mean age= 24.6 years, 15 females, 5 males). All participants
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and signed written in-
formed consent prior to data collection.
2.1.2. Apparatus and Stimuli
Stimulus presentation and response collection were controlled by a
notebook connected to a TFT-screen, with screen resolution set to
1280×1024 px. (visible screen size: 53× 30 cm). Start and response
boxes were 60× 60 px. The start box was centered at the lower part of
the screen. The response boxes were located in the upper left/right
corner and were colored in green and red to indicate a “true” and a
“false” response, but the words “true” and “false” did not appear on the
screen. Between the response boxes, the outline of a rectangle was
displayed (the shopping basket), and the three context fruits were dis-
played within it. A picture of Jan was visible below the rectangle. All
visual stimuli and sentential materials were presented against a white
background with black font color.
2.1.3. Task and Procedure
The participants’ task was to evaluate the stimulus sentence against
the provided context and the fruit Jan received at the beginning of each
trial. Instructions were provided in written form including a graphical
illustration of the setup. For this illustration, the pictures of
Fig. 1.1.–1.3 were used and additionally described in sentences. The
required answers were also illustrated with an infelicitous sentence
using a definite determiner to make participants more sensitive to in-
felicitous uses of determiners without explaining in detail the concept
of felicity in the instruction phase. Finally, participants were instructed
to perform smooth mouse movements without any stops and backward
movements, and they were made familiar with the fruit we used in the
experiment and their depiction. Following previous work, participants
were instructed to judge the test sentence as “true” or “false” against
the visualized context.4
Each trial started with the presentation of the initial scene along
with its description (see Fig. 1.1). Participants were then required to
stay with the mouse cursor in the start box for 500ms before pre-
sentation of the next scene (see Fig. 1.2). From then on, participants
needed to start their mouse movement within 5,000ms to trigger pre-
sentation of the test sentence (see Fig. 1.3) and to finish within
12,000ms. The visual stimulus sentence was presented when the mouse
cursor was moved a minimum of 60 px outside the start box into the
upper direction, within a corridor of 60 px horizontally centered (to
prevent participants from leaving the start box in a diagonal direction).
Participants were instructed to select the correct response box as soon
as possible then. When participants took longer than 5000ms to initiate
their movement or longer than 12,000ms to finish the movement, they
received the visual feedback “Please answer faster” (German original:
“Bitte schneller antworten”). Error feedback (“Wrong answer”; German
original: “Falsche Antwort”) for undesired responses (see Fig. 2) was
also provided visually in all conditions throughout the whole experi-
ment. All feedback was presented centrally in black against the white
background for 3000ms.
For the first three blocks, the green response box was in the left or
right corner and the red response box in the respective other corner.
The locations were then changed for the remaining three blocks. The
initial location was counterbalanced across participants, but each par-
ticipant performed with both possibilities for two reasons. First, to
counteract possible influences of the preferred reading direction on the
mouse movements. Second, to counteract an evolving bias toward the
red response box (which was required in two thirds of the trials; see
above). Participants were informed about the locations prior to each
half of the experiment.
Each experimental block comprised 36 trials, resulting from six
sentences of each condition (see Fig. 2). As participants performed in
six blocks with 36 items each, this results in a total 216 test items.
Another 12 un-analyzed practice trials, two of each condition, preceded
Blocks 1 and 4. The combination of the context and the test sentence on
3 Reviewers of this manuscript raised the possibility of other interpretations
of the German word “eine” than the intended one as the indefinite determiner.
We will consider these interpretations in the General Discussion and detailed
accounts are provided in the Online Supplement of this article.
4We are aware that there is a difference between logical truth and felicity,
but we followed previous work on scalar implicatures (Bott et al., 2004;
Tomlinson & Bott, 2013) where the same problem exists. Further, the chosen
labels are understood intuitively by the naïve participants, who are usually not
trained in pragmatic theory. Explaining the meaning of “felicitous” and “in-
felicitous” and to ask participants for felicity judgments is difficult, when par-
ticipants have no/only little linguistic understanding. Note also that this would
include telling the participants what felicity means and direct their attention to
the research question we were interested in.
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each trial was drawn randomly from the pool of all logically possible
combinations: With seven types of fruit it is possible to create 84 false
combinations with definite and indefinite determiners, and 42 felicitous
and infelicitous combinations with definite and indefinite determiners.
For the experimental blocks, 36 such combinations were required for
each of the six conditions, and each practice block required two addi-
tional such combinations per condition. Thus, in sum 40 different
combinations were required for each of the six conditions in Experi-
ment 1. Because there is no a priori reason to judge which combinations
should be used, we drew randomly from all possible ones (note that
increasing the number of items per condition by just one would have
required more sentences than were available for felicitous and in-
felicitous sentences).
The experimenter demonstrated the task prior to the experiment
with 12 additional trials using false sentences and emphasized a smooth
mouse movement without stops and vertical turns. This was done to
reduce errors in mouse movements and thereby to minimize the
number of participants that were excluded because of more than 30%
mouse movement errors.
Following published work in the field of scalar implicatures (Bott &
Noveck, 2004) and negation processing (Dale & Duran, 2011) we did
not include filler items. The inclusion of filler items would also imply a
reduction of test items, and thus a reduced ability to detect the pre-
dicted patterns of the dependent variables due to more noisy data.
2.1.4. Design and analyses
Trials with unspecific errors (initiation time too long, response too
slow), stops of the mouse movement (no movement within 200ms), or
backward movements (> 2px) were excluded from the data set first. As
mentioned above, two participants were excluded because more than
30% of their trials met the last two criteria. Additional 4.7% of the trials
of the remaining 20 participants were excluded because of such errors.
Further, trials with incorrect responses were omitted from the data
(3.3%). For mouse data analyses, trajectories were centered to a
common starting point at× =0 and y=120 (which is the y-co-
ordinate that needed to be exceeded for presentation of the test sen-
tence), with all trajectories ending in the left response box. Calculation
of the dependent measures area under the curve, movement time, and
Xneg was based on raw trajectories, following Kieslich and Henninger
(2017). To plot mean trajectories (see Fig. 3), data was time-normalized
to 101 timesteps.
Two independent variables were of interest: (1) sentence type (false
vs. felicitous vs. infelicitous) and (2) determiner (definite vs. in-
definite). The trajectory measures area under the curve, movement
time, and Xnegwere first screened for outliers and trials were excluded if
the respective value deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations from
the design cell mean (calculated separately for each participant). Error
rates were also analyzed to exclude tradeoffs with the time-based
measures (see Liesefeld & Janczyk, 2019). Given the hypotheses of the
present study, the trajectory measures and error rates were then ana-
lyzed with planned contrasts within the 3× 2 factorial design with
sentence type and determiner as repeated-measures. In particular, a set
of Helmert contrasts was formulated on sentence type. Contrast 1
compared false sentences with the average of felicitous and infelicitous
sentences; Contrast 2 compared felicitous and infelicitous sentences.
Using the two orthogonal Helmert contrasts has the advantage to allow
for testing interactions of the contrasts as defined on the factor sentence
type with the factor determiner in addition. This latter point is im-
portant, because we predicted the same increase in Xneg values for the
indefinite compared with the definite determiner for both the felicitous
and the infelicitous sentences. In other words, Contrast 2 should not
interact with the factor determiner, in particular for the Xneg values.
(For completeness, the results of the omnibus 3× 2 Analyses of Var-
iance are provided in the Online Supplement of this article.) For Xneg,
one-sample t-tests against 0 were additionally calculated (note that by
definition Xneg cannot become less than 0). When hypotheses allowed
predictions of particular directions (i.e., false < felicitous/infelicitous;
felicitous < infelicitous; definite < indefinite determiner), single-
tailed p-values are reported. Otherwise, tests were two-tailed.
Fig. 3. Mean trajectories for both experiments as a function of sentence type
and determiner (for examples of the six different conditions, see Fig. 2). The
mouse trajectories visualized in this figure are always mapped to the final re-
sponse, which was “true” for the felicitous sentences and “false” for the other
sentences. This was done to allow an easier comparison of the different tra-
jectories. The stimulus sentence was presented once the mouse cursor vertically
left the grey shaded area.
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2.2. Results
Fig. 3a visualizes the mean trajectories as a function of sentence
type and determiner. For false sentences, no difference between the two
determiners is apparent. In contrast, for the felicitous and the in-
felicitous sentences, the deviation toward the final response location
started later for the indefinite determiner, and overall later for in-
felicitous sentences. In addition, a slight deviation toward the non-
target response is apparent for the indefinite determiner.
These impressions are corroborated when considering the trajectory
measures (see Fig. 4). Area under the curve (1.71% outliers) was larger
for felicitous and infelicitous sentences compared with false sentences,
Contrast 1: t(19)= 5.53, p < .001, g=1.24, rcontrast=0.79,
5 and this
contrast interacted with the variable determiner, t(19)= 2.46,
p= .023, g=0.55, rcontrast=0.49, reflecting a smaller difference be-
tween definite and indefinite determiners in false sentences compared
with the two other sentence types. The difference between felicitous
and infelicitous sentences was also significant, Contrast 2: t(19)= 3.05,
p= .003, g=0.68, rcontrast=0.57, but the contrast did not interact
with the variable determiner, t(19)= 1.52, p= .145, g=0.34,
rcontrast=0.33. Overall, area under the curve was larger for the in-
definite than for the definite determiner, t(19)= 4.02, p < .001,
g=0.90, rcontrast=0.68. Because Contrast 1 interacted with the vari-
able determiner, the difference between definite and indefinite de-
terminers was assessed for each sentence type. It was not significant for
false sentences, t(19)= 0.57, p= .287, g=0.13, rcontrast=0.13, but
was so for felicitous, t(19)= 2.62, p= .008, g=0.59, rcontrast=0.52,
and infelicitous sentences, t(19)= 4.56, p < .001, g=1.02,
rcontrast=0.72.
Movement times (2.34% outliers) were longer for felicitous and
infelicitous sentences compared with false sentences, Contrast 1: t
(19)= 5.00, p < .001, g=1.12, rcontrast=0.75, but this contrast did
not interact with the variable determiner, t(19)= 1.32, p= .203,
g=0.29, rcontrast=0.29. Further, the difference between felicitous and
infelicitous sentences was significant, Contrast 2: t(19)= 6.20,
p < .001, g=1.39, rcontrast=0.82, but this contrast also did not in-
teract with the variable determiner, t(19)=−0.37, p= .714,
g=−0.08, rcontrast=0.08. Overall, movement times were longer for
the indefinite than for the definite determiner, t(19)= 3.44, p= .002,
g=0.77, rcontrast=0.62.
6
Xneg values (3.67% outliers) were larger for felicitous and in-
felicitous sentences compared with false sentences, Contrast 1: t
(19)= 5.61, p < .001, g=1.25, rcontrast=0.79, and this contrast in-
teracted with the variable determiner, t(19)= 3.16, p= .005, g=0.71,
rcontrast=0.59. The difference between felicitous and infelicitous sen-
tences was also significant, Contrast 2: t(19)= 2.70, p= .007,
g=0.60, rcontrast=0.53, but this contrast did not interact with the
variable determiner, t(19)= 0. 98, p= .341, g=0.22, rcontrast=0.22.
Overall, Xneg values were larger for the indefinite than for the definite
determiner, t(19)= 3.11, p= .003, g=0.69, rcontrast=0.58. Because
Contrast 1 interacted with the variable determiner, the difference be-
tween definite and indefinite determiners was assessed for each sen-
tence type. It was not significant for false sentences, t(19)= 1.25,
p= .114, g=0.28, rcontrast=0.28, but for felicitous sentences, t
(19)= 1.92, p= .035, g=0.43, rcontrast=0.40, and for infelicitous
sentences, t(19)= 3.94, p < .001, g=0.88, rcontrast=0.67. For all
conditions, the Xneg values differed significantly from zero, all t(19)
s≥ 3.82, all ps≤ .001.
Error rates (see Table 1) were larger for felicitous and infelicitous
sentences compared with false sentences, Contrast 1: t(19)= 3.23,
p= .002, g=0.72, rcontrast=0.60, but this contrast did not interact
with the variable determiner, t(19)= 1.76, p= .094, g=0.39,
rcontrast=0.37. The difference between felicitous and infelicitous sen-
tences was significant, Contrast 2: t(19)= 1.96, p= .032, g=0.44,
rcontrast=0.41, but the contrast did not interacted with the variable
determiner, t(19)= 0.11, p= .911, g=0.03, rcontrast=0.03. Overall,
error rates were larger for the indefinite than for the definite de-
terminer, t(19)= 3.62, p < .001, g=0.81, rcontrast=0.64.
Fig. 4. Means of the trajectory measures as a function of sentence type and determiner from Experiment 1. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for
the (pairwise) difference between definite and indefinite determiners calculated separately for each dependent measure and sentence type (see Pfister & Janczyk,
2013).
5 The effect size rcontrast is the partial correlation between dependent variable
scores on the individual level and the mean score as predicted by the respective
contrast (Rosenthal, Rosnow, & Rubin, 2000). Put simply, rcontrast is the contrast
analysis-equivalent to ηp.
6Although determiner did not interact with the contrasts, we tested the dif-
ferences between definite and indefinite determiners for each sentence type
separately and report them here for completeness. It was not significant for false
sentences, t(19) = 0.26, p= .400, g= 0.06, rcontrast = 0.06, but for felicitous, t
(19) = 2.52, p = .001, g= 0.56, rcontrast = 0.50, and for infelicitous sentences,
t(19) = 1.93, p = .034, g = 0.43, rcontrast = 0.40.
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2.3. Discussion
Experiment 1 revealed several interesting results. First, area under
the curve was larger and movement times were longer for indefinite
than for definite determiners in felicitous and infelicitous sentences.
Thus, there appears to be an increased processing effort associated with
indefinite determiners. In addition, and most importantly, Xneg values
were reliably larger for indefinite than for definite determiners, and this
was true for both felicitous and infelicitous sentences. This suggests that
the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner is at least
briefly and temporarily activated and evaluated by participants upon
encountering an indefinite determiner, as is suggested by anti-pre-
supposition theory.
Second, area under the curve was smaller and movement times were
shorter in the false compared to the felicitous and infelicitous condi-
tions, and no difference between determiners was observed in the false
condition. Thus, mere falsification of a sentence, which does not require
assessing a presupposition-related meaning component, comes with the
least processing difficulties.
Third, overall area under the curve was smaller and movement
times were shorter in the felicitous condition compared to the in-
felicitous condition. Thus, it appears that processing is more difficult in
case of infelicitous compared with felicitous sentences (see also
Hertrich et al., 2015; Kirsten et al., 2014; Tiemann et al., 2011; and
others).
In sum, these results are well in line with our predictions. However,
the error feedback provided throughout the whole experiment adds
some oddness to the experiment, because in natural language use, a
speaker is often not provided immediate feedback concerning her in-
terpretation of an utterance. In Experiment 2, we borrowed an ap-
proach used by Tomlinson et al. (2013, Exp. 1) and “primed” partici-
pants toward the intended indefinite interpretation of the German word
“eine” only during the initial practice phase. Thus, the practice phase
was extended and feedback was provided in all conditions in this
practice phase, but not during the subsequent test blocks. Since this
may reduce the impact of the suspected processing difficulties on the
mouse trajectories, we increased sample size as a countermeasure.
3. Experiment 2
This experiment largely resembled Experiment 1, but error feedback
was only provided during the practice phase, but not during the sub-
sequent test blocks.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
The intended sample size in this experiment was increased to
n=50. Data were collected from fifty-three native speakers of German,
of which three participants were excluded because of more than 30%
mouse errors (final sample: mean age=24.2 years, 39 females, 11
males). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision
and signed written informed consent prior to data collection.
3.1.2. Stimuli, Apparatus, Task, Procedure, Design, and Analyses
The experiment resembled Experiment 1 with the following
changes: Participants received error feedback only during the practice
trials prior to the experimental blocks. The practice phase before Block
1 was increased to 48 trials made of 24 different trials repeated twice in
a random order. Thus, we required additional six combinations (of
context and test sentence) per condition in this experiment. For the
experimental blocks, 36 combinations of context and test sentence were
required for each of the six conditions. In sum, Experiment 2 required
all available 42 different combinations for felicitous and infelicitous
sentences, which were presented in a random order. The 42 different
false combinations for each determiner were randomly drawn from the
available false combinations (see Experiment 1 for more details). We
removed 8.2% of the trials because of unspecific errors or mouse
movement errors.
Table 1
Mean error rates (percentage) as a function of sentence type and determiner for
both experiments.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
determiner determiner
sentence type definite indefinite definite indefinite
false 0.61 2.29 1.48 1.03
felicitous 1.29 4.68 2.62 5.75
infelicitous 3.73 7.36 3.75 3.16
Fig. 5. Means of the trajectory measures as a function of sentence type and determiner from Experiment 2. Error bars are 95% within-subject confidence intervals for
the (pairwise) difference between definite and indefinite determiners calculated separately for each dependent measure and sentence type (see Pfister & Janczyk,
2013).
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3.2. Results
Mean trajectories are visualized in Fig. 3b and means of all trajec-
tory measures are visualized in Fig. 5. The general impression is very
similar to the results of Experiment 1. All dependent measures showed
higher values for felicitous and infelicitous sentences compared with
false sentences, and higher values for indefinite than for definite de-
terminers, but only within the felicitous and infelicitous sentences. A
slight deviation toward the non-target response for indefinite determi-
ners seems also to be present.
The area under the curve (1.62% outliers) was larger for felicitous
and infelicitous sentences compared with false sentences, Contrast 1: t
(49)= 9.60, p < .001, g=1.36, rcontrast=0.81, and this contrast also
interacted with the variable determiner, t(49)= 4.73, p < .001,
g=0.67, rcontrast=0.56. The difference between felicitous and in-
felicitous sentences was not significant, Contrast 2: t(49)= 0.56,
p= .286, g=0.08, rcontrast=0.08, but the contrast interacted with the
variable determiner, t(49)= −2.65, p= .012, g=−0.37,
rcontrast=−0.35, reflecting a larger difference between the definite and
the indefinite determiner in the felicitous compared with the in-
felicitous condition. Overall, the area under the curve was larger for the
indefinite than for the definite determiner, t(49)= 5.85, p < .001,
g=0.69, rcontrast=0.57. Because the contrasts interacted with the
variable determiner, the difference between definite and indefinite
determiners was assessed for each sentence type. It was not significant
for false sentences, t(49)=−0.88, p= .190, g=−0.13,
rcontrast=0.13, but was so for felicitous, t(49)= 5.91, p < .001,
g=0.84, rcontrast=0.64, and infelicitous sentences, t(49)= 2.50,
p= .008, g=0.35, rcontrast=0.34.
Movement times (2.22% outliers) were longer for felicitous and
infelicitous sentences compared with false sentences, Contrast 1: t
(49)= 7.61, p < .001, g=1.08, rcontrast=0.74, and this contrast in-
teracted with the variable determiner, t(49)= 3.43, p= .001, g=0.49,
rcontrast=0.44. Further, the difference between felicitous and in-
felicitous sentences was significant, Contrast 2: t(49)= 3.78, p < .001,
g=0.54, rcontrast=0.48, but this contrast did not interact with the
variable determiner, t(49)=−1.86, p= .069, g=−0.26,
rcontrast=0.26. Overall, movement times were longer for the indefinite
than for the definite determiner, t(49)= 5.77, p < .001, g=0.82,
rcontrast=0.64. Because Contrast 1 interacted with the variable de-
terminer, the difference between definite and indefinite determiners
was assessed for each sentence type. It was not significant for false
sentences, t(49)= 1.06, p= .146, g=0.15, rcontrast=0.15, but it was
significant for felicitous, t(49)= 5.21, p < .001, g=0.74,
rcontrast=0.60, and infelicitous sentences, t(49)= 2.75, p= .004,
g=0.39, rcontrast=0.37.
Xneg values (3.92% outliers) were larger for felicitous and in-
felicitous sentences compared with false sentences, Contrast 1: t
(49)= 8.82, p < .001, g=1.25, rcontrast=0.78 and this contrast in-
teracted with the variable determiner, t(49)= 4.62, p < .001,
g=0.65, rcontrast=0.55. Xneg values were not significantly larger for
infelicitous compared to felicitous sentences, Contrast 2: t
(49)=−1.58, p= .940 g=−0.22, rcontrast=0.22, and this contrast’s
interaction with the variable determiner was not significant, t
(49)=−0.49, p= .312, g=−0.07, rcontrast=0.07. Overall, Xneg va-
lues were larger for the indefinite than for the definite determiner, t
(49)= 4.86, p < .001, g=0.69, rcontrast=0.57. Because Contrast 1
interacted with the variable determiner, the difference between definite
and indefinite determiners was assessed for each sentence type. It was
not significant for false sentences, t(49)=−0.58, p= .282,
g=−0.08, rcontrast=0.08, but it was significant for felicitous sen-
tences, t(49)= 3.96, p < .001, g=0.56, rcontrast=0.49, and for in-
felicitous sentences, t(49)= 4.05, p < .001, g=0.57, rcontrast=0.50.
For all conditions, the Xneg values differed significantly from zero, all t
(49)s≥ 6.61, all ps≤ .001.
Error rates (see Table 1) were larger for felicitous and infelicitous
sentences compared with false sentences, Contrast 1: t(49)= 2.99,
p= .002, g=0.42, rcontrast=0.39, and this contrast interacted with the
variable determiner, t(49)= 3.23, p= .002, g=0.46, rcontrast=0.42.
The difference between felicitous and infelicitous sentences was not
significant, Contrast 2: t(49)=−1.30, p= .100, g=−0.18,
rcontrast=0.18, and the contrast did not interact with the variable de-
terminer, t(49)=−1.17, p= .247, g=−0.17, rcontrast=0.17.
Overall, error rates were larger for the indefinite than for the definite
determiner, t(49)= 2.08, p= .043, g=0.29, rcontrast=0.28. Because
Contrast 1 interacted with the variable determiner, the difference be-
tween definite and indefinite determiners was assessed for each sen-
tence type. It was not significant for false, t(49)=−1.35, p= .092,
g=−0.19, rcontrast=0.19, and infelicitous sentences, t(49)=−0.36,
p= .361, g=−0.05, rcontrast=0.05, but was so for felicitous sen-
tences, t(49)= 1.90, p= .032, g=0.27, rcontrast=0.26.
3.3. Discussion
Providing feedback only in the practice block sufficed to make the
participants take the context into account and to interpret the de-
terminers as intended, and a largely similar pattern of results as ob-
served in Experiment 1 was revealed in Experiment 2. We again ob-
served a larger area under the curve and longer movement times for the
indefinite compared with the definite determiner within the felicitous
and infelicitous conditions. Importantly, Xneg values were higher for the
indefinite than for the definite determiner in both the felicitous and the
infelicitous conditions. This is again consistent with the claim that the
uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner receives a brief
initial activation upon encountering the indefinite determiner.
The results are less clear than those of Experiment 1 with regard to
more difficult processing in infelicitous compared with felicitous sen-
tences (see also Clifton, 2013). Area under the curve was smaller and
movement times were shorter in the false condition than in the felici-
tous and infelicitous conditions, and no difference between determiners
was observed for the false condition. Movement times were also longer
for the infelicitous compared with the felicitous conditions, thus sug-
gesting more processing difficulties in the former compared with the
latter condition, but the corresponding contrast for area under the curve
was not significant (though descriptively in the predicted direction).
4. General discussion
The present study provides evidence for the psychological reality of
a formal theory of presupposition generation, known as Maximize
Presupposition. To this end, we used mouse-tracking, a method that has
not been applied to this phenomenon so far, but offers the possibility to
analyze general processing difficulties as well as an indirect measure of
the interpretations entertained by a reader in the course of sentence
processing. Participants were asked to evaluate sentences with definite
and indefinite determiners in three types of test sentences (see also
Fig. 2): (1) literally false sentences, (2) literally true and pragmatically
felicitous sentences, and (3) literally true, but pragmatically infelicitous
sentences, because of a violation of their presuppositional meaning
component (uniqueness or anti-uniqueness). Across both experiments,
the main result is that processing of the indefinite determiner is more
difficult than processing the definite determiner, and involves a tem-
porary initial activation of the uniqueness-presupposition. This latter
result can be seen as support for anti-presupposition theory.
4.1. Summary of the results and their theoretical implications
Several results were clear-cut across both experiments. As expected,
false sentences came with the least processing difficulties compared
with the felicitous and infelicitous sentences. Further, except for the
false sentences, the indefinite determiner was associated with more
difficult processing as reflected in longer movement times and a larger
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area under the curve. Finally, and most important for the present
purposes, Xneg values were larger for the indefinite than for the definite
determiner in both felicitous and infelicitous sentences.
The Xneg result is particularly informative, because it provides evi-
dence that processing the indefinite determiner actually involves an
initial activation of the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite de-
terminer. This prediction is derived uniquely from anti-presupposition
theory and the Maximize Presupposition principle (Heim, 1991). Ac-
cording to this principle, indefinite determiners carry their anti-un-
iqueness meaning component as an anti-presupposition, which is de-
rived indirectly in two steps: First, the uniqueness-presupposition of the
definite determiner is considered, and second, it is then negated. This
predicts that participants are initially more biased toward the non-
target response, but subsequently correct their decision to the final
response. This would be reflected in larger Xneg values for the indefinite
compared with the definite determiner in both the felicitous and in-
felicitous sentences (see the Online Supplement for a more detailed
description), and is exactly what we observed in both our experiments.
This result is particular noteworthy for the infelicitous sentences, where
the initial bias was observed, even though the context facilitates a
“false” response. To avoid misunderstandings, this interpretation is not
meant to imply that participants evaluate the initial uniqueness-pre-
supposition during the sentence comprehension process consciously.
Considering the rather small effects observed, we suggest that the
uniqueness-presupposition receives some initial, but temporarily re-
stricted activation. Still, this activation was measurable from the mouse
movements, and left a trace on the participants’ behavior. In contrast,
the initial biases seem much larger for implicatures (see Tomlinson
et al., 2013). This may point to a larger effort required to enrich the
initial meaning with the additional meaning components in the case of
scalar implicatures. Although it should again be noted that the two
suggested steps in processing scalar implicatures and the indefinite
determiner are different, future studies may directly compare both
pragmatic phenomena and reduce methodological differences between
the studies. For example, we used a dynamic procedure for the stimulus
presentation (see Scherbaum & Kieslich, 2018, for advantages of this),
and participants were required to leave the start box with a movement
directing straight-up. Thus, the stimulus was perceived and read during
the movement itself, and the required straight initial movement may
have reduced the opportunity for large deviations.
Somewhat inconsistent are the results concerning the processing
difficulties for infelicitous compared with felicitous sentences. In
Experiment 1, infelicitous sentences had longer movement times and a
larger area under the curve than felicitous sentences, thus suggesting
greater processing difficulties. In Experiment 2, however, this was only
observed in movement times, but not for area under the curve.
Remember that false and infelicitous sentences both required a “false”
response. Consequently, two factors may have increased processing
difficulties of infelicitous sentences: First, the unnaturalness of classi-
fying an infelicitous sentence with the “false” response, and second, the
ambiguity arising from two sentence types requiring the same response
(compared with the felicitous sentences, which were the only ones re-
quiring a “true” response). Thus, it is conceivable that the variables
(movement times, area under the curve) indicating larger processing
difficulties for the infelicitous sentences were artificially increased to
some degree, although the bias toward a “false” response (which was
required in two thirds of the trials; see Introduction) might simulta-
neously have increased values for the felicitous sentences. In sum,
however, the most warranted conclusion would be that processing
difficulties were similar in felicitous and in infelicitous sentences,
contrary to what has been observed in some other studies (e.g., Hertrich
et al., 2015; Kirsten et al., 2014; and others). A similar observation, that
is, no processing disadvantage for infelicitous conditions, was reported
in Experiments 1 and 3 of Clifton (2013), who argued that this differ-
ence is only observed with sufficient cognitive workload (as induced in
his Experiments 2 and 4 with the addition of a mental arithmetic task).
4.2. Objections and possible alternative accounts
In this section we discuss two concerns that may affect the inter-
pretation of the results: first, that the error feedback provided during
the test trials in Experiment 1 and the practice trials in Experiment 2
coerced participants into an indefinite interpretation of the German
word “eine” (English ‘a’) in a way that is not ecologically valid, and
second, that the experimental setup did not successfully exclude alter-
native interpretations of this word.
In the practice phases of both experiments and throughout
Experiment 1, participants received error feedback in case they re-
sponded in an undesired way (see Fig. 2). This was done to ensure that
participants actually entertain the desired interpretation of the word
“eine” as an indefinite determiner, thereby enhancing the internal va-
lidity of the experiment. A similar way has been taken by previous
research to coerce participants into the particular behavior of current
interest (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Bott et al., 2012; Tomlinson et al., 2013),
and thus seems to be a reasonable way to achieve the desired inter-
pretation. It should also be noted that the critical results remained the
same in Experiment 2, even when error feedback was removed from all
test trials and only provided during the 48 practice trials.
The most important point, however, is that the aim of this study was
not to investigate all the possible interpretations of the German word
“eine”, but rather to examine the processing of this word on its in-
definite reading. That is, in contexts that induce the desired indefinite
reading, how is this word processed, as opposed to the definite de-
terminer? In other words, we did not investigate “Under which cir-
cumstances interpret people the word ‘eine’ as an indefinite determiner,
as opposed to, say, a number word?”, although this is certainly an in-
teresting question as well.
A further objection in relation to the error feedback is that partici-
pants may only have learned how to respond in the course of the ex-
periment. Under the assumption that encountering the word “eine”
causes uncertainty, initial deviations toward the wrong response may
occur on a subset of trials. This could explain the larger Xneg values in
the indefinite determiner conditions within the felicitous and in-
felicitous sentences. However, this reasoning suggests that mean tra-
jectories for indefinite determiner conditions are a mixture of two types
of trajectories: (1) those directly heading toward the correct response
and (2) those first heading toward the non-target response. This would
be reflected in a bimodal distribution of, for example, area under the
curve. However, area under the curve did not show signs of bimodality
in both experiments, as all bimodality coefficients were≤0.40 and
thus point to a unimodal distribution (Freeman & Dale, 2013; Pfister,
Schwarz, Janczyk, Dale, & Freeman, 2013). Thus, at present we do not
consider this alternative explanation likely, but future research should
certainly pick up this issue.
Another and equally important question is: Are there alternative
interpretations of the word “eine” that make the same predictions as
those we made from our assumptions based on anti-presupposition
theory? We will discuss three possible interpretations in the following:
(1) a literal interpretation, (2) an interpretation as a numeral (e.g., “one
banana”), and (3) an interpretation as a novel object that was not in-
troduced in the given context (e.g., “some or other banana”). For fur-
ther details and a discussion of the definite determiner in these cases,
we refer the reader to the Online Supplement (Scenarios 1–3). Not
taking the exact number into account, a ”literal” interpretation of the
word “eine” (the at-issue reading without anti-uniqueness or other
enrichments) is compatible with the picture in both felicitous and in-
felicitous sentences. If we therefore assume, similar to the first step in
two-step models of scalar implicatures’ processing (see Bott & Noveck,
2004; Tomlinson et al., 2013), that the first step of processing consists
of entertaining only the literal reading, an initial response tendency
towards the “true” response may result. If then participants want to
avoid response errors, they need to reverse their movement direction
toward the “false” response in an infelicitous sentence. Thus, Xneg
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values are expected to be high in infelicitous sentences, but low in fe-
licitous sentences, contrary to what we observed. The same reasoning
applies if participants endorse an interpretation of the German word
“eine” as a numeral (“one”), because Jan always received exactly one
banana or pear. Finally, it is possible that participants interpreted the
mentioned fruit still as a novel one, that is, one not introduced in the
context already (see Grønn & Sæbø, 2012; Heim, 1983), although we set
up the context (including the descriptive sentences, the pictorial illus-
tration, and starting the test sentences with “Davon….” [engl. “Of these,
…”]) in a way to prevent this. If participants then interpret the sentence
as “Jan received some or other banana/pear”, the initial response di-
rection would be “true”. However, then the same reasoning as for the
previous two interpretations applies and the same prediction results for
the Xneg values.
In sum, these three alternative readings predict small Xneg values in
felicitous sentences and large Xneg values in infelicitous sentences when
encountering and interpreting the German word “eine” in these ways.
Only the assumption of an initial activation of the uniqueness-pre-
supposition as derived from anti-presupposition theory predicts larger
Xneg values for the indefinite than for the definite determiner in both
felicitous and infelicitous sentences—and this is what we observed.
Depending on how the definite determiner is processed in the case of
the three alternatives discussed above, further diverging predictions
may arise (in particular when one assumes that only existence is
checked against the current context). For more details, please consider
the Online Supplement.
4.3. Limitations and future extensions
Although we are convinced that the present study provides im-
portant insights into presupposition processing, there are several po-
tential limitations and possible extensions for future work.
One difference between the German definite and indefinite feminine
determiner is their length, with the indefinite determiner comprising
more letters and syllables. Thus, one may object that the increased
processing difficulty results from longer reading and/or comprehension
time of the indefinite determiner. This is, however, unlikely for at least
two reasons. First, no difference between the determiners was measured
for the false sentences, which served as a control condition. Second,
such account would predict differences only in time-based measures,
but the theoretically most important differences were observed in Xneg
values.
Yet, one may object that the results from the false sentences are not
conclusive, because the strategy of just noting that the last word mis-
matches the picture is sufficient to judge the sentences as false. While
theoretically this is a possible strategy, it is inefficient within the con-
text of the present experiment, because it can be only applied in one
third of the trials in both experiments, and participants never knew in
advance when they can and when they cannot successfully employ it.
Further, consider what follows if participants indeed always employed
this strategy. In the felicitous and the infelicitous sentences, the initial
response would then be the “true” response. This is already the correct
response for felicitous sentences. To avoid committing errors in the
infelicitous sentences, a reversal of the movement direction toward the
“false” response is then required (note that to distinguish felicitous and
infelicitous sentences it is also necessary to consider the whole context).
Thus, for felicitous sentences, one would predict small Xneg values (for
both types of determiners), while for infelicitous sentences large Xneg
values are expected (for both types of determiners). This differs from
our predictions and also from the observed results. Thus, we are con-
fident that participants did not follow such a strategy (for more details,
see Scenario 4 in the Online Supplement).
Further limitations of the present study result from the choice of the
language and the particular presupposition trigger we focused on. More
precisely, we investigated only the definite and the indefinite de-
terminer, and this only in the German language. One reason for this is
that the determiner, and in particular the indefinite one, is an inter-
esting case from a linguistic perspective and its status is unclear with
regard to whether it triggers a presupposition or can better be viewed as
an anti-presupposition. As such, the Maximize Presupposition principle
is most prominently applied to the case of determiners. However, it also
applies to other presupposition triggers. For example, “both” has a
competitor, namely “all” and Maximize Presupposition accounts for the
fact that the possibility of using a sentence with “both” blocks the
possibility of using a sentence with “all”. It is as yet unclear whether in
these cases a two-step model also applies, but such additional triggers
are certainly a vital topic for future research. Further, future studies
should be carried out in different languages than German, to explore
the generality of our results across different languages.
4.4. Conclusion
The Maximize Presupposition principle and the consequent anti-
presupposition theory for the indefinite determiner suggest that the
anti-uniqueness of this determiner results only indirectly via a two-step
processing: An initial consideration of the uniqueness-presupposition of
the definite determiner followed by its subsequent negation. The two
experiments of our study provide experimental evidence for the psy-
chological reality of this assumption. Thus, the data support this prin-
ciple and add an important piece of evidence to the experimental
pragmatics literature. They also support the idea that presuppositions
and anti-presuppositions differ and must be treated as different prag-
matic phenomena with systematic differences in their processing sig-
nature.
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Abstract 
Definite determiners trigger existence- and uniqueness-presuppositions, that is, the speaker 
assumes that it is taken for granted that there exists exactly one of the mentioned objects in the 
relevant discourse. Indefinite determiners are associated with anti-uniqueness, that is, that there 
are several of the mentioned object. Applying the Maximize Presupposition principle, this 
additional meaning component arises as an anti-presupposition and involves first considering 
the definite determiner’s uniqueness-presupposition and then its negation. We here investigate 
processing of the two determiners in more detail and ask whether this processing is automatic 
or requires limited central capacities. To do so, we employed the Psychological Refractory 
Period (PRP) approach and the locus of slack-logic. We observed more difficult processing for 
the indefinite compared to the definite determiner in felicitous sentences, and also in infelicitous 
compared to felicitous sentences. Further, immediate processing of presuppositions appears 
capacity-limited. These results support the Maximize Presupposition principle and are an 
important step forward towards understanding cognitive processing of presuppositions. 
 
Key words: presuppositions ; experimental pragmatics ; dual-task ; PRP  
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Capacity limitations of processing presuppositions 
There are three bottles and one glass of water on the table, and somebody says ‘Give me the 
bottle!’ – Although this is a grammatically sound sentence and you are familiar with the 
semantics of all words, something is odd. This oddness results from you expecting that using 
the definite determiner “the” refers to an object which is unique in the current context of 
discourse (in addition to the fact that a bottle exists at all). As a consequence, while not logically 
false, the example sentence is infelicitous.  In contrast, ‘Give me the glass!’ would be felicitous. 
Technically, the assumption of existence and uniqueness associated with the definite determiner 
are called presuppositions (Heim, 1991, 2011) and the definite determiner “the” acts as their 
trigger. While the presuppositions of the definite determiner are largely agreed on, there is 
much more discussion about why the indefinite determiner, in contrast, is associated with anti-
uniqueness (e.g., Alonso-Ovalle, Menéndez-Benito, & Schwarz, 2011).  
Presuppositions of determiners. In general, presuppositions convey information that is 
already assumed or taken for granted by the discourse participant. In Example (1) the speaker 
assumes that the listener takes it for granted that Anna has scored before yesterday. This 
additional meaning component is triggered by the word “again”.  
(1) Yesterday, Anna scored again. 
Frege (1892) was the first to discuss presuppositions in connection with definite descriptions, 
and since then, the literature suggests that the definite determiner triggers existence- and 
uniqueness-presuppositions (e.g., Heim, 1991, 2011). When the presuppositions are met by the 
context, the definite determiner must be used as in Example (2), otherwise it becomes odd as in 
Example (3), where the use of the indefinite determiner is infelicitous. 
(2) The father of the soccer coach laughed. 
(3)  # A father of the soccer coach laughed. 
The inappropriateness of the indefinite determiner in Example (3) is often accounted for by the 
Maximize Presupposition principle (Heim, 1991): Presuppose as much as possible! (see also 
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Chemla, 2009; Sauerland, 2008; Schlenker, 2012). This principle – an addition to the Gricean 
maxims of conversation (Grice, 1975) – requires speakers to always use the felicitous sentence 
with the strongest presupposition among a set of alternatives, if the speaker knows that these 
presuppositions are fulfilled. The definite determiner is presuppositionally stronger because it 
triggers two presuppositions (existence and uniqueness). In contrast, the indefinite determiner 
is associated with anti-uniqueness. This additional meaning component is not a presupposition, 
but instead arises from pragmatic reasoning over alternatives. In this way, Maximize 
Presupposition accounts for the fact that indefinite determiners of the form “a X” (where X is 
a noun phrase) are infelicitous when it is common ground1 that there is exactly “one X”. In 
Example (3), the speaker chose the indefinite determiner. Because the indefinite determiner 
does not presuppose anything it is presuppositionally weaker than its stronger alternative, the 
definite determiner. By choosing a weaker item from two alternatives that can be ordered on a 
scale (similar to scalar implicatures), it is implied that the presupposition of the stronger 
alternative (the definite determiner) does not hold. In Example (3) this means that the coach 
does not have a unique father. The oddness of the utterance follows from the conflict with our 
common knowledge. Accordingly, as an “anti-presupposition” (Percus, 2006), the indefinite 
determiner leads to anti-uniqueness only indirectly in two steps: (1) evaluation of the 
uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner and (2) the subsequent negation of this 
presupposition. The second step leads to more difficult processing compared with the definite 
determiner.  
Previous experimental work. Previous studies provided evidence for an immediate 
processing of presuppositions starting already on the trigger. For example, Schwarz (2007) 
employed self-paced reading to compare processing of sentences including the word auch (too) 
 
1 The common ground is defined as the set of propositions believed to be true by all participants of a conversation. 
More formally speaking, a sentence p presupposes q if the use of p is inappropriate when q is not in the common 
ground (Stalnaker, 2002). 
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in contexts that either satisfied the presupposition or did not. In the latter case, reading was 
slower and the effect was confined to the region containing the presupposition trigger and the 
author concluded that presuppositions play an important role in online sentence comprehension. 
Tiemann et al. (2011) investigated five different triggers in a self-paced reading experiment. 
Participants were instructed to read a context and a test sentence in three different conditions, 
one including a presupposition trigger, one with a neutral word that triggered no presupposition, 
and one with a word that made the sentence ungrammatical. They also observed increased 
reading times already on the trigger and concluded that processing presuppositions starts 
already on the trigger. Recent studies (e.g., Domaneschi & Di Paola, 2018; Domaneschi et al., 
2014; Tiemann et al., 2015) suggest that different types of presupposition triggers differ in 
processing, and thus it is unfortunate that Tiemann et al. (2011) did not report separate analyses. 
Schneider, Bade, and Janczyk (2020) focused on only two triggers (definite determiners and 
again) and basically replicated the results of Tiemann et al. (2011) in their Experiment 1 and 
employed separate analysis for the two different triggers. Further, their Experiment 2 employed 
a similar method as the present paper does to investigate whether presupposition verification is 
capacity-limited or not. (More details will be provided after introducing the employed method.)  
Further evidence for additional processing difficulties if the determiner is used 
infelicitously against the provided context comes from a self-paced reading study by Altmann 
and Steedman (1988). These authors investigated how sentences with a definite determiner are 
processed if the uniqueness-presupposition is not met and observed that test sentences with an 
unmet uniqueness-presupposition were read slower. Van Berkum, Brown, Hagoort, and 
Zwitserlood. (1999; see also van Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 2003) also investigated 
referentially ambiguous noun phrases and observed early effects when the uniqueness 
presupposition was not met. Additional evidence from a study utilizing event related potentials 
(ERPs) by Burkhardt (2006). A test sentence with a definite noun phrase was presented in 
different contexts that either explicitly introduced the mentioned individual (given condition), 
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made it easy to infer the mentioned individual (bridged condition), or made it impossible to 
infer the mentioned individual (new condition). The results also revealed a negative shift that 
emerged in the ERPs at about 300–400 ms after acoustic onset of the noun (see van Berkum et 
al., 2003) when the existence-presupposition of the definite determiner was not given.  
Differences in processing of both determiners were also investigated. For example, 
Kirsten et al. (2014) used ERPs to investigate processing of definite and indefinite determiners 
in contexts that either fulfilled the uniqueness-assumption or did not. The nonmatching 
determiner evoked early effects (N400/P600) immediately on reading the determiners. The 
enhanced negativity in case of the definite compared with the indefinite determiner at least 
suggests that the underlying processes between the two determiners differ. Similar results were 
obtained in a MEG study with auditorily presented test sentences (Hertrich et al., 2015). 
Some studies also reported more difficult processing of the indefinite compared to the 
definite determiner (Schneider, Schonard, Franke, Jäger, & Janczyk, 2019; Schumacher, 2009). 
Schneider et al. (2019) directly investigated the two-step evaluation that follows from the anti-
presupposition account of the indefinite determiner. To this end, they used mouse-tracking to 
compare processing of both determiners in felicitous and infelicitous sentences, as well as in 
logically false sentences. In two experiments, participants were asked to judge the 
appropriateness of sentences like "Of these, Jan received the/a banana." in contexts showing 
that Jan’s mother bought three pieces of fruit (e.g., one banana and two pears), and handed one 
of these fruits to Jan. Participants made their judgment via moving the mouse cursor into 
response boxes located in the top left and right corner of the computer screen. In the false 
conditions, the depicted fruit and the fruit mentioned in the test sentence did not match (e.g., 
the picture depicted Jan with a pear and the test sentence said “Jan received the/a banana”). For 
the felicitous and infelicitous conditions, they matched, but the determiner was used felicitously 
or infelicitously against the presented context. Mouse-tracking gives insight into how 
processing the definite and indefinite determiner unfolds over time (a similar procedure was 
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also used by Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 2013, to investigate the processing of scalar 
implicatures). In both felicitous and infelicitous sentences, the indefinite determiner was more 
difficult to process than the definite determiner. Most importantly, mouse-trajectories also 
revealed an initial deviation toward the response that was eventually not chosen (i.e., toward 
the non-target) in felicitous and infelicitous sentences for the indefinite determiner (i.e., larger 
“Xneg values”2). This was predicted by the two-step account: (1) participants initially consider 
the uniqueness-presupposition (2) before then negating this presupposition. Thus, these data 
can be taken as evidence for the anti-presupposition nature of the anti-uniqueness inference. At 
the same time, the data did not reveal a clear difference between the felicitous and infelicitous 
uses, even though the descriptive statistics of all dependent measures were in the predicted 
direction, that is, larger measures for infelicitous compared to felicitous uses (see also Clifton, 
2003, Exp. 1 and 3). The authors suggested that this unexpected observation may have resulted 
from including the logically false sentences that potentially introduced some response 
ambiguity: First, the ‘false’ response was required for both the infelicitous and the false 
sentences, and second, a bias toward the ‘false’ response may have emerged, because this 
response was required in two-thirds of the trials. 
In sum, the literature suggests that presuppositions that are supported by the present 
context are indeed processed immediately. Furthermore, additional processing costs in cases of 
infelicitously used presupposition triggers, and more complex processing of indefinite 
compared to definite determiners can be concluded from the available literature. In the present 
experiment we focus on the verification of presuppositions in case of determiners and ask 
whether the implicated processes are capacity-limited or can run in parallel with other ongoing 
processes. 
 
2 Xneg is the amount of horizontal deviation toward the competitor (i.e., toward the non-target response) and is 
measured as the maximum x-coordinate reached by the mouse as it veers away from the target response. This 
measure is particularly useful for detecting two-step processes, in which the second step involves a negation of the 
first step and is therefore expected to trigger a reversal in mouse direction (cf. Tomlinson et al., 2013, for an 
example with implicatures). 
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Assessing capacity limitations: The Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) approach. 
The term “capacity-limited” is here used in a broad sense meaning that a process is capacity-
limited if it is not automatic. In other words, a process is capacity-limited if its efficiency suffers 
(e.g., its duration increases) when it must run simultaneously with other processes.  This is often 
translated in a way that a capacity-limited process requires the “central stage” and thus cannot 
run in parallel with other processes (see below where we introduce particular models). An 
accepted way to determine capacity limitations in cognitive processing uses the PRP approach 
in combination with the locus of slack-logic. Because of the complexity of this method, we first 
introduce the logic of this approach in general and then illustrate it with an example by 
Mädebach, Kieseler, and Jescheniak (2017). 
In general, a PRP experiment is a variant of a dual task in which each trial consists of 
two different tasks that temporally overlap. The two stimuli (S1 and S2) are presented 
consecutively with a varying stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) and require separate responses 
(R1 and R2). Typically, SOA has little or no influence on the response time in Task 1 (RT1), 
but those in Task 2 (RT2) increase when SOA decreases: the PRP effect (Telford, 1931; see 
also Fischer & Hommel, 2012; Janczyk, Humphreys, & Sui, 2019; Magen & Cohen, 2010; 
Miller, Ulrich, & Rolke, 2009; for exceptions, please see Janczyk, Wallmeier, Pfister, & Kunde, 
2014). This pattern is often accounted for by the central bottleneck model (CBM; Pashler, 1984, 
1994; Welford, 1952). The CBM assumes that processing of a task is divided into three stages, 
namely (i) a pre-central (perceptual) stage, (ii) a central stage, and (iii) a post-central (motor) 
stage (see also Fig. 1a). While pre- and post-central stages can be processed in parallel with 
other stages, the critical assumption concerns the central stage, which is conceived capacity-
limited and only one central stage can be processed at any time, thus constituting a bottleneck.3 
 
3 There are, of course, other models addressing dual-task costs and the PRP effect (for a recent overview, see Koch, 
Poljac, Müller, & Kiesel, 2018). For example, while the CBM describes the bottleneck as structural, other authors 
viewed the bottleneck as a strategic implementation to avoid crosstalk between tasks (e.g., Meyer & Kieras, 1997). 
In contrast, capacity-sharing models assume that central processes can run in parallel, but become less efficient 
then (Navon & Miller, 2002; Tombu & Jolicoeur, 2003). In addition, the nature of the capacity-limited process 
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As a consequence, with a short SOA, the central stage of Task 2 must be postponed until the 
central stage of Task 1 has finished. This waiting time is called cognitive slack and increases 
the corresponding RT2. In contrast, with a long SOA, the central stage of Task 1 is already 
processed and no (or only little) cognitive slack occurs, leading to shorter RT2 (see Fig. 1a). 
Within a PRP experiment, the locus of slack-logic (Schweickert, 1978) allows to 
identify whether an RT effect (1) results from the parallel, pre-central stage of processing or (2) 
from the capacity-limited central stage of processing.4 To this end, the manipulation yielding 
the RT effect is implemented in Task 2. 
Consider first the case where a manipulation in Task 2 affects processing during the 
capacity-limited central stage of Task 2, the duration of which then becomes longer (see Fig. 
1b). With a long SOA, the manipulation prolongs the central stage and thereby RT2 becomes 
longer. Similarly, with a short SOA, processing of the central stage of Task 2 has to wait until 
the central stage of Task 1 has finished. The effect caused by the manipulation in Task 2 
prolongs the central stage of Task 2 and thus RT2 as well. In other words, the same RT2 
difference is observed with a short and long SOA which statistically means an additive 
combination of SOA and the manipulation in Task 2 (i.e., no interaction).  
Now consider the case where the manipulation affects parallel, pre-central processing 
(see Fig. 1c). With a long SOA, the manipulation becomes evident in an RT2 difference as well. 
With a short SOA, in contrast, the longer duration of pre-central processing runs while the 
central stage of Task 1 is still processed. Therefore, the effect is absorbed into the cognitive 
slack and there will not be an observable difference for RT2. Statistically, the manipulation and 
SOA interact in an underadditive way.   
 
and its meaning for dual-task costs is a topic being discussed (Janczyk & Kunde, 2020). It is finally worth a 
mention that bottleneck and capacity sharing models make the same predictions for the critical Task 2 results. 
4 To be precise, it cannot be distinguished with this logic whether an effect results from the central or the post-
central stage of processing. To do so, the effect propagation-logic might be used (e.g., Durst & Janczyk, 2018; 
Janczyk et al., 2019; Miller & Reynolds, 2003). 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the central bottleneck model (a) and the predictions of the locus of slack-logic (b) and (c). 
In (b) and (c), the solid and dotted lines for Task 2 represent two levels of the manipulation implemented in Task 
2. 
 
This method was, for example, used to investigate during which processing stage 
semantic interference effects arise in (Mädebach, Kieseler et al., 2017). In a previous study, 
Mädebach, Wöhner, Kieseler, and Jescheniak (2017) observed interference between 
semantically related environmental distractor sounds and picture naming. When, for example, 
naming a “horse”, the effect was larger when the distractor sound came from a semantically 
related environment (e.g., a barking dog) compared to unrelated environmental distractor 
sounds (e.g., drums). Mädebach, Kieseler et al. (2017) then investigated the processing stage 
responsible for this effect and thus aimed to distinguish between the competitive selection view 
(e.g., Levelt, Roelofs, & Meyer, 1999) and the non-competitive selection view (e.g., Mahon, 
Costa, Peterson, Vargas, & Caramazza, 2007). According to the former, the effect would arise 
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during response selection in picture naming and thus be a capacity-limited process. In contrast, 
the effect would arise during preselection processes like visual processing and object 
identification and thus be an automatic process according to the latter view. 
 In their experiment, Mädebach, Kieseler et al. (2017) had participants to perform a 
geometric form classification task with manual responses as Task 1, and a picture-sound 
interference task with vocal responses as Task 2. Stimuli in both tasks were presented with an 
SOA of 0 versus 500 ms. Critically, pictures in Task 2 were paired with different sounds 
resulting in different conditions. We will focus on two conditions that are relevant to explain 
the method. In the semantic condition, the picture was paired with a sound from the same 
semantic category (e.g., picture “horse” with a barking sound from a dog). In the unrelated 
condition, the picture was paired with an unrelated sound (e.g., picture “horse” with a drumming 
sound from a drum). Considering only the long SOA of 500 ms, the first prediction is that RT2 
should be longer in the semantic compared with the unrelated condition. 
For the short SOA, in contrast, both theoretical views make different predictions. First, 
if the picture-sound interference effect arises from the capacity-limited selection stage, a 
difference in RT2 of the same size as with the long SOA is expected (cf. Fig. 1b). In other 
words, SOA and picture-sound interference combine additively. Second, if the interference 
effect arises from preselection processes, the additional processing time becomes absorbed into 
the cognitive slack and no RT2 difference is observed (cf. Fig. 1c), and an underadditive 
interaction of SOA and picture-sound interference is predicted. 
The data clearly revealed an additive combination of SOA and picture-sound 
interference, suggesting that the picture-sound interference effect requires central capacity and 
arises from the central stage. Such pattern has also been observed for, for instance, semantic 
interference in picture naming (Piai, Roelofs, & Schriefers, 2013), encoding into short-term 
memory (Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 1998), switching between working memory items (Janczyk, 
2017), and resolving Garner interference (Janczyk, Franz, & Kunde, 2010). 
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Capacity limitations and presupposition processing: The present study. We here apply 
the PRP approach and the locus of slack-logic to presupposition processing. Task 1 in our 
experiment was a tone discrimination task. Task 2 was a sentence evaluation task borrowed 
from Schneider et al. (2019). In this task, participants were provided with a context and asked 
to evaluate the appropriateness of a test sentence against this context (see Fig. 2 for an 
illustration; a more detailed description is provided in the Method section). This combination 
brings together well-established cognitive psychologist’s chronometric tools with a topic from 
the field of pragmatic. We believe that such cross-domain research can stipulate methodological 
advance and also yield important results for linguistic theory building.  
Apart from the methodological contribution, we pursued three goals with our 
experiment. The first goal was to replicate the more difficult processing of indefinite compared 
with definite determiners with RTs instead of mouse-trajectory analyses (as in Schneider et al., 
2019).  
The second goal was to investigate whether processes implicated in interpretations of 
the indefinite determiners (1) run in parallel with other central stages or (2) are capacity-limited. 
Considering the indefinite determiner as an anti-presupposition suggests the longer RTs for the 
indefinite compared to the definite determiner to result from negating the uniqueness-
presupposition of the definite determiner. Processing linguistic negations was shown to induce 
longer RTs than processing affirmative sentences due to two-step process where the to-be-
negated information is activated first and subsequently negated (Dudschig & Kaup, 2018). 
Further, negation was argued to be a “resource dependent process” (Strack & Deutsch, 2004, 
p. 227; see, e.g., Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & Strack, 2009, Exp. 3; Foerster, 
Wirth, Berghoefer, Kunde, & Pfister, 2019; Wason, 1959). Thus, inferring anti-uniqueness 
should require central capacity and thus an additive combination with SOA is predicted. In 
other words, the RT difference between definite and indefinite determiners is expected to be 
the same at both SOAs with no interaction of determiner and SOA. This expectation receives 
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further preliminary support from a recent study with a self-paced reading experiment (Schneider 
et al., 2020). In this study, processing costs of the definite determiner and the presupposition 
trigger again when compared to non-trigger words were investigated. The results of this study 
are more in line with the idea that presupposition processing requires limited capacities, but it 
is important to note that this is a different question than we ask here for the comparison between 
the definite and the indefinite determiner. 
The third goal was to re-address the unexpected observation of Schneider et al. (2019) 
that infelicitous sentences were not more difficult to process than felicitous ones were. 
Schneider et al. reasoned that this observation may have resulted from peculiarities of the 
particular design. We here eliminated these problematic aspects by omitting the “logically 
false” sentences. If the reasoning were true, we would then expect longer RT2s for the 
infelicitous sentences (see, e.g., Burkhardt, 2006; Kirsten et al., 2014; Tiemann et al., 2011; see 
also Clifton, 2013, for the possible role of a dual-task). In addition, we expected this RT 
difference to also combine additively with SOA, indicating the implication of limited central 
capacities. In other words, no interaction of sentence type and SOA is predicted and the 
differences between felicitous and infelicitous sentences should be the same for both SOAs. 
More precisely, the presupposition trigger is assumed to immediately start a context search for 
an appropriate referent introduced by the preceding context. This search process in turn involves 
repeated selection and de-selection of working memory items that are considered as referents. 
Janczyk (2017) observed that this selection and de-selection prosses is a capacity limited. In 
case of an infelicitous sentence, detecting the mismatch requires more (and unsuccessful) 
comparisons, but no appropriate referent is found and finally the search process has to be 
terminated. 
 
Method 
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 Participants. An a-priori power analysis for a paired t-test (δ=0.5, 1-β=.9, α=.05) 
yielded a minimum sample size of n = 44, and thus our intended sample size was n = 48. To 
achieve this, data were originally collected from 54 native speakers of German from the 
Tübingen (Germany) area, of which six participants were excluded because of more than 30% 
errors (final sample: mean age = 22.1 years, 38 females, 10 males). All participants were native 
speakers of the German language, reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing 
abilities, and signed written informed consent prior to data collection.  
Apparatus and Stimuli. Stimulus presentation and response collection were controlled 
by a standard PC connected to a 17-in. CRT monitor. Two external response keys each to the 
left and to the right of the participants were used for response collection, and were operated 
with the index- and middle-fingers of both hands. Responses with the left hand were required 
in Task 1, and with the right hand in Task 2. Auditory stimuli for Task 1 (S1) were 300 and 900 
Hz sinusoidal tones (50 ms) presented via headphones. Visual stimuli for the sentence 
evaluation task (Task 2) were adopted from Schneider et al. (2019; for an example see Fig. 2). 
A rectangle with three items of fruit was used as the shopping basket of “Jan’s mother”, and a 
picture of “Jan” was visible below. Sentential stimuli (i.e., the context and the test sentence) 
were presented in black font on the otherwise white background. Seven kinds of fruit (banana, 
lemon, orange, pear, pineapple plum, and strawberry) were used in the experiment. On each 
trial, the shopping basket comprised two items of one fruit and one different item that were 
introduced as the current context. All test sentences were of the form "Of these, Jan received 
[determiner: the or a] [fruit].", and only the feminine determiner was used in conjunction with 
the seven kinds of fruit to avoid the possibility of early disambiguation. To facilitate 
interpretation of the test sentence and evaluation of the determiner according to the current 
context, test sentences started with “Davon…” (English Of these, …). This emphasizes that Jan 
received the fruit from the three initial fruit of the shopping basket and minimizes the possibility 
of interpreting the determiner according to a global context (e.g., all available fruit in the world). 
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This procedure is thought to maximize the likelihood of interpreting the determiner in the 
restricted local context (Singh, 2011).  
Four sentence types resulted from combining the definite and the indefinite determiner 
with their felicitous and infelicitous uses (see Fig. 2 for an overview). With seven types of fruit 
it is possible to create 42 felicitous and 42 infelicitous combinations with definite and indefinite 
determiners, resulting in 168 possibilities. 
 Figure 2. Examples for the four different conditions resulting from combining the two determiners 
(definite vs. indefinite) with two sentence types (felicitous vs. infelicitous).  
 
We did not include filler items to avoid a reduction in the amount of test items. Including 
filler items bears the risk of more noisy data and worse point estimation. In this, we also 
followed published work on scalar implicatures (Bott & Noveck, 2004) and processing of 
negation (Dale & Duran, 2011), and additionally we aimed to keep these procedural aspects 
close to the study of Schneider et al. (2019). 
Task and Procedure. Task 1 was to respond to the pitch of a tone (S1) with a left-hand 
key press (R1). Task 2 was to indicate the appropriateness of the test sentence (S2) against the 
current context with a right-hand key press (R2) (e.g., “green” in the example in Fig. 3). 
Each trial started with a picture of Jan and a context in the form of the shopping basket 
with three pieces of fruit (the context relevant fruit) and an additional sentential description (for 
example, ”Jan's mother was shopping. She bought one banana and two pears.”; Fig. 3.1). After 
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1000 ms, Jan received one piece of the context fruit, additionally visualized by an arrow to 
emphasize the transfer to Jan. Further, the first part of the test sentence became visible as well 
(“Of these, Jan received…”; Fig. 3.2). Pressing both left-hand response keys simultaneously 
initiated the next step, and S1 was played after 500-700 ms (randomly determined; Fig. 3.3). 
Following an SOA of 100 or 1200 ms, the test sentence was completed on the screen as S2 
(e.g., “Of these, Jan received a pear.”; Fig. 3.4).  
In case of errors in either task, written feedback (“Wrong answer in tone discrimination 
task.” or “Wrong answer in sentence evaluation task.”) was provided on the screen for 2000 
ms. Further error feedback was provided when participants did not perform according to the 
instructions (unspecific errors; i.e., when they performed Task 2 before Task 1, responded twice 
in one task, or did not respond within 5000ms). The next trial started after an inter-trial interval 
(ITI) of 1000 ms. Task 2-related feedback was also applied to bias participants towards the 
intended interpretation of the German word “eine” as an indefinite determiner (see Schneider 
et al., 2019, for a justification, and also Bott & Noveck, 2004, or Tomlinson et al., 2013, for a 
similar approach with scalar implicatures).  
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Figure 3. Illustration of the trial procedure (see text for more information). 
 
Participants were tested individually in a single session of about 30 minutes. A session 
started with 40 practice trials of only Task 1. These trials were initiated by written instructions 
centered on the screen asking participants to press both left-hand response keys simultaneously 
to start a trial (to mimic the procedure required in the main experiment). After 100 ms, S1 was 
played (each pitch 20 times in a random order) and participants were to respond with a left-
hand key press. In case of errors, respective error feedback was presented on the screen (1000 
ms). The ITI was 1000 ms. After practicing Task 1, two unanalyzed practice blocks including 
both tasks with six trials of each condition (i.e., 48 practice trials in total; resulting from using 
the same six trials in four conditions in both practice blocks) were administered. Following that, 
three experimental blocks with twelve trials per condition (i.e., 48 trials per block, or 144 trials 
in total) were administered. In sum then, all logically possible combinations were used. Each 
participant saw six practice items (twice in each practice block) and 36 experimental items in 
18 
 
each of the four conditions, resulting in the 168 available items. The trials were administered 
in random order. 
Participants received written instructions before the experiment that were also visually 
illustrated with an example trial. Instructions focused on speed while maintaining a low level 
of errors. Stimulus-response mappings were counterbalanced across participants.  
Design and Analysis. Dependent measures were RTs and percentage of errors (PEs) in 
Task 1 and Task 2. For all analyses, trials with unspecific errors were excluded first (3.24%). 
The most important RT analyses were based on correct trials only and trials with RTs deviating 
more than 2.5 SDs from the mean of the respective cell (calculated separately for each 
participant) were excluded as outliers. To exclude speed-accuracy tradeoffs (see Liesefeld & 
Janczyk, 2019), we also analyzed PEs in the same way as RTs (what is standard in RT research). 
In particular, RTs and PEs in Task 2 and Task 1 were submitted to a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with 
SOA (100 vs. 1200 ms), determiner (definite vs. indefinite), and sentence type (felicitous vs. 
infelicitous) as repeated-measures. Because the critical results concern the additivity of 
determiner and sentence type with SOA (i.e., non-significant two-way interactions), these 
interactions were also assessed with Bayes factors calculated with the R-package BayesFactor 
(Morey & Rouder, 2018). Bayes factors BF01 were calculated as the ratio of (1) the model 
including the three main effects and the interaction of interest and of (2) the model including 
only the three main effects, and they are reported following the respective F-test of the 
ANOVA. In addition, although such ANOVA-approach has been used in previous 
psycholinguistic PRP experiments as well (Mädebach, Kieseler et al., 2017; Piai et al., 2014), 
Task 2 RTs and PEs were additionally analyzed with a (generalized) linear mixed effect model 
with participant and stimulus/context-set (i.e., item) as random effects, and the results are 
reported in the Appendix. All analyses were carried out using the R software (R Core Team, 
2020). 
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Results 
Because the theoretically most important results relate to Task 2, we begin with these 
results and the Task 1 results are reported afterwards. 
Task 2. Mean RT2s (2.76% outliers) are summarized in Table 1.  RTs were longer with 
a short than with a long SOA (1502 vs. 784 ms), thus a PRP effect, F(1,47) = 1183.87, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .96. Further, RT2 was longer for indefinite compared to definite determiners (1163 vs. 
1123 ms), F(1,47) = 10.34, p = .002, ηp2 = .18, and in infelicitous compared to felicitous 
sentences (1098 vs. 1188 ms), F(1,47) = 53.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .53 (see Fig. 4 for an illustration 
of these main effects). Most importantly, determiner did not interact with SOA, F(1,47) < 0.01, 
p = .948, ηp2 < .01, BF01 = 3.17, nor did sentence type interact with SOA, F(1,47) = 1.23, p = 
.273, ηp2 =.03, BF01 = 6.49. However, determiner and sentence type interacted, F(1,47) = 15.92, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .25: For felicitous sentences, RT2s were longer for indefinite compared with 
definite determiners (1143 vs. 1053 ms; Δ = 90 ms), but the difference was reversed and small 
in size for infelicitous sentences (1182 vs. 1193 ms; Δ = -11 ms; see Fig. 5 for an illustration). 
The three-way interaction was not significant, F(1,47) = 0.80, p = .374, ηp2 =.02.  
Mean PEs are summarized in Table 1. Only the main effect of determiner was 
significant, F(1,47) = 19.85, p < .001, ηp2 =.30, with more errors for indefinite compared to 
definite determiners. All other Fs ≤  2.77, all ps ≥ .103. 
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Table 1. Mean RTs (in milliseconds, ms) | PEs (percentage of errors) for the sentence evaluation 
task (Task 2) as a function of determiner, sentence type, and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). 
sentence type 
determiner  
definite indefinite 
SOA [ms] SOA [ms] 
100 1200 100 1200 
felicitous 1401 | 4.71 705 | 3.87 1500 | 8.12 786 | 8.40 
infelicitous 1563 | 6.20 824 | 5.96 1544 | 9.28 819 | 8.82 
 
 
Figure 4. Response times for the sentence evaluation task (RT 2) as a function of determiner 
and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) (left) and (b) sentence type and SOA (right). Error bars 
are within-subjects standard errors (Morey, 2008). 
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Figure 5. Response times for the sentence evaluation task (RT 2) as a function of determiner 
and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) separately for felicitous (left) and infelicitous sentences 
(right). Error bars are within-subject standard errors (Morey, 2008). 
 
Task 1. Mean RT1s (2.82% outliers) and mean PE1s are summarized in Table 2. RT1s 
were longer with a short compared to a long SOA (928 vs. 773 ms), F(1,47) = 73.91, p < .001, 
ηp2 =.61, and were longer for infelicitous compared to felicitous sentences (861 vs. 840 ms), 
F(1,47) = 4.78, p = .034, ηp2 =.09. The main effect of determiner was not significant (849 vs. 
852 ms, definite vs. indefinite determiner, respectively), F(1,47) = 0.17, p = .686, ηp2 < .01. The 
effect of sentence type was larger at the short SOA (952 vs. 904 ms; Δ = 48 ms) than at the long 
SOA (771 vs. 776 ms; Δ = -5 ms), thus an overadditive interaction, F(1,47) = 7.88, p = .007, 
ηp2 =.14. Determiner did not interact with SOA, F(1,47) = 0.30, p = .585, ηp2 =.01, nor with 
sentence type, F(1,47) = 3.46, p = .069, ηp2 =.07. The three-way interaction was significant, 
F(1,47) = 5.38, p = .025, ηp2 =.10. One way to view this interaction is that the overadditive 
interaction of sentence type and SOA was more clearly expressed for definite than for indefinite 
determiners. For PE1s, no effect reached significance, all Fs ≤ 2.46, all ps ≥ .123. 
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Table 2. Mean RTs (in milliseconds, ms) | PEs (percentage of errors) for the auditory 
discrimination task (Task 1) as a function of determiner, sentence type, and stimulus onset 
asynchrony (SOA). 
sentence type 
determiner 
definite indefinite 
SOA [ms] SOA [ms] 
100 1200 100 1200 
felicitous 888 |1.17 780 | 0.46 931 | 0.72 769 | 0.35 
infelicitous 958 | 0.72 773 | 0.93 950 | 1.31 769 | 0.70 
 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated whether processing the (anti-) presuppositions of 
determiners requires limited cognitive capacities or proceeds rather automatically. To this end, 
we embedded a sentence evaluation task (see Schneider et al., 2019) as Task 2 in a PRP 
experiment with an auditory discrimination task as Task 1 (see Pashler, 1994, for a review).  
Summary of results. The two main effects that were in the focus of the present study 
support our hypotheses. First, processing sentences with indefinite determiners took longer 
compared to those with definite determiners. This result conceptually replicates the 
observations by Schneider et al. (2019; see also Hertrich et al., 2015; Kirsten et al., 2014; 
Schumacher, 2009) and suggests that indeed processing indefinite determiners is more difficult 
and/or requires an extra processing step compared with the definite determiner. Second, 
participants also responded more slowly when the determiner was used infelicitously against 
the current context compared to its felicitous use. Such result has been reported in previous 
studies (Altmann & Steedman, 1988; Clifton, 2003, Exp. 2 and 4; van Berkum et al., 1999, 
2003), but failed to replicate in Schneider et al. (2019). Both effects were of the same size with 
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the long and with the short SOA, that is, they combined additively with the SOA manipulation. 
Although this conclusion is based on retaining the null-hypotheses of interactions, additional 
Bayesian analyses revealed BF01 > 3.0 in both cases, thus strengthening the evidence for the 
null-hypotheses. 
However, the two main effects need an important qualification, because determiner and 
sentence type interacted. Essentially, the longer RTs with indefinite compared with definite 
determiners was only visible in felicitous sentences, while RTs were roughly the same in 
infelicitous sentences. At the same time, error rates were higher for indefinite compared with 
definite determiners, irrespective of sentence type.  
Theoretical implications and limitations. The observed RT difference between the 
definite and the indefinite determiner in the felicitous sentences, fits well with the anti-
presupposition account for the anti-uniqueness association of the indefinite determiner, as 
derived from application of the Maximize Presupposition principle (Heim, 1991, 2011): 
Evaluation of the indefinite determiner involves first evaluating the uniqueness-presupposition 
of the definite determiner and in a second step its negation. Thus, the indefinite determiner does 
not presuppose anti-uniqueness itself.  We concur that the assumed negation was not directly 
manipulated in our experiment, but still it was assumed as the reason for the increased 
processing difficulties for the indefinite determiner and the results are in agreement with this 
assumption. However, the two-step nature of interpreting the indefinite determiner becomes 
visible more directly in the mouse-trajectory analyses of Schneider et al. (2019) where 
especially high Xneg scores revealed that participants initially considered the competitor 
response for indefinite determiners. The additivity with SOA means, in terms of the locus of 
slack-logic, that one or both processes require the central bottleneck and thus require limited 
cognitive capacities. In fact, the assumed second process of negation has been suggested as a 
capacity-limited process (see Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Thus, this aspect of the results first 
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replicates previous results and thereby strengthens the belief in more difficult processing of the 
indefinite compared with the definite determiner. In addition, the conclusion that the additional 
process responsible for the processing difficulties is capacity-limited helps delineating the 
nature of this process: negation of the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner 
indeed appears to be a viable candidate.  
Further, these results would also be in line with the assumption that presupposition 
triggers start a context search for an appropriate referent. This search process likely involves 
working memory resources. An involvement of working memory in presupposition processing 
has been suggested from different perspectives as well. This makes sense against the present 
results, because working memory has often been described as severely limited in capacity. That 
such kind of cognitive work load influences presupposition processing was reported by 
Domaneschi et al. (2014). In this study, participants had to answer yes/no questions on 
presuppositional content of a presented context and cognitive work load was manipulated with 
a memory task. The study revealed that the cognitive demand of presuppositions is related to 
the complexity of the mental representation that the presupposition requires. Definite 
descriptions require a simple representation of a referent in the mental model, whereas change 
of state verbs seem to be more complex and require different temporal representations. Further 
evidence for an involvement of working memory in presupposition processing can be derived 
from a study by Anderson and Holcomb (2005), who observed an increased left anterior 
negativity (LAN) for definite compared with indefinite determiners, what can be interpreted as 
a referential assignment increasing demands on working memory (see also King & Kutas, 
1995). Additional support for an involvement of working memory resources in presupposition 
processing comes from a recent aging study. Di Paola and Domaneschi (2019) investigated how 
the decline of working memory abilities with increasing age affects presupposition processing 
and observed longer RTs for older participants, especially for presuppositions triggered by 
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change of state verbs like stop. In their conclusion, the authors argued that change of state verbs 
require a more demanding mental representation (as, e.g., definite descriptions) and thus more 
cognitive recourses are used. The decline of working memory abilities with age has an effect 
on processing of presuppositions and can explain why older participants need more time. 
Why did we not observe a similar RT effect in infelicitous sentences? Tentatively we 
can offer two explanations for this unexpected observation. First, to some degree a speed-
accuracy tradeoff (e.g., Liesefeld & Janczyk, 2019) might have contributed, because the error 
rate was consistently larger for the indefinite determiner across all conditions. Second, Bade 
and Schwarz (2019) observed that the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite determiner is 
evaluated less often than the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner. This can 
explain why participants make more errors in the infelicitous indefinite condition, but it appears 
difficult to explain RT patterns based on this argument. Third, a possible explanation for the 
absence of an RT effect between the two determiners in the infelicitous condition might be that 
the definite determiner is even more implausible in a situation depicting multiple objects than 
the indefinite determiner is in the context of a single object. This might in fact lead to a larger 
effect of infelicity for the definite compared to the indefinite determiner, increase the 
corresponding RTs, and mask the otherwise expected RT difference between the two 
determiners. 
It certainly deserves a mention that this aspect of the results was not expected: Schneider 
et al. (2019) obtained the disadvantage for indefinite compared with definite determiners for 
both felicitous and infelicitous sentences, though not in RTs proper but in measures derived 
from mouse trajectories. Whether peculiarities of the design or the different dependent 
measures played an important role for these diverging results is an interesting topic for future 
research. One possible candidate for a critical difference is the response mode. With key press 
responses—as used in the present study—one can only measure RTs at the final decision for 
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which no correction is further possible. In contrast, mouse movements allow to observe 
unfolding of the decision-making process. With this method it is thus possible that participants 
change their mind before reaching the final response box. Taken together, longer movement 
times etc. in the Schneider et al. (2019) study may be a by-product of the initial deviation toward 
the wrong response in case of indefinite determiners, which is the main indicator for the 
assumed two-step processing though.   
The longer RTs in infelicitous than in felicitous sentences clarifies the somewhat 
ambiguous results obtained by Schneider et al. (2019), although this effect was larger for the 
definite than the indefinite determiner. In the Schneider et al. study, this effect was not 
consistently significant, although descriptively in the expected direction, and the authors 
reasoned that the inclusion of logically wrong sentences might have worked against observing 
the expected effect. We here omitted these sentences and observed more difficult processing of 
infelicitous sentences. The additional processes running when evaluating an infelicitously used 
determiner also seem to be capacity limited. We suggest that encountering a presupposition 
trigger immediately starts a context search for an appropriate referent which likely involves 
repeated selection and de-selection of working memory items that are considered as referents. 
Such selection of working memory items has been shown capacity-limited (Janczyk, 2017). 
In sum, the results support the notion that the processes initiated by presupposition 
triggers are capacity-limited rather than automatic. This conclusion receives additional 
evidence from a study by Schneider et al. (2020). This study combined the PRP approach with 
a self-paced reading task as used by Tiemann et al. (2011) and compared sentences including a 
presupposition trigger (definite determiner or again) with grammatical sentences without a 
presupposition trigger and unacceptable sentences. As expected, an RT difference between the 
trigger and the unacceptable condition was observed for both triggers. In combination with the 
SOA manipulation and the locus of slack-logic, the results are not in line with the idea that the 
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trigger-initiated processing is automatic. More precisely, it was assumed that the search for an 
appropriate referent (in case of the definite determiner) or for a suitable previous event (in case 
of again) that is immediately started when encountering a presupposition trigger initially fails, 
because contrary to the current experiment, the context did not explicitly verify or falsify the 
presupposition. To prevent the sentence from being uninterpretable, participants anticipated 
accommodation (which was suggested by high acceptability ratings). Accommodation is 
understood as a process of enriching the context with the information of the presupposition (as 
long as this is contextually feasible; for a formal definition see Lewis, 1979). Before adding the 
presuppositional content to the context one has to check whether this is plausible, and this 
preparation for accommodation requires cognitive resources like working memory. It is 
important to note, however, that Schneider et al. (2020) investigated the processing of 
presupposition triggers in comparison to other words triggering no presupposition and words 
that made the sentence ungrammatical. It did not compare different triggers, nor did it 
investigate infelicitously used presupposition triggers. In contrast, the current experiment 
focuses on the comparison between the definite and the indefinite determiner and their felicitous 
or infelicitous use.  
For Task 1 we observed a significant three-way interaction and an overadditive 
interaction of SOA and sentence type with longer RTs in long compared to short SOAs as well 
as in infelicitious compared to felicitous sentences. Against the background of the central 
bottleneck model (CBM), effects on Task 1 RTs are somewhat unexpected. However, such 
observations are not uncommon in PRP research. In particular, longer RT1 with decreasing 
SOA can easily be accounted for by central capacity sharing models (Tombu & Jolicoeur, 
2003). Thus, while this part of the results can be taken to argue in favor of capacity sharing 
models of dual-tasking (see also Mittelstädt & Miller, 2017), these models make in fact the 
same predictions as the CBM regarding the critical Task 2 RTs (Navon & Miller, 2002). In 
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addition, the effect and the overadditive interaction involving sentence type may be attributed 
to some trials with response grouping (Ulrich & Miller, 2008), that is, trials in which 
participants delayed responding in Task 1 until they have selected the Task 2 response as well. 
 The probably clearest limitation of the present study is its focus on the two determiners 
in the German language. These presupposition triggers were chosen, because the Maximize 
Presupposition principle was most often applied to determiners. Whether it can fruitfully be 
applied to other triggers as well is a case for future research. One candidate is “both” which has 
a competitor, namely “all”. In this case, Maximize Presupposition accounts for the fact that the 
possibility of using a sentence with “both” makes the sentence infelicitous when “all” is used. 
Thus, future studies should (1) investigate possible limits of the anti-presupposition approach 
and its implicated negation with other presupposition triggers, and (2) be carried out in different 
languages than German, to explore the generality of our results. 
 Conclusion. To conclude, the present experiment provides evidence for a more difficult 
processing of indefinite determiners, as would be expected if the anti-uniqueness inference 
arises from a negation of the uniqueness-presupposition of the definite determiner. Thus, this 
result supports the idea of the Maximize Presupposition principle. Further, using determiners 
infelicitously seems to induce processing costs. Finally, the most important and novel 
contribution of the present study is that presupposition processing requires limited cognitive 
capacities. It also demonstrates that bringing together cognitive psychologist’s (chronometric) 
tools with the emerging field of experimental pragmatic (Noveck, 2019) can be a fruitful and 
promising endeavor for future research. 
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Appendix 
A linear mixed effect model with Task 2 RTs using the lmer() function of the R package lme4 
yielded basically the same results as the ANOVA reported in the main text. Of the initial full 
model (d = determiner; s = sentence type; soa = SOA) 
𝑅𝑇2 ~ 𝑑 ⋅ 𝑠 ⋅ 𝑠𝑜𝑎 + (1 + 𝑑 ⋅ 𝑠 ⋅ 𝑠𝑜𝑎|𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡) + (1 + 𝑑 ⋅ 𝑠 ⋅ 𝑠𝑜𝑎|𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚), 
the random effect structure was reduced to  
𝑅𝑇2 ~ 𝑑 ⋅ 𝑠 ⋅ 𝑠𝑜𝑎 + (1 + 𝑑 + 𝑠 + 𝑠𝑜𝑎 + 𝑑: 𝑠 + 𝑑: 𝑖 + 𝑖: 𝑠||𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡) + (1 + 𝑑||𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚), 
to avoid singularities. Then, the significance pattern of fixed effects was assessed using 
Satterthwaite’s method to estimate degrees of freedom. The results are summarized in Table 
A1 and the qualitative pattern resembles that of the standard ANOVA as reported in the main 
text. In particular, the effects of determiner and sentence type were significant, but neither of 
them interacted with SOA. Distributional assumptions were better complied with when RTs 
were log-transformed. The same analyses on log-transformed RTs yielded comparable results. 
A generalized linear mixed effect model with a logit-link and the same random effect 
structure was then applied to Task 2 PEs using the glmer() function of the R package lme4 and 
the results are summarized in Table A1. Results resemble that of the ANOVA approach, except 
for the main effect of sentence type which was significant here as well. 
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Table A1. Inferential statistics from the linear mixed effect model analysis on Task 2 RT2s and 
the generalized linear mixed effect model on Task 2 PEs. 
  Task 2 RTs Task 2 PEs 
Effect |t| dfs p |z| p 
determiner 3.10 49.27 .003 4.99 <.001 
sentence type 7.20 48.49 <.001 2.04 .041 
soa 35.12 48.23 <.001 0.65 .517 
determiner × sentence type 3.96 48.32 <.001 0.87 .386 
determiner × soa 0.13 47.34 .899 0.60 .547 
sentence type × soa 0.93 47.16 .357 0.22 .824 
determiner × sentence type × soa 0.94 5759.19 .345 0.70 .487 
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Abstract
Informally speaking, presuppositions are meaning components which are part of the com-
mon ground for speakers in a conversation, that is, background information which is taken 
for granted by interlocutors. The current literature suggests an immediate processing of 
presuppositions, starting directly on the word triggering the presupposition. In the pre-
sent paper, we focused on two presupposition triggers in German, the definite determiner 
the (German der) and the iterative particle again (German wieder). Experiment 1 repli-
cates the immediate effects which were previously observed in a self-paced reading study. 
Experiment 2 then investigates whether this immediate processing of presuppositions is 
automatic or capacity-limited by employing the psychological refractory period approach 
and the locus of slack-logic, which have been successfully employed for this reason in var-
ious fields of cognitive psychology. The results argue against automatic processing, but 
rather suggest that the immediate processing of presuppositions is capacity-limited. This 
potentially helps specifying the nature of the involved processes; for example, a memory 
search for a potential referent.
Keywords Presuppositions · Experimental pragmatics · Dual-task · PRP
Introduction
Language and communication are ubiquitous in everyday life and speakers often communi-
cate more than they actually say. How this additional meaning arises is an important ques-
tion in the study of natural language meaning. Presuppositions are an example of meaning 
components that can be distinguished from the purely asserted meaning of an utterance, 
and have been a vital topic in the semantic and pragmatic literature of the last decades (see 
Beaver and Geurts 2012). While much of the previous work on presupposition processing 
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focused on the influence of different contexts on the interpretation of presuppositions, the 
main goal of the present paper is to investigate at which stage of cognitive processing pre-
suppositions unfold their impact.
Presuppositions and Their Immediate Processing
From a theoretical point of view, the term presupposition refers to background informa-
tion which is taken for granted by speaker and listener. It differs from the assertion of a 
sentence, which is novel content and part of the main meaning of an utterance. Presupposi-
tions are modeled as restrictions on what are appropriate contexts for the utterance (Heim 
1991; Heim and Kratzer 1998; Stalnaker 1973), that is, propositions that must be entailed 
by the context in order for a sentence with a presupposition to be felicitously uttered and 
added to the common ground (Heim 1990). The context (set) or common ground is defined 
as the set of propositions believed to be true by all participants of a conversation. More 
formally speaking, a sentence p presupposes q if the use of p is inappropriate when q is not 
in the common ground (Stalnaker 2002). Under a semantic view, certain linguistic expres-
sions trigger these appropriateness conditions and are therefore called presupposition trig-
gers. In (1), for example, the word again triggers the presupposition that Anna has already 
scored before yesterday.
(1) Yesterday, Anna scored again.
As a result, a sentence as in (1) is predicted to only be appropriate (i.e., felicitous) in con-
texts which entail that Anna scored before. If the context does not entail this information, 
the sentence is predicted to be infelicitous. There is, however, a rescue strategy for sen-
tences like (1) if the presupposition is not fulfilled. So-called accommodation describes the 
process of just assuming the presupposition to hold on the part of the speaker. It has been 
observed that accommodation is a highly context-dependent process (based on the prob-
ability of the truth of the presupposition in the given context; Heim 1992). For example, 
(1) might be surprising given that Anna never plays soccer. However, if she is known to be 
a very talented striker it is quite unsurprising. It has also been claimed that the availability 
of accommodation is dependent on the type of trigger and more difficult for triggers like 
again (see more discussion below).
Presuppositions are differentiated from asserted meaning and conversational implica-
tures, because they have different properties. For example, unlike assertions, presupposi-
tions survive embedding under certain operators such as negation, conditionals, modals, 
or questions. The sentence in (2), for example, still presupposes that Anna scored again. 
However, it does not assert anymore that she scored yesterday.
(2) If Anna scored again yesterday, I’d be surprised.
As pointed out above, presuppositions are assumed to be encoded in a lexical trigger 
according to a semantic view, that is, they are associated with certain words (Frege 1892; 
Heim 1982; Russell 1905). This view is in line with the prediction that the trigger itself 
leads to awareness of the importance of context and could thus evoke immediate pro-
cessing costs. However, there is an alternative theoretical perspective on presuppositions 
which takes a more pragmatic approach (Stalnaker 1973; Levinson 1983; Simons 2001). 
It assumes that presuppositions are not semantically encoded but are pragmatic, that is, 
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they only play a role after the sentence’s main meaning is computed and its integration into 
the context is considered. This “two-step” procedure means that the presupposition is not 
necessarily processed immediately, but only later at the end of the sentence. How presup-
positions arise is still a highly debated issue in the literature (“the triggering problem”). It 
led to the debate whether presuppositions are needed as a separate concept or whether the 
issue is better understood in terms of what is at-issue or raises attention versus what is non-
at-issue/in the background (Simons et al. 2011; Abrusán 2011; Tonhauser et al. 2018).1 So 
far, there is a lot of evidence supporting the view that presuppositions are processed imme-
diately (see below), which speaks against a two-step process. The data thus suggest that 
any processing model of presuppositions should contain the trigger itself as an important 
factor.
Experimental evidence for immediate processing of presuppositions comes from vari-
ous methods. For example, Kirsten et al. (2014) investigated the processing of presupposi-
tions while measuring event related potentials (ERPs) of the EEG in an experiment focus-
ing on the presuppositions triggered by the definite determiner, compared to inferences 
arising from the indefinite  determiner. Participants were presented with test sentences 
word-by-word on a computer screen and were asked comprehension questions at the end 
of the experiment. The data revealed ERP effects already on the trigger word. This led the 
authors to conclude that presupposition processing begins as soon as the presupposition 
trigger is encountered. Burkhardt’s (2006) ERP study further supports the idea of early 
processing of presuppositions by revealing an N400 effect on the trigger position when 
the existence presupposition of the definite determiner was not given. The experiment var-
ied the degree of availability of referents for definite determiner phrases by manipulating 
the context (given, bridged, and new). Definite noun phrases that were completely novel 
elicited N400 and P600 components  compared to definite noun phrases whose referents 
were given in the context. In cases where the referent could easily be inferred (e.g., “the 
bus driver” in situations describing somebody entering a bus), the effect was weaker. In a 
follow-up study, Burkhardt (2007) manipulated the terms of inferential demands needed 
to form a relationship between the definite noun phrase and the information of the context 
sentence, which was previously presented. It was either necessary or inducible informa-
tion. Drawing more demanding inferences resulted in larger P600 effects, whereas no N400 
effects were observed when the context did not support the presupposition. Jouravlev et al. 
(2016) also examined ERPs, but focused on the PSP trigger again (in English). Participants 
read sentences in contexts that either supported the presupposition (e.g., “Jake had tipped a 
maid at the hotel once before. Today he tipped a maid at the hotel again…”) or violated it 
(e.g., “Jake had never tipped a maid at the hotel before. Today he tipped a maid at the hotel 
again…”). The data analysis revealed the expected effects for semantic and syntactic viola-
tions (N440 and P600). Summing up, these results provide evidence for a rapid, on-line 
integration of presupposed content triggered by the adverb again. However, the observed 
pattern differs from the pattern reported for definite determiners.
Domaneschi et al. (2018) also investigated presupposition processing in different con-
textual conditions. To this end, they used contexts that satisfied the presupposition ver-
sus contexts that were neutral with regard to the truth of the presupposition (i.e., required 
accommodation), and compared two types of triggers, that is, definite descriptions and 
1 We are simplifying a bit here, as these accounts do not necessarily make these claims for all presupposi-
tion triggers but make further distinctions. As the direct comparison of these different classes of triggers is 
not the main focus of our paper, we will not go into the details of this part of the debate.
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change-of-state verbs. The results also support the idea of immediate presupposition pro-
cessing in the accommodation condition (a biphasic N400–P600 pattern at the point where 
the presupposition is known), but furthermore show that the two triggers differ in process-
ing: for definite descriptions, a clear involvement of the N400 was observed, while for 
change-of-state verbs the costs of accommodation were associated with a more pronounced 
P600. The data support the idea that presupposition accommodation involves two steps: (1) 
search for a previous antecedent in the discourse, and in case of an unsuccessful search, (2) 
a second step of context repairment, namely an integration of the presupposed content into 
the discourse model.
In sum, these EEG studies provide evidence for an immediate processing of presupposi-
tions, starting on the trigger itself. It is important to note that all of the studies presented 
focused on the influence of context, that is, they compared the processing cost of accom-
modation with the processing costs of a satisfied presupposition. In contrast, the present 
study focused on comparing a presupposition trigger with non-trigger words, and on the 
question whether processing the trigger is a capacity-limited process.
Other studies on presupposition processing used reading times. For example, Schwarz 
(2007) focused on the German additive particle and presupposition trigger auch (Engl. too) 
and reported longer reading times for clauses containing the trigger auch when the pre-
supposition was not satisfied compared to when it was. Of particular importance for the 
present purposes is Experiment 1 of Tiemann et al. (2011). These authors also employed 
self-paced reading to investigate at which point in time processing of presuppositions takes 
place and included five different presupposition triggers (German wieder, Engl. again; 
auch, Engl. also; aufhören, Engl. stop; wissen, Engl. know; and definites in the shape of 
possessive noun phrases [sein/ihr, Engl. his/her]). In their experiment, they compared (1) 
sentences with a presupposition trigger, (2) grammatical sentences without a trigger, and 
(3) ungrammatical sentences without a trigger. The sentences were presented in contexts 
which did not explicitly verify the presupposition (i.e., they were neutral with regard to 
the presupposition). Overall, reading times at the positions of the trigger and the following 
word were longest in sentences with presupposition triggers, intermediate in grammatical 
sentences, and shortest in the ungrammatical sentences. These effects also indicate that a 
presupposition trigger is considered immediately upon encountering it. However, recent 
studies suggest that different types of presupposition triggers differ in processing (Abrusán 
2011; Domaneschi et al. 2014; Domaneschi et al. 2018; Domaneschi and Di Paola 2018; 
Jouravlev et al. 2016; Tiemann et al. 2015). Against this background, it is unfortunate that 
Tiemann et al. (2011) did not analyze reading times for the different triggers separately. It 
thus remains unclear whether the results are similar for all triggers or just for a subset of 
them.
In sum, the current literature suggests an immediate processing of presuppositions, 
which starts directly on the trigger. The present study goes a step further by asking whether 
this immediate processing is automatic or capacity-limited. More precisely, we investi-
gated this for two selected triggers, definite determiners and again, using a similar meth-
odology as Tiemann et  al. (2011, Exp. 1). The choice of triggers is partly motivated by 
the theoretical discussion in Kripke (2009), who argued that presuppositions triggered 
by again and too are especially hard to accommodate compared to definite determiners. 
The choice is also motivated by the classifications that were suggested to account for dif-
ferences in processing. More specifically, Tiemann et  al. (2015) suggested to categorize 
the triggers again and definite determiner in two different classes based on their different 
behavior. They proposed a maxim of interpretation which they called Minimize Accommo-
dation: “Do not accommodate a presupposition unless missing accommodation will lead to 
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uninterpretability of the assertion.” According to this classification, Class 1 comprises trig-
gers that are likely to be ignored in case of presupposition failure (e.g., particles like again, 
too, and even), because their presuppositions are not relevant to the assertion (and can thus 
be ignored given Minimize Accommodation). On the other hand, presuppositions of trig-
gers in Class 2 must be accommodated according to this view, because otherwise the utter-
ance cannot be interpreted (e.g., definite descriptions, factives, and change of state verbs), 
as these triggers do contribute to the assertion (see also Glanzberg 2005, for a similar dis-
tinction). Processing of presuppositions associated with the definite determiner and again 
should be different following this proposal: again, being a Class 1 trigger, does not contrib-
ute anything to the assertion of the sentence. That is, the sentence in (3) can be evaluated 
with regard to its truth conditional content (that Jenna went ice-skating) without know-
ing the presupposition. This is not the case for triggers belonging to Class 2 such as, for 
example, definite determiners. The truth of the sentence in (4) cannot be evaluated without 
the presupposition of existence and uniqueness being verified, that is, without knowing 
whether there is a sun and whether it is unique.
(3) Jenna went ice-skating, again.
(4) The sun is shining.
We therefore focus on these two triggers, which have been argued to belong to different 
categories. Focusing on only two triggers has the advantage that we will be able to increase 
the number of stimuli per participant to allow for meaningful separate analyses of the two 
triggers.
The Locus of Slack‑Logic and an Example Application
To determine whether presupposition processing is automatic or a capacity-limited pro-
cess, we will use the psychological refractory period (PRP) approach, a method that has 
been widely used in cognitive psychology with its origin in dual-task research. Of particu-
lar importance is the locus of slack-logic (Schweickert 1978) within a PRP experiment. We 
will introduce the general logic with an experimental example in the following, and will 
adapt this logic to a self-paced reading task.
In general, participants perform two independent tasks in each trial of a PRP experi-
ment. The critical manipulation is the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), which is the time 
between the presentation of the Task 1 stimulus (S1) and the Task 2 stimulus (S2). With 
a short SOA, the two tasks overlap temporally, whereas there is no or only little temporal 
overlap with long SOAs. The typically observed result pattern is that the response time 
in Task 1 (RT1) does not depend on SOAs, but those in Task 2 (RT2) become longer the 
shorter the SOA—the PRP effect (Telford 1931). The most widely accepted explanation 
for this observation is the central bottleneck model (e.g., Pashler 1994; Welford 1952; see 
Fig. 1a for an illustration). A starting assumption of this model is that processing of a task 
is split into three stages: (a) a precentral stage, (b) a central stage, and (c) a postcentral 
stage. The precentral stage has most often been related to (early) perceptual processing 
and the postcentral stage to motor processing and execution. It is assumed that these two 
stages can run in parallel with all other stages of simultaneously processed tasks. The cen-
tral stage has originally been related to response selection (Pashler 1994), but other pro-
cesses seem to require this stage as well, for example, encoding into short-term memory 
(Jolicoeur and Dell’Acqua 1998), selection of working memory items (Janczyk 2017), or 
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anticipation of action effects (Wirth et al. 2015; see Janczyk and Kunde, under review). In 
contrast to the two other stages, the central stage is conceived as capacity-limited and can 
only be invoked by one task at a time, thereby constituting a bottleneck. With a short SOA, 
the central stage of Task 1 is not yet processed when the precentral stage of Task 2 has fin-
ished. Thus, central processing of Task 2 has to wait until the bottleneck is available again. 
This time of waiting is called the cognitive slack and is what leads to long RT2s with a 
short SOA. With a long SOA, in contrast, no cognitive slack occurs and Task 2 processing 
is not interrupted, resulting in short RT2s.
Importantly, this model can also be used to distinguish at which stage of processing 
a particular RT effect emerges (i.e., its “locus” in processing), and by implication then, 
whether this process is automatic or capacity-limited. We will explain this with a study 
by Piai et  al. (2014) as an example, who investigated the locus of semantic interference 
Fig. 1  Illustration of the central bottleneck model (a) and the predictions of the locus of slack-logic (b, c). 
(Note: PWI picture word interference)
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in picture-word interference (PWI) experiments (see Abdel Rahman and Melinger 2009). 
Typically, participants are presented with pictured objects and distractor words and are 
instructed to name the picture while ignoring the distractor word. Naming latencies are 
shorter when picture and word match than when they do not. Piai et  al. asked whether 
this semantic interference effect arises during the precentral stage, and thus is the result of 
parallel processing (Dell’Acqua et  al. 2007), or during the capacity-limited central stage 
that was related to lexical selection (Schnur and Martin 2012). To illustrate, consider Piai 
et al.’s Experiment 1.2 Task 1 was to give a manual response to a low- or high-pitched tone, 
and Task 2 was a vocal naming response to a picture combined with a distractor word. Pic-
tures of the body parts leg, arm, and finger were combined with the corresponding word or 
a string of five Xs. In congruent trials, pictures and words matched, in incongruent trials, 
they did not match. In neutral trials, the pictures were presented with the five Xs. The SOA 
between the tone and the PWI stimulus was either 0 or 500 ms.
Two different predictions can be derived from the central bottleneck model. First, con-
sider that the PWI effect results from processing during the capacity-limited central stage 
(see Fig. 1b). With a long SOA, Task 2 RTs are prolonged in incongruent compared to con-
gruent trials (visualized by the gray box labeled PWI). Because with a short SOA the cen-
tral stage can only start after the central stage of Task 1 has finished, the same PWI effect 
is expected in this case. In other words, the PWI effect is expected to combine additively 
with SOA. Second, consider that the PWI effect emerges from parallel processing that can 
run simultaneously with the central stage of Task 1 (see Fig. 1c). With the long SOA, the 
same prediction as for the previous case is made and the PWI effect should be observed. 
With a short SOA, in contrast, the processing leading to the PWI effects starts regardless 
of the central stage of Task 1, and any additional processing required in incongruent trials 
stretches into the cognitive slack. As a consequence, the PWI effect becomes invisible at 
the short SOA and SOA and PWI are expected to produce an (underadditive) interaction. 
The data clearly revealed an additive effect of SOA and PWI what suggests that the PWI 
effect requires central capacity and arises during (or after) the central stage. The results of 
further experiments in Piai et al. (2014) support this, because the additivity robustly repli-
cated across these other experiments.
The Present Study: Is Processing of Presupposition Triggers Capacity‑Limited 
or Automatic?
In the present study, we will use the PRP approach we just introduced to investigate the 
processing of presuppositions triggered by again and by  definite determiners in more 
detail. The major question of our study is whether processing initiated when encounter-
ing a presupposition trigger is automatic or requires limited capacities. Experiment 1 was 
designed after Experiment 1 of Tiemann et al. (2011) with several goals. First, we aimed 
at replicating the observation of longer reading times for triggers compared with neutral 
or unacceptable sentences (Tiemann et  al. 2011; see also Schwarz 2007, for the trigger 
auch compared to the neutral word vorher [Engl. earlier]). Second, because we needed 
to use a slightly modified presentation method of the words in the self-paced reading task 
to apply the PRP setup and the locus of slack-logic in Experiment 2, we already adopted 
2 In this experiment, the authors actually compared performance in a PWI task with performance in a color 
word Stroop task. For simplicity, we here only consider the PWI task.
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this method in Experiment 1 to ensure that the longer reading times for triggers are also 
observed under these conditions. Third, based on the acceptability ratings of sentences 
collected in Experiment 1, we selected those items that fit best for use in the subsequent 
experiment. In Experiment 2, we then adapted the PRP approach to the reading task by 
adding a tone discrimination task and presenting the trigger (or the corresponding word 
at this position) after a variable SOA following the tone. To ensure that participants inter-
preted the sentences in the intended way, we again included the rating after each trial and 
asked comprehension questions at the end of the experiment. We would like to stress at 
this point that conclusions about differences between the triggers can only be made if the 
qualitative pattern we observe is different. Numerical differences, even if substantiated by 
significant main effects, do not necessarily mean that the underlying processes are differ-
ent. For example, the processes may simply require more time because they are more dif-
ficult in one condition.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 uses a self-paced reading task to investigate and establish the reading times 
for several regions of interest (i.e., the presupposition trigger, the word following the pre-
supposition trigger, the final word, and the total reading time) separately for two particular 
presupposition triggers, namely determiners and the German word wieder (Engl. again). 
Additionally, this experiment prepared the subsequent Experiment 2, which focuses on 
the main question of this paper. To this end, participants rated acceptability of sentences 
against the presented context after each trial. On the basis of these data, we selected the 
sentences for the following experiment. Furthermore, Experiment 2 required the simulta-
neous presentation of all words preceding the presupposition trigger or the corresponding 
word on the trigger position to apply the locus of slack-logic. Thus, we already used this 
procedure in Experiment 1 to determine whether or not we still observe an effect of the 
presupposition trigger in reading times.
Although this experiment is closely designed after Experiment 1 of Tiemann et  al. 
(2011), we used only two triggers as opposed to the five different triggers used by Tie-
mann et  al. This allowed us to increase the number of times each trigger was presented 
in the experiment. Following Tiemann et  al., we will first visualize reading times aver-
aged for both triggers, but—if warranted—this is followed-up by analyses of both triggers 
separately. By and large, the expectation was to replicate the results obtained by Tiemann 
et al. despite the changes in the presentation procedure and to identify possible differences 
between the two triggers belonging to different categories.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight native speakers of German (35 female, 13 male; mean age = 24.4 years) partici-
pated in this experiment. They were recruited from the participant pool at the University of 
Tübingen (Germany), were naïve regarding the hypotheses of this experiment, and signed 
informed consent prior to data collection. Participants received 8€ or course credit for their 
participation.
Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 
1 3
Apparatus and Stimuli
Stimulus presentation and response collection were controlled by a standard PC con-
nected to a 17-in. CRT monitor. Responses in the reading task were given on an external 
response key which was located to the right of the participants and was operated with 
the right index-finger. Ratings of the sentences were provided via the number keys 1–4 
on a standard QWERTZ keyboard ranging from very unnatural (1) to very natural (4).
All stimuli were presented in white font on a black background. Context sentences 
were presented in full length in the upper half of the screen. The letters of the test sen-
tences’ words were first substituted by underscores as placeholders. All words preceding 
the presupposition trigger or the corresponding word on this position were presented 
simultaneously; all subsequent words were presented one-by-one (see below, section 
“Task and Procedure” for more information). Once a new word was presented, the pre-
vious word disappeared and was again substituted with the underscores (see Fig. 2).
We included two types of presupposition triggers in this experiment, namely the Ger-
man definite determiner der (Engl. the) and the German iterative particle wieder (Engl. 
again). For each trigger, we created 52 sets of experimental sentences, thus 104 sets 
in total. Each set consisted of a context sentence and three test sentences. The context 
sentences merely introduced the protagonists, but were kept as neutral as possible with 
regard to the truth of the presupposition. They were designed so that they made the 
acceptable test sentence appropriate, the trigger sentence somewhat degraded due to the 
presupposition being neither true nor false in the context, and the unacceptable sentence 
inappropriate [see (5) and (7)]. The test sentences contained either a presupposition 
trigger [(6a) and (8a)], a neutral word [(6b) and (8b)], or a semantically unacceptable 
word [(6c) and (8c)]. The neutral/unacceptable words replaced the trigger word in the 
respective conditions and kept the sentence semantically acceptable or made it semanti-
cally unacceptable. In total, 312 trials resulted.
Example item again
(5) Kontext: Monika ist mit ihren Freunden unterwegs.
 Context: Monika is with her friends out.
(6) Test sentences:
(a) Monika läuft wieder Schlittschuh und lacht. (trigger)
 Monika does again ice-skating and smiles.
(b) Monika läuft heute Schlittschuh und lacht. (neutral)
 Monika does today ice-skating and smiles.
(c) Monika läuft freundlich Schlittschuh und lacht. (unacceptable)
 Monika does friendly ice-skating and smiles.
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Example item determiner
(7) Kontext: Marie sonnt sich heute im Garten.
 Context: Marie suns herself today in (the) garden.
(8) Test sentences:
(a) Marie liegt auf der Liege und trinkt Wasser. (trigger)
 Marie lies on the lounger and drinks water.
(b) Marie liegt auf einer Liege und trinkt Wasser. (neutral)
 Marie lies on a lounger and drinks water.
(c) Marie liegt auf jeder Liege und trinkt Wasser. (unacceptable)
 Marie lies on every lounger and drinks water.
When creating context and test sentences, we pursued the same goals as Tiemann et al. 
(2011) did. Most importantly, we made the sentences as neutral as possible with regard to 
the presupposition, that is, they did not explicitly verify or falsify it. At the same time, we 
made the events described plausible in the given setting so that the “neutral” test condi-
tion would be completely acceptable, the trigger sentence somewhat acceptable (requiring 
accommodation, however), and the unacceptable sentence the most unacceptable (as it was 
ill-formed irrespective of plausibility in the context).
Task and Procedure
Each trial started with the complete context sentence, horizontally centered in the upper 
part of the computer screen (see Fig.  2 for an illustration of the following). After par-
ticipants read the sentence, they were to press the response button to request the test sen-
tence. The test sentence was presented in a self-paced reading manner. This allows readers 
to use the response button presses to control the exposure duration for each section of the 
sentence they read. The test sentence was divided into a segment preceding the trigger 
word or the corresponding word on this position [the underlined part in Examples (6) 
and (8)], in which all words were presented simultaneously, and a section following it. 
Since simultaneous presentation applied to all sentence types, it was up to then equally 
likely for a participant to be confronted with a trigger sentence, a neutral sentence, or an 
unacceptable sentence. The following words, that is the presupposition trigger itself, the 
neutral word, or the unacceptable word [printed in bold font in Examples (6) and (8)], and 
all subsequent words were presented word-by-word upon response key presses. Reading 
times were measured from word/segment onset until the response key was pressed. After 
the test sentence was read, participants rated the acceptability of the test sentence within 
the given context.
Participants started with reading written instructions. This was followed by a short prac-
tice block with two sets of each trigger in all three conditions, thus 12 trials in total. The 
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order of these practice trials was determined randomly, but was the same for all participants. 
Then, the 300 test trials were administered in three blocks of 100 trials each. The order of 
presentation was random, with the restriction that sentences of the same item did not appear 
in different conditions directly in succession. All participants were tested individually in a 
single session of about 60 minutes. This is another slight change compared to the original 
study: Tiemann et al. (2011) tested participants in three separate sessions to avoid that they 
saw the same item in different conditions within one session. As we increased the number of 
stimuli though, we did not expect recognition effects during one session.
Design and Analyses
The independent variables of interest were (1) sentence type (trigger vs. neutral vs. unac-
ceptable) and (2) trigger type (determiner vs. again). Mean acceptability ratings were sub-
mitted to a 3 × 2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with sentence type and trigger type as 
repeated-measures. Reading times were calculated per letter (see Tiemann et al. 2011) for 
the following regions: (1) the word(s) preceding the trigger position (pre-trigger), (2) the 
presupposition trigger or the corresponding word on this position (trigger), (3) the word 
following the trigger position (post-trigger), the final word (final word), and the reading 
time of the whole sentence (total). Trials in which one reading time deviated more than 2.5 
standard deviations from the respective design cell (calculated separately for each partici-
pant) were excluded as outliers (11.01% of the trials). Mean reading times for each region 
were submitted to the same ANOVA as acceptability ratings were. When the interaction of 
trigger type × sentence type was significant, we ran separate ANOVAs for both triggers 
Fig. 2  Illustration of the task used in Experiment 1 (see text for more information). (Note that the words 
appearing in the upper part (“context”, “preparation of test sentence”, …) did not actually appear during the 
experiment but were added here for clarity)
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Fig. 3  Acceptability ratings in Experiments 1 and 2 as a function of sentence type and trigger type. Error 
bars are 95% confidence intervals for the means
with sentence type as a repeated-measure. A significant main effect in this analysis was fol-
lowed up by paired t tests. In case of violations of the sphericity assumption, uncorrected 
degrees of freedom are reported, but the corresponding ε-estimate is provided. Effect sizes 
for t tests were calculated as d = t√
n
 with n = 48.
Results
Acceptability Rating
Results of the acceptability rating are visualized in Fig. 3a. Unacceptable sentences were 
rated worst and trigger and neutral sentences were rated much more appropriate. Descrip-
tively, for the determiner condition, ratings for neutral sentences were slightly worse than 
for trigger sentences, whereas for the trigger again, neutral sentences were rated best. The 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of sentences type, F(2,94) = 330.60, p < .001, ηp
2 = .88, 
ε = .55, and of trigger type, F(1,47) = 4.78, p = .034, ηp
2 = .09. The interaction was signifi-
cant as well, F(2,94) = 6.08, p = .007, ηp
2 = .11, ε = .77, and we therefore analyzed the two 
triggers separately.
For the determiner condition, the ANOVA revealed a main effect of sentence type 
F(2,94) = 302.87, p < .001, ηp
2 = .87, ε = .59. Significant differences were obtained 
between all sentence types, trigger versus neutral: t(47) = 3.10, p = .003, d = 0.45; 
unacceptable versus trigger: t(47) = 17.89, p < .001, d = 2.58; unacceptable versus 
neutral: t(47) = 17.89, p < .001, d = 2.58. For the trigger again, the main effect of sen-
tence type was significant as well, F(2,94) = 213.66, p < .001, ηp
2 = .82, ε = .61, and the 
t tests revealed significant differences between all sentence types, trigger versus neu-
tral: t(47) = 4.58, p < .001, d = 0.66; trigger versus unacceptable: t(47) = 14.62, p < .001, 
d = 2.11; neutral versus unacceptable: t(47) = 15.53, p < .001, d = 2.24.
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Reading Times
Reading times per letter across both triggers are visualized in Fig. 4a, and separately for 
the determiner and again in Fig. 4b and c, respectively. All inferential statistics are sum-
marized in Table 1. The ANOVA revealed significant differences between the two trigger 
types for all analyzed positions, perhaps pointing to differences in how the two triggers are 
processed. 
For the trigger position, the interaction was significant and differences in reading times 
were observed for both trigger conditions, though in different directions. For the deter-
miner, trigger sentences had the longest reading times, while those for neutral and unaccep-
table sentences did not differ. In contrast, for again, reading times were longest for neutral 
sentences, intermediate for trigger sentences, and shortest for unacceptable sentences.
Also for the post-trigger position, the interaction was significant and differences in read-
ing times were observed for both triggers. For the determiner, differences were small in 
size, but reading times were longest for unacceptable sentences, intermediate for neutral 
sentences, and shortest for trigger sentences. For again, reading times were longest for 
unacceptable sentences, but similar for trigger and neutral sentences.
No differences in reading times between the sentence types were obtained for the final 
word. When considering the total reading time though, reading times depended on sen-
tence type only for again, and were longest for neutral sentences, intermediate for trigger 
sentences, and shortest for unacceptable sentences.
Discussion
Experiment 1 was largely built on Experiment 1 of Tiemann et  al. (2011), however, we 
focused on the definite determiner and again to allow for separate analyses of reading times 
if warranted. The rating data replicate the results of Tiemann et al. in general, with minor 
Fig. 4  Reading times (RT; in milliseconds) per letter of Experiment 1 analyzed across triggers in (a), and 
separately for the two triggers determiner (b) and again (c) for the regions pre-trigger (pre), trigger, post-
trigger (post), final word (final), and total as a function of sentence type
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exceptions: Unacceptable sentences were rated worst, and for the trigger again, neutral 
sentences were rated slightly better than trigger sentences. In contrast to Tiemann et al.’s 
study, trigger sentences were rated better than neutral sentences for the definite determiner. 
In the original study this was reversed although it is unclear from the report whether the 
contrasts between sentence types were significant. Overall, this supports the original idea 
of Tiemann et al. that using presuppositions in neutral contexts is not as unacceptable as 
using grammatically deviant structures. As a result, successful context integration (i.e., 
accommodation of the presupposition) should be distinguished from semantic violations.
That context integration did play a role, that is, that participants accommodated the pre-
supposition, is supported by the ratings for the trigger condition, which are unexpectedly 
quite high, and higher than in the original study. Although the presupposition was not actu-
ally mentioned in the context, participants easily accepted the sentences. This suggest that a 
process of accommodation took place, which was facilitated by the contexts we used. The 
deviation from Tiemann et al.’s results can be explained by assuming that the contexts used in 
the present study made accommodation more likely. The observed difference between again 
and the determiner is rooted in the fact that the presuppositions of determiners in general 
seem to be easier to accommodate (Tiemann et al. 2015).3 Based on the ratings, we selected 
the 32 items that fit our requirements best for use in Experiment 2, namely those sentences 
that revealed the general pattern we expected most clearly (ungrammatical sentences are 
worse than trigger sentences which are [slighlty] worse than acceptable sentences).
Reading time results are largely in line with Tiemann et al.’s (2011) observations, but 
also extend them in an important way. Most importantly, we were able to replicate immedi-
ate effects on the trigger and the word following the trigger, with a descriptive pattern very 
similar to the original study. These results speak for an immediate processing of the pre-
supposition trigger. However, one purpose of the present study was to analyze both triggers 
separately. While for both trigger types reading times for the trigger positions were longer 
for trigger than for unacceptable sentences, neutral sentences had the longest reading times 
for the trigger again, but for the determiner, they were similar to those of unacceptable 
sentences. The long reading times for the neutral condition for the trigger again might be 
due to the unexpected appearance of the word heute (Engl. today) in this position. It sounds 
more natural to place the word heute at the beginning of the sentence in German. This 
unexpected word order might have caused the long reading times.
In sum, Experiment 1 replicated effects already on the trigger position for both trigger 
types, despite our change of presenting all pre-trigger position words simultaneously and 
testing all items in one session.
Experiment 2
By and large, Experiment 1 replicated and extended the results obtained by Tiemann et al. 
(2011). Based on this, Experiment 2 embeds the self-paced reading task within a PRP 
experiment to apply the locus of slack-logic. The goal is to evaluate whether the processing 
3 We would like to point out though that we can only draw weak conclusions about accommodability based 
on our data, as we did not explicitly control for factors that have been shown to influence the availability of 
accommodation, for example, plausibility, bridging etc. It is important to note, however, that this is not the 
main point of the present study, but rather the comparison of presuppositional sentences to non-presuppo-
sitional ones, both grammatical and ungrammatical, to test whether processing presuppositions is capacity 
limited.
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initiated by a presupposition trigger is (a) automatic and running in parallel with other 
tasks or is (b) capacity limited with a locus within the central stage of processing. Thus, a 
binary tone discrimination was added to the self-paced reading task. More precisely, a tone 
was played after participants read all pre-trigger position words and participants were to 
respond with a key-press with their left hand to the pitch of the tone. After a variable SOA, 
the word on the trigger position appeared, and participants proceeded through the remain-
ing sentence in a similar way as in Experiment 1. In terms of the PRP logic (see Introduc-
tion), the tone discrimination task can be considered as Task 1, and reading the word on the 
trigger position would be Task 2.
Because the locus of slack-logic can—in the present setup—only be applied to the word 
on the trigger position, the predictions for Experiment 2 focus on this position.4 We illustrate 
the predictions for the comparison between trigger and unacceptable sentences in Fig. 5, with 
the former sentences having resulted in longer reading times for both triggers in Experiment 1. 
Regardless of whether trigger processing is capacity-limited (Fig. 5a) or automatic (Fig. 5b), 
differences in reading times for the trigger position are expected with a long SOA. Ideally, the 
pattern observed there should be the same as already obtained in Experiment 1. Different pre-
dictions, however, can be made for the situation with a short SOA. If processing at the trigger 
position does require central capacity (Fig. 5a), it cannot be initiated before the central stage 
of Task 1 has finished. In this case, the same differences as with the long SOA are observed 
and—statistically—sentence type and SOA should combine additively. If, in contrast, this pro-
cessing is automatic and runs in parallel to the central stage of Task 1, all differences become 
absorbed into the cognitive slack and should become unobservable with the short SOA 
(Fig. 5b). Statistically, sentence type and SOA should yield an (underadditive) interaction. In 
any case, reading times are expected to be longer with a short than with a long SOA, that is, a 
PRP effect, because some central processing can be assumed anyway, for example, response 
selection required for pressing the response key (see also Janczyk 2017, for an example).
Method
Participants
The intended sample size in this experiment was n = 48. Data were collected from 51 native 
speakers of German from the Tübingen (Germany) area, of which three participants were 
excluded because of 30% or more errors in the comprehension questions at the end of the exper-
iment (final sample: mean age = 24.2 years, 39 females, 9 males). Participants signed informed 
consent prior to data collection and were paid 8€ or received course credit for participation.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The same general setup as in Experiment 1 was used. Due to the addition of the audi-
tory (tone) discrimination task, two additional response keys were placed to the left of the 
4 In principle, of course, the PRP and locus of slack-methods can be applied to other positions as well. 
Yet, one has to conduct a separate experiment, because with the locus of slack-logic it is only possible to 
investigate one position at a time. Thus, a similar investigation, for example, for the point where the presup-
position becomes completely known cannot be done within the same experiment and must be postponed to 
future research.
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participants which were operated with the left index- and middle-finger. Stimuli in this task 
were 300 and 900 Hz sinusoidal tones of 50 ms length presented via headphones.
Based on the results of Experiment 1, we selected the 32 sets of experimental items per 
trigger (out of the 50 experimental sets used in Experiment 1) that best fit our expectations 
regarding the ratings (see “Appendix” for more details on the selection).
Task and Procedure
While the general procedure of the self-paced reading task and the acceptability rating was 
similar to Experiment 1 (see Fig. 6), several changes were required to integrate the audi-
tory discrimination task. To minimize exclusion of trials due to errors in this task, partici-
pants started with 40 practice trials of only the auditory discrimination task. Each of these 
trials was initiated by written instructions centered on the screen that asked the participant 
to press the right response key to start a trial (to mimic the procedure required in the main 
experiment). After 100 ms, the 300 or 900 Hz tone was played (each 20 times in a random 
order) and participants were to respond with a key press of the left hand. In case of errors, 
respective error feedback was presented on the screen (1000 ms) and the next trial started 
after an inter-trial interval of 1000 ms.
Fig. 5  Predictions for reading times at the trigger position for the comparison trigger versus unacceptable 
(unacc.) sentences. a Processing at the trigger position requires central capacity and can thus only start 
once the central stage of the (preceding) tone task has finished. b Processing at the trigger position can run 
in parallel to other capacity-limited stages and with a short SOA it extends into the cognitive slack. (SOA 
stimulus onset asynchrony)
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Then the main experiment began and, similarly to Experiment 1, participants read a 
context sentence at the beginning of each trial. Pressing the right response key made the 
context sentence disappear and the underscores appeared as placeholders. With the next 
key press, all pre-trigger position words appeared. Then, following the next press of the 
right response key, the 300 or 900 Hz tone was played and following an SOA of 100 or 
1200 ms, the next word (on the trigger position) occurred. Participants were to first respond 
to the tone and then to continue reading. If the response to the tone was correct and no fur-
ther errors occurred (wrong response order, no response within 5000  ms), the trial was 
continued until the end of the sentence. As in Experiment 1, this procedure was followed 
by an acceptability rating task, but in case of errors, the trial was aborted and respective 
error feedback was presented on the screen (1000 ms).
Participants began with 48 (unanalyzed) practice trials. The 32 (sets) × 2 (trigger 
types) × 3 (sentence type) = 192 test trials were divided into three test blocks of 64 test sen-
tences each, with a randomized presentation order. The two SOAs were orthogonally distrib-
uted across the six combinations of trigger types and sentence types. The stimulus–response 
mapping of the auditory discrimination task was counterbalanced across participants.
Design and Analyses
For all analyses (except on error rates in the discrimination task), trials with an erroneous 
response in the auditory discrimination task were excluded first (those trials were aborted 
during the experiment and not continued). Acceptability ratings were analyzed as for 
Experiment 1. Mean discrimination response times, error rates in the discrimination task, 
and reading times (per letter) at the trigger position were submitted to a 2 × 3 × 2 ANOVA 
Fig. 6  Illustration of the task used in Experiment 2 (see text for more information). (Note that the words 
appearing in the upper part (“context”, “preparation of test sentence”, …) and the pictures illustrating the 
tone discrimination task did not actually appear during the experiment but were added here for clarity)
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with SOA (100 vs. 1200 ms), sentence type (trigger vs. neutral vs. unacceptable), and trig-
ger type (determiner vs. again) as repeated-measures.
Trials with response times or reading times deviating more than 2.5 standard deviations 
from the mean of the respective design cell (calculated separately for each participant) 
were excluded as outliers.
Results
First of all, we excluded 2.7% trials with unspecific errors (too slow response, responding 
to the reading task before responding to the discrimination task, no response within the 
time limit).
Acceptability Rating
Results of the acceptability rating are visualized in Fig. 3b. For the determiner condition, 
trigger and neutral sentences were rated almost equally well, while unacceptable sen-
tences were rated worst. For again, neutral sentences were rated better than trigger sen-
tences, while unacceptable sentences were also rated worst. The ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of sentence type, F(2,94) = 551.27, p < .001, ηp
2 = .92, ε = .63, but not of trigger type, 
F(1,47) = 0.29, p = .595, ηp
2 = .01. The interaction was also significant, F(2,94) = 4.27, 
p = .025, ηp
2 = .08, ε = .79, and we thus analyzed the two triggers separately.
For the determiner, we observed a main effect of sentence type, F(2,94) = 478.90, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .91, ε = .59. There was no significant difference between trigger and neutral 
sentences, t(47) = 1.40, p = .167, d = 0.20, but ratings for unacceptable sentences differed 
significantly from both the trigger sentences, t(47) = 22.65, p < .001, d = 3.27, and the neu-
tral sentences, t(47) = 22.30, p < .001, d = 3.22. For again, the main effect of sentence type 
was also significant F(2,94) = 331.67, p < .001, ηp
2 = .88., ε = .88, and all differences were 
significant, trigger versus neutral: t(47) = 2.88, p = .006, d = 0.42; trigger versus unaccep-
table: t(47) = 18.49, p < .001, d = 2.67; neutral versus unacceptable: t(47) = 22.94, p < .001, 
d = 3.31.
Auditory Discrimination Task
Response times and error percentages are summarized in Table  2 (2.55% outliers). Par-
ticipants responded more slowly with a short compared to a long SOA, F(1,47) = 47.57, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .50, and overall  descriptively slightly shorter in the again condition, 
F(1,47) = 2.46, p = .123, ηp
2 = .05. There was also a main effect of sentence type, with 
slowest responses for unacceptable sentences, intermediate for neutral sentences, and 
fastest responses for the trigger sentences, F(2,94) = 5.02, p = .013, ηp
2 = .10, ε = .84. This 
effect was much larger at the short than at the long SOA, thus an overadditive interac-
tion, F(2,94) = 9.87, p = .001, ηp
2 = .17, ε = .77, and for again compared to the determiner, 
F(2,94) = 4.20, p = .018, ηp
2 = .08. There was no significant interaction of SOA and trigger 
type, F(1,47) = 0.40, p = .532, ηp
2 = .01. Because the three-way interaction was significant, 
however, F(2,94) = 3.72, p = .028, ηp
2 = .07, separate 3 × 2 ANOVAs were run for each trig-
ger type.
For the determiner, only the main effect of SOA was significant, F(1,47) = 42.72, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .48. Neither the main effect of sentence type, F(2,94) = 0.33, p = .722, 
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ηp
2 = .01, nor the interaction were significant, F(2,94) = 3.04, p = .059, ηp
2 = .06, ε = .89. 
For again, both main effects were significant, SOA: F(1,47) = 40.15, p < .001, ηp
2 = .46; 
sentence type: F(2,94) = 9.28, p < .001, ηp
2 = .16, as was the interaction, F(2,94) = 12.53, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .21, ε = .84.
For error rates, no effect reached significance, all Fs ≤ 3.06, all ps ≥ .087.
Self‑Paced Reading Task
Mean reading times (per letter) for the trigger position across both trigger types are vis-
ualized in Fig. 7a (2.77% outliers). Sentence type influenced reading times significantly, 
F(2,94) = 471.53, p < .001, ηp
2 = .91, ε = .76. Furthermore, we observed a main effect of 
SOA, F(1,47) = 1539.54, p < .001, ηp
2 = .97, with shorter reading times with a long SOA, 
and a main effect of trigger type, F(1,47) = 495.16, p < .001, ηp
2 = .91. Sentence type and 
SOA also interacted, F(2,94) = 231.57, p < .001, ηp
2 = .83, but the effect of sentence type 
was larger with a short than with a long SOA, that is, the interaction was overadditive. 
Table 2  Mean response times (in 
milliseconds)|error percentages 
for the auditory discrimination 
task as a function of sentence 
type, trigger type, and stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA)
Sentence type Trigger type
Determiner Again
SOA (ms) SOA (ms)
100 1200 100 1200
Trigger 823|3.63 763|1.70 801|2.49 734|1.83
Acceptable 843|1.98 752|2.25 810|2.41 751|2.15
Unacceptable 860|3.29 743|1.97 891|1.60 732|2.92
Fig. 7  Reading times (RT) for the trigger position as a function of sentence type and stimulus onset asyn-
chrony (SOA) in Experiment 2 analyzed across triggers in (a), and separately for the two triggers deter-
miner (b) and again (c)
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Sentence type and trigger type also interacted, F(2,94) = 376.94, p < .001, ηp
2 = .89, ε = .67, 
and the interaction of SOA and trigger type was significant as well, F(1,47) = 717.47, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .94. Finally, the three-way interaction was also significant, F(2,94) = 175.37, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .79, ε = .84, and we thus analyzed both trigger types separately.
For the trigger determiner (Fig.  7b), the main effect of sentence type was sig-
nificant, F(2,94) = 391.44, p < .001, ηp
2 = .89, ε = .71, as was the main effect of SOA, 
F(1,47) = 1590.31, p < .001, ηp
2 = .97. Further, we observed a significant interaction of 
sentence type and SOA, F(2,94) = 186.88, p < .001, ηp
2 = .80, ε = .82. A very similar pic-
ture was obtained for the trigger again (Fig.  7c). The main effect of sentence type was 
significant, F(2,94) = 542.56, p < .001, ηp
2 = .92, ε = .78, as was the main effect of SOA, 
F(1,47) = 1224.45, p < .001, ηp
2 = .96. The interaction of sentence type and SOA was also 
significant, F(2,94) = 259.45, p < .001, ηp
2 = .85.
Discussion
Experiment 2 investigated whether the immediate processing induced by presupposition 
triggers is automatic or requires limited capacity. To this end, the PRP approach and the 
logic of slack-logic were combined with the self-paced reading task already used in Exper-
iment 1.
The ratings largely replicated the results obtained in Experiment 1 with the exception 
that the difference between neutral and trigger sentences was not significant for the deter-
miner. The overall higher ratings for trigger sentences compared to unacceptable sentences 
suggest that participants accommodate the presupposition and interpret the sentences (and 
presuppositions) as intended.
Regarding the tone discrimination task, the main effect of SOA is somewhat unexpected 
against the background of the central bottleneck model. However, such observations are 
not uncommon in PRP research. We will come back to this in the General Discussion, 
where we also consider the overadditive interaction of sentence type and SOA.
Regarding reading times on the trigger position, we obtained several results of interest. 
First, with a long SOA, the observed pattern of differences between sentence types was 
the same as in Experiment 1, and thus a successful replication of these results. Secondly, 
these differences were the same with a short SOA. This result contradicts the notion that 
the processes initiated by the trigger are automatic. It is noteworthy though that the dif-
ferences were even larger with a short than with a long SOA—a pattern that is also not 
predicted by the underlying central bottleneck model. We will come back to this in the 
General Discussion.
General Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the nature of the immediate processing ini-
tiated upon encountering a presupposition trigger. To that end, we compared sentences 
including a presupposition trigger with grammatical sentences without a presupposition 
trigger and unacceptable sentences. Experiment 1 replicated several results obtained by 
Tiemann et al. (2011), but focused only on two triggers, namely definite determiners and 
again. Experiment 2 combined a self-paced reading task with the PRP approach and the 
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locus of slack-logic to address the main question of the present study: Is presupposition 
processing an automatic or capacity-limited process?
Main Results and Theoretical Implications
Experiment 1 replicated the immediate effects of presupposition processing on the presup-
position trigger, as observed by Tiemann et al. (2011). Furthermore, our first experiment 
revealed that presenting all words preceding the trigger simultaneously and presenting all 
relevant stimuli in one test session did not influence the immediate effects on the trigger 
itself or the participants’ interpretation.
Experiment 2 was based on the results of Experiment 1 and assessed whether the 
observed processing initiated by the presupposition trigger is automatic or capacity-limited. 
The former leads to the prediction that the trigger effects should only be observed with a 
long but not with a short SOA. This was clearly not the case, and thus an automatic pro-
cessing of presupposition triggers appears unlikely. Admittedly, the observed overadditive 
interaction (i.e., a larger trigger effect [of sentence type] with the short than with the long 
SOA) is also not predicted by the central bottleneck model.5 However, we can tentatively 
offer an explanation for this result. In particular, a very similar pattern was observed for the 
response times in the tone discrimination task. With a short SOA, differences in this task 
“propagate” into the reading times of the subsequent task, in this case the reading times at 
the trigger position. This might have induced the overadditivity we observed. Although this 
is a post hoc explanation, it seems important to again point out that the observed results are 
certainly not compatible with automatic trigger processing.
The findings are in line with assuming that for presupposition triggers a context search 
is started immediately: For the definite determiner, the search for an appropriate referent is 
started, and for again a suitable previous event has to be found in the context. It is impor-
tant to note that this search for a referent must initially be unsuccessful in the presented 
context, as the presupposition was never explicitly verified, that is, a clear referent for the 
definite noun phrase was never given and there was no previous event that again could 
refer to either. As a result, participants possibly anticipated to accommodate the presuppo-
sition, which the acceptability ratings suggest they did. Accommodation is a poorly under-
stood process, both from the theoretical and experimental point of view. However, under 
any theory it is usually assumed to be a process of enriching the context with the informa-
tion of the presupposition, if that is contextually feasible. To check whether adding the 
presupposition is plausible requires good knowledge of the contents of the context. It is 
thus unsurprising that in preparation of accommodation cognitive resources like working 
memory play a role already on the trigger itself.
From a different perspective, assuming a search process is well in line with previ-
ous research suggesting a link between presupposition processing and working mem-
ory. For example, Anderson and Holcomb (2005) compared test sentences that either 
included a definite or an indefinite determiner (e.g., “The/A cab came very close to hit-
ting a car.”) with a context sentence preceding these test sentences that either introduced 
the critical noun directly or used a synonym (e.g., “Kathy sat nervously in her cab/taxi 
to the airport.”). The data revealed an enhanced left anterior negativity (LAN) for the 
5 The overadditive interaction remained significant when the neutral sentences were excluded, and thus was 
not driven by these sentences only.
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definite compared with the indefinite determiner, reflecting a referential assignment 
of the noun phrase following the definite determiner to an antecedent. King and Kutas 
(1995) also interpreted the increase in the LAN as a referential assignment that increases 
the demands on working memory (see also Domaneschi et al. 2014). Conceivably, this 
requires encoding of information into working memory, and exactly this has been shown 
capacity-limited (Jolicoeur and Dell’Acqua 1998). Furthermore, this assignment is only 
possible when the relevant entity is found in memory. The necessary search process in 
turn likely involves repeated selection and de-selection of working memory items that 
are considered as referents, and selecting working memory items is also a capacity lim-
ited process (Janczyk 2017).
Regarding potential similarities and differences in processing between both triggers, the 
results suggest that both triggers share the feature of capacity-limitations. As suggested, 
we suspect that the underlying process requiring cognitive capacity is indeed the same. 
At the same time, however, the numerical difference of the size of the interaction between 
sentence type and SOA may point to differences. These could result from different difficul-
ties in the underlying search for a potential referent or from an additional process running 
only for one of the triggers. The present data do not allow for drawing definite conclusions 
on this matter, however. Moreover, based on our data, a direct comparison between the two 
triggers is not feasible as we did not control for several factors influencing differences in 
processing, for example, syntactic position. The present paper offers an indirect compari-
son by showing that processing both presupposition triggers is capacity-limited. They may 
require different amounts of capacity and/or different processes; however, the qualitative 
conclusion is the same for both investigated triggers.
We would like to make two additional comments regarding a comparison. First, a 
direct comparison between triggers, and especially the one between the  definite deter-
miner  and again, is hardly ever possible, even if many factors are controlled for. This 
is because both words belong to different categories (determiner vs. adverb), and, as a 
result, necessarily appear in different syntactic positions and fulfill different syntactic 
roles. They also occur with different frequency. Second, we believe we did control for 
several factors that were relevant for our critical Experiment 2. In particular, we tested 
for naturalness, readability, and predictability by including the acceptability rating 
task, which should reveal any deviances in these respects. The findings reveal consist-
ent behavior of participants in judging the sentence with the trigger to be acceptable. 
Further, the role of position was reduced in our experiment as we presented the part 
before the trigger position simultaneously for all sentence types. In other words, the criti-
cal word of investigation always occurred in the second position. Finally, the total word 
length of the sentence could not have influenced interpretation of the word at the trig-
ger position and, in the critical Experiment 2, this is the only position of interest for the 
locus of slack-logic.
Limitations and Future Extensions
The probably clearest limitation of the present study is its focus on only two particu-
lar triggers in only one language (German). One reason for this choice was to increase 
the amount of test sentences and thereby improve the precision of aggregate estimates 
compared to the original study by Tiemann et al. (2011). We purposefully chose triggers 
belonging to different classes, that is, again as a representative of Class 1 and definite 
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determiners as a Class 2 member according to the classification by Tiemann et al. (2015).6 
However, a generalization on the basis of only these two triggers is impossible, and con-
sequently, additional data are needed to gain further insights into potential classes of trig-
gers. Furthermore, future studies should be carried out in different languages than Ger-
man, to explore the generality of our results across different languages. The important 
contribution of the present paper is that the methodology and logic of our experiment can 
be fruitfully extended to investigate difference between (other) triggers and non-triggers, 
as well as different languages.
Another objection may relate to the choice of the central bottleneck model from which 
we derived the predictions for Experiment 2. It is certainly true that the adequacy of 
this model is debated in cognitive psychology. Rather, models have been suggested that 
allow for parallel processing of the central stage as well, even though the assumption of 
a capacity-limitation is still made (Navon and Miller 2002; Tombu and Jolicoeur 2003).
While parallel processing is possible, the available capacity must be divided between 
tasks leading to performance decrements in turn. The exact proportion is, for example, 
determined by a sharing parameter in the model of Tombu and Jolicoeur: if all capacity 
is first devoted to Task 1, their model mimics the central bottleneck model. The impor-
tant point here is, however, that the critical predictions for Task 2 (in our case: reading 
the word at the trigger position) are the same for capacity sharing models and the central 
bottleneck model. It is simpler, though, to derive and illustrate the predictions from the 
latter model. Regarding Task 1 performance (in our case: the tone discrimination task), 
both types of models indeed differ in their predictions. However, the effect of SOA and 
the overadditive interaction of sentence type and SOA in response times in the auditory 
discrimination task are more compatible with the capacity sharing approach.
Conclusion
The present study replicates and extends previous results regarding immediate processing 
of presuppositions, starting on the respective triggers. Two main conclusions can be drawn 
based on the two experiments we reported: First, encountering a presupposition trigger 
indeed appears to induce immediate processing of the presupposition. Second, this pro-
cessing requires limited cognitive capacities and is not automatic.
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Appendix
The items used in Experiment 2 were selected on the basis of the ratings obtained in 
Experiment 1 with regard to two criterions. Criterion 1 was that the difference between the 
ratings of neutral sentences and trigger sentences was minimal (and at best: negative), and 
Criterion 2 was that the difference between trigger sentences and unacceptable sentences 
Fig. 8  Visualization of the differences between the relevant sentence types for again (a, b) and determiner 
(c, d) that were used to select the 32 items for Experiment 2. The exclusion criteria are visualized with the 
black line
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was maximal. The exact exclusion criteria for the two trigger types were set in a way that 
approximately one third of the trials were excluded for Criterion 1, and two thirds were 
excluded due to Criterion 2. For the trigger again, exclusion criteria were a value > 0.03 
(Criterion 1) or a value < 0.095 (Criterion 2). For the trigger determiner, exclusion criteria 
were a value > 0.25 (Criterion 1) or a value < 1.00 (Criterion 2) (see Fig. 8 for a visual 
illustration). The six items for each trigger that were closest to the exclusion criteria were 
used for the practice block.
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Abstract
The present study investigated how listeners understand and process the definite and the indefinite determiner. While the 
definite determiner clearly conveys a uniqueness presupposition, the status of the anti-uniqueness inference associated with 
the indefinite determiner is less clear. In a forced choice production task, we observed that participants make use of the 
information about number usually associated with the two determiners to convey a message. In a subsequent mouse-tracking 
task, participants had to select one of two potential referents presented on screen according to an auditorily presented 
stimulus sentence. The data revealed that participants use the information about uniqueness or anti-uniqueness encoded in 
determiners to disambiguate sentence meaning as early as possible, but only when they are exclusively faced with felicitous 
uses of  determiners.
Introduction
Imagine a situation where someone says “The fridge at work 
is broken”. There are probably two assumptions you make 
when hearing this utterance. First, that there actually exists a 
fridge at the workplace of the speaker, and second, that there 
is exactly one fridge. Both of these assumptions are called 
presuppositions in the semantics/pragmatics literature and 
they are referred to as the presuppositions of existence and 
uniqueness of the definite determiner “the”.
Presuppositions are background assumptions that speak-
ers of a conversation take to hold. They are usually triggered 
by a lexical item, the so-called presupposition trigger. In 
the example above, this would be the definite determiner 
“the”. Since we know that it can only be felicitously used 
with unique objects due to its presuppositions, we can draw 
conclusions about the number of fridges based on its use. 
Compare the example with the utterance “A fridge at work 
is broken.”, that is, with the same utterance containing the 
indefinite determiner “a”. The assumption about the exist-
ence of a fridge remains the same. However, there is no 
inference of the fridge being unique. Rather, one could 
deduce that there is actually more than one fridge at the 
workplace of the speaker. Similarly to the case of the definite 
determiner, we deduce this based on the fact that indefi-
nite determiners are only felicitously used with non-unique 
objects. However, the status of this anti-uniqueness infer-
ence is more controversially discussed in the literature.1 It 
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1 Some authors use the term “non-uniqueness” instead of “anti-
uniqueness” to refer to this effect of the indefinite determiner (Heim 
1991; Sauerland, 2008; but see, e.g., Alonso-Ovalle, Menndez-Ben-
ito, & Schwarz, 2011, using the term “anti-uniqueness”). We use the 
term “anti-uniqueness” to describe the same phenomenon as dis-
cussed by these authors, and do not mean to imply any theoretical 
distinction. Importantly, we do not assume Barker’s more specialized 
definition of “anti-uniqueness” as definite determiners being blocked 
in partitive constructions (e.g., one of John’s friends; Barker, 1998).
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has been argued that both uniqueness and anti-uniqueness 
inferences are part of the non-literal meaning component of 
sentences. However, open questions are whether they are 
equal in strength, and how and when these different infer-
ences arise.
The question we address in this paper is whether listen-
ers use inferences associated with definite and indefinite 
determiners to disambiguate utterance meaning as early 
as possible, even if the speaker does not always use these 
determiners felicitously. Much previous research has pro-
vided evidence that listeners may, often swiftly, adapt to 
the idiosyncrasy of the given speaker. This applies to many 
different aspects of the interpretation of language, includ-
ing phonetics/phonology (Kleinschmidt & Jaeger, 2015; 
Roettger & Franke, 2019), syntax (Fine, Jaeger, Farmer & 
Qian, 2013; Jaeger & Snider, 2013), semantics (Yildirim, 
Degen, Tanenhaus, & Jaeger, 2016), and pragmatic factors 
(Grodner & Sedivy, 2011; Stranahan, 2018). However, to 
the best of our knowledge, there is so far no work inves-
tigating adaptation effects of presuppositional information 
for online processing. Moreover, there is a vast amount of 
literature on the processing of felicitous and infelicitous uses 
of presuppositions in different contexts (see Schwarz 2007; 
Schwarz & Tiemann, 2012; Tiemann et al., 2011; Tiemann, 
2014; for a recent review, see Schwarz, 2016), but almost no 
experimental investigations of when and how the interpreta-
tion of utterances may be affected by information encoded 
in the presuppositions of certain expressions. The present 
study tries to fill these gaps. To this end, we will compare 
how listeners’ online interpretation of definite and indefinite 
determiners changes depending on how reliable the speaker 
is in using the determiner felicitously. To do so, we compare 
a group of participants encountering only felicitous uses of 
determiners with a group that also encounters infelicitous 
uses of determiners. In the following, we will introduce pre-
suppositions and the triggering mechanism in more detail, 
focusing on determiners. This is followed by a discussion 
of earlier work suggesting that the process of presupposi-
tion evaluation is started immediately on the presupposition 
trigger. We report one experiment comprising two parts: in a 
production task, we test whether participants use the presup-
position usually associated with the determiner to convey 
information. The subsequent mouse-tracking task addresses 
whether participants use determiners to disambiguate utter-
ance meaning and if so, whether this is different for the defi-
nite and the indefinite determiner.
Presuppositions
Informally speaking, presuppositions are background 
assumptions that are shared by all interlocutors of a con-
versation. They are introduced by certain words, so-called 
presupposition triggers. One classical example of such a 
trigger is the definite determiner. It introduces the presup-
position that there exists a unique individual with the prop-
erty described by the noun it combines with. Technically 
speaking, these words introduce appropriateness conditions, 
that is, certain restrictions on what the context must look like 
for the sentence containing them to be felicitously uttered. 
The assumption is that if the presupposition of a trigger is 
not met in the context, uttering a sentence containing it is 
infelicitous. This is illustrated in (1). In (1-a), the presuppo-
sition of the definite determiner, that there is a unique apple, 
is fulfilled in the context. Thus, the sentence is felicitous. In 
(1-b), the presupposition of uniqueness is not fulfilled in the 
context and the sentence is infelicitous (or inappropriate).
1. (a)  Context: There is an apple and a banana on the 
desk.
   Please give me the apple.
(b) Context: There are three apples and a banana on 
the desk.
   # Please give me the apple.
Whereas felicitous uses of the definite determiner require a 
unique discourse referent (i.e., the definite determiner pre-
supposes uniqueness), the indefinite determiner is assumed 
to require there to be more than one referent in the context. 
As a result, its use becomes odd if it is known that the refer-
ent is unique, as in (2). 
2. # A sun is shining.
It was thus suggested in the literature that the indefinite 
determiner presupposes anti-uniqueness (see Kratzer, 2005, 
or the discussion in Heim, 1991, 2011) in the same way 
the definite determiner presupposes uniqueness. Under this 
view, both definite and indefinite determiners come with 
their own restrictions on what are appropriate contexts. 
Henceforth, we will refer to this theory as the “presupposi-
tion theory” and assume that both inferences are equally 
robust and accessed quickly.
However, Heim (1991) noted that (3) can be uttered with-
out it being certain that there is more than one 20-ft-long 
catfish: it suffices that the speaker is not sure that there is 
exactly one 20-ft-long catfish. 
3. Robert caught a 20-ft-long catfish.
From such observations, Heim (1991) concluded that the 
inference associated with the indefinite determiner is weaker 
than the presupposition of the definite determiner. To capture 
this, she proposed to add another principle to the Gricean 
maxims of conversation, Maximize Presupposition, which 
says: Presuppose as much as possible! (see also Chemla, 
2009; Percus, 2006; Sauerland, 2008; Schlenker, 2012, for 
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more refined versions of Maximize Presupposition). This 
principle can account for the fact that using indefinite deter-
miners is infelicitous when it is common ground that the 
referent is unique, as in (4-a). More specifically, it explains 
the oddness of (4-a) by means of pragmatic reasoning over 
presuppositional stronger alternatives (Heim, 1991; Percus, 
2006; Sauerland, 2008; Schlenker, 2012). The sentence in 
(4-b) is an alternative since it only differs from its competi-
tor regarding the presuppositions it introduces. It introduces 
more presuppositions that are true in the context (since we 
know people have one unique father) and is thus the pre-
suppositionally stronger alternative. When a listener hears 
the presuppositionally weaker sentence (4-a), s/he assumes 
the speaker must believe the presupposition of the stronger 
alternative to be false. The reasoning behind this conclusion 
is based on two main assumptions: (1) that the speaker obeys 
the conversational maxims including Maximize Presupposi-
tion, and (2) that the speaker tries to be cooperative in doing 
so. The hearer thus assumes that if the speaker believed the 
presupposition of (4-b) to be true, s/he would have used this 
version, because it would be more informative on a presup-
positional level. Since s/he did not, s/he must believe it to 
not hold. The belief that the victim does not have a unique 
father, however, is contrary to common knowledge and, 
therefore, leads to the oddness of (4-a).2
4. (a)    ∗ A father of the victim arrived at the crime scene. 
(Heim, 1991)
(b) The father of the victim arrived at the crime scene.
In other words, anti-uniqueness is derived by (1) consider-
ing the (stronger) alternative with the definite determiner 
and (2) negating its presupposition. The inferences, which 
are the result of pragmatic reasoning based on Maximize 
Presupposition, are not presuppositions proper under this 
view. Henceforth, we will refer to them as anti-presupposi-
tions (Percus, 2006). They are theoretically kept apart from 
presuppositions (and implicatures) and should be processed 
differently. As opposed to the assumptions of the “presuppo-
sition theory” introduced above, the anti-presupposition aris-
ing with the indefinite determiner has a weaker status than 
the presupposition of the (stronger) definite determiner; we 
will refer to this theory as the “anti-presupposition theory” 
in the following. Because the anti-uniqueness inference is 
derived by initially considering the (stronger) alternative of 
the definite determiner and subsequently negating it, pro-
cessing of the indefinite determiner should thus be more 
complex than processing the definite determiner.
A third type of theory assumes that the indefinite deter-
miner triggers an implicature due to its competition with 
other quantificational terms, for example, “every/all” or 
“another” (Chierchia, Fox, & Spector, 2012; Grønn & Sæbø, 
2012). These quantificational terms form a lexical scale with 
the indefinite determiner (Horn, 1972). An implicature arises 
when the weaker item on such a scale is chosen, in this case 
the indefinite determiner. All items that are higher in the 
scale (items that trigger stronger alternatives) get negated: 
for example, the implicature of “A boy came” is that “Not all 
boys came”. This negation process requires the assumption 
of existence of other boys, and anti-uniqueness follows as 
a consequence. Contrary to the competition on a presup-
positional level according to Maximize Presupposition, 
the competition between alternatives in this case arises on 
the level of assertion (“a” and “all” differ on the level of 
assertion, whereas “a” and “the” are alike on that level). 
Variants of this argue that anti-presuppositions are essen-
tially implicatures in that they can be informative and fol-
low from the same general mechanism (of exhaustification) 
(Magri, 2009; Schlenker, 2012; Singh, 2011). According to 
these theories, the definite and indefinite determiners are 
also asymmetric in the inferences they introduce: whereas 
the indefinite determiner should come with an implicature, 
which has shown to be processed even more rapidly (at least 
if certain conditions are met) than presuppositions (Bill, 
Romoli, & Schwarz, 2018; but see also Chemla, 2008), the 
definite determiner should come with a presupposition. We 
will refer to this theory as the “implicature theory”.
In sum, three different approaches are available to explain 
the effects of uniqueness and anti-uniqueness resulting from 
the definite and the indefinite determiner. (1) According 
to the “presupposition theory”, both determiners carry their 
own presuppositions proper and thus processing the two 
determiners should be equally difficult. (2) According to the 
“anti-presupposition theory” based on Maximize Presuppo-
sition, the anti-uniqueness inference of the indefinite deter-
miner is derived indirectly from negating the uniqueness 
presupposition of the definite determiner. Thus, processing 
indefinite determiners should be more difficult than process-
ing a definite determiner. (3) According to the “implicature 
theory”, the indefinite determiner comes with an implicature 
instead of an (anti-)presupposition. In this case, one may 
expect the indefinite determiner to be more easily processed 
than the definite determiner.
Previous investigations of processing determiners
Experimental investigations of presuppositions have 
increased in recent years (for a recent review, see Schwarz, 
2 We are aware that the example is outdated, as nowadays gay cou-
ples frequently adopt children, which seems to lead to language 
change, especially in lexical fields dealing with family concepts. We 
think that the example still illustrates the relevant point well though, 
if we imagine the noun phrase to refer to the biological father, not the 
person(s) fulfilling the role of a father.
 Psychological Research
1 3
2016). Here, we focus on studies dealing with (1) the early 
processing of presuppositions/inferences triggered by 
determiners, (2) differences between felicitous and infe-
licitous uses of determiners, and (3) potential differences 
between definite and indefinite determiner.
In a self-paced reading study, Altmann and Steedman 
(1988) investigated the syntactic consequences of a definite 
noun phrase having its presuppositions met or not met by 
the context. The data revealed early processing of the pre-
supposition, before the end of the sentence. More precisely, 
participants were presented with test sentences in two dif-
ferent contexts. Context 1 introduced two candidates for a 
potential referent (a safe with a new lock and a safe with an 
old lock, see (5)), while Context 2 introduced exactly one 
candidate for a potential referent (see (6)). 
5. Context 1: A burglar broke into a bank carrying some 
dynamite. He planned to blow open a safe. Once inside 
he saw that there was a safe with a new lock and a safe 
with an old lock.
6. Context 2: A burglar broke into a bank carrying some 
dynamite. He planned to blow open a safe. Once inside 
he saw that there was a safe with a new lock and a 
strongbox with an old lock.
In the test sentence in (7), the prepositional phrase “with the 
new lock” modifies the noun phrase “safe”. As a result, the 
uniqueness presupposition is met in both contexts for this 
test sentence. This is not the case for the test sentence in (8), 
whose presupposition is only satisfied by Context 2. 
7. The burglar/blew open/the safe/with the new lock/and 
made of/with the loot.
8. The burglar/blew open/the safe/with the dynamite/and 
made of/with the loot.
Reading times differed in the disambiguation region (i.e., 
on the prepositional phrase “with the new lock” or “with 
the dynamite”). Test sentences with an unmet uniqueness 
presupposition as in (8) were read slower than test sentences 
as in (7). Thus, the authors conclude that people experience 
processing difficulties at an early point in time, when the 
uniqueness presupposition of the definite determiner is not 
met. However, no evidence for processing difficulties on the 
presupposition trigger itself was reported. We believe that 
the relatively late effects are most likely due to the experi-
mental design. In particular, the content of the presupposi-
tions was only known on the prepositional phrase, because 
only then it was clear which referent was considered unique 
in the context. In sum, the results suggest that a presup-
position is processed as soon as it is fully known. A more 
detailed analysis of syntactic ambiguity resolution strate-
gies was done by Spivey, Grosjean, and Knoblich (1995) 
who provide further evidence for an immediate influence of 
pragmatics and logically specific biases in syntactic ambigu-
ity resolution.
Tiemann et al. (2011) reported three self-paced reading 
studies and acceptability ratings on presupposition process-
ing as induced by different triggers (German “wieder”: 
English “again”; “auch”: “also”; “aufhören”: “stop”; “wis-
sen”: “know”, and definites in the shape of possessive noun 
phrases). In their first experiment, which is important for 
the current paper, they focus on the processing of the trigger 
itself. Participants were presented with a context (as in (9)) 
and the authors compared test sentences including a presup-
position trigger (as in (10)) with sentences including a neu-
tral word that does not trigger a presupposition (as in (11)), 
and with semantically unacceptable sentences (as in (12)). 
 9. Context: Tina ist mit einer guten Freundin shoppen.
  Tina is shopping with a good friend.
 10. Sie kauft wieder rote Handschuhe.
  She buys red gloves again.
 11. Sie kauft heute rote Handschuhe.
  She buys red gloves today.
 12. *Sie kauft freundlich rote Handschuhe.
  She buys red gloves friendly.
Sentences with the neutral word were rated best, followed 
by sentences including the presupposition trigger and unac-
ceptable sentences. Second, and most importantly, reading 
time data revealed that—for the position of the presupposi-
tion trigger—sentences with a trigger induced the longest 
reading times, followed by sentences with a neutral word, 
while unacceptable sentences were read fastest (see also 
Schneider, Bade, & Janczyk, 2020). This pattern suggests 
that a presupposition trigger immediately demands more 
attention, because it alerts the reader to consider the pre-
ceding context. Furthermore, in their third experiment, they 
investigated whether a presuppositional sentence in a neutral 
context (neither making the presupposition explicitly true 
nor false) evokes longer reading times than in a falsifying 
or verifying context. The data revealed early effects on the 
trigger, which also suggest that processing of the presup-
position begins immediately upon encountering the trigger.
Unfortunately, reading times were not analyzed for indi-
vidual presupposition triggers, as there were not enough 
items for each trigger to allow for strong conclusions. It is 
thus unclear whether the same pattern holds for all triggers 
or not.
There is further evidence for an immediate processing of 
presupposition triggers from electrophysiological studies. 
For example, van Berkum, Brown, and Hagoort (1999) and 
van Berkum, Brown, Hagoort, and Zwitserlood (2003) used 
event related potentials (ERPs) to investigate the interplay of 
referential and structural factors during sentence processing 
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in discourse. To do so, the authors used referentially ambigu-
ous noun phrases. In these studies, participants were pre-
sented with a discourse as in (13) and (14). A corresponding 
test sentence was, for example, “David told the girl that had 
been on the phone to hang up.” In discourse (13), unique-
ness of the noun phrase “the girl” in the test sentence was 
granted, because the discourse introduces only one salient 
girl. In contrast, this is not the case in the other discourse 
(14), where both girls are equally salient. As a result, the 
uniqueness presupposition is not fulfilled up to the disam-
biguating relative clause (“...that had been on the phone...”). 
 13. David had told the boy and the girl to clean up their 
room before lunchtime. But the boy had stayed in bed 
all morning and the girl had been on the phone all the 
time.
 14. David had told the two girls to clean up their room 
before lunchtime. But one of the girls had stayed in bed 
all morning and the other girl had been on the phone 
all the time.
The definite noun phrases evoked early ERP effects already 
on the noun, when the uniqueness presupposition was not 
met. Thus, referential ambiguity appears to be detected very 
early during sentence processing. Contrary to Altmann and 
Steedman (1988), evaluation of the presupposition was not 
delayed until to the relative clause, but instead participants 
considered the presupposition against the context as early 
as they heard or read the noun. This may come as a surprise 
given that participants knew that there were also sentences 
where the presupposition failure was resolved by the follow-
ing relative clause, similar to the participants in Altmann and 
Steedman (1988) becoming aware that the following prepo-
sitional phrase was important for evaluating the presupposi-
tion. The difference might be due to the different syntactic 
status of relative clauses and prepositional phrases. Taken 
together, the studies of van Berkum et al. (1999, 2003) sup-
port the idea of early processing of presuppositions triggered 
by the definite determiner. Participants realize that there 
might be presupposition failure of a definite noun phrase 
immediately on the noun itself.
Evidence for immediate presupposition processing also 
comes from Kirsten et al. (2014) who investigated the pro-
cessing of definite and indefinite determiners in an ERP 
study. Two types of contexts (see (15)) introduced either 
a single referent (e.g., one polar bear) or multiple refer-
ents  (e.g., some polar bears). Test  sentences were alike 
except for the determiner used (“the/a”) and were either pre-
sented in a matching condition where the context sentence 
introduced the noun phrase with an indefinite determiner 
“ein/e” (Engl.: “a”) or in a mismatching condition where it 
contained a quantifier such as “einige” (Engl.: “some”) or 
“viele” (Engl.: “many”).
15. (a)    Antje war gestern im Zoo in Düsseldorf und 
besuchte einen /einige Eisbären im Bärengehege.
(b) Antje visited the Düsseldorf zoo yesterday and 
saw a/some polar bear/s in the bear enclosure.
16. (a)  Antje beobachtete, dass der/ein Eisbär sehr 
aggressiv war.
(b) Antje noticed that the/a polar bear was very 
aggressive.
The data revealed that participants recognized mismatching 
conditions already when reading the determiner. For both 
determiners, the mismatching effect became visible through 
an N400 and a P600 effect after onset of the noun.3 Thus, the 
results support the idea of immediate processing of presup-
positions, already starting on the trigger.
There is further evidence that information encoded in 
determiners is exploited to guide behavior. Dahan, Swing-
ley, Tanenhaus, and Magnuson (2000) focused on gender 
information encoded in the determiner (in the French lan-
guage) in an eye-tracking study and demonstrated that gen-
der-marked determiners immediately directed the listeners’ 
eyes towards the object that matched the gender. This sup-
ports the idea of immediate processing of determiners and 
the use of information encoded in therein.
Further support for early processing of determiners 
comes from a visual-world eye-tracking study using a pic-
ture selection task (Bade & Schwarz, 2019a). In one critical 
condition, sentences like “A/The shirt in Benjamin’s closet 
is blue” were presented auditorily and paired with three dif-
ferent pictures, all of which showed a boy with a closet. 
On one of the pictures, the closet contained three shirts, 
one of which was blue (non-unique condition). On another 
picture, only one blue shirt was depicted (unique condition), 
and no shirts were depicted on a third (distractor) picture. 
Participants were asked to choose the picture they thought 
was corresponding to the sentence, and indeed they looked 
at the respective target picture (picture with a single shirt 
for the definite determiner, and picture with multiple shirts 
for the indefinite determiner) very early on upon hearing the 
noun. This suggests that the (anti-)uniqueness information 
encoded in the determiners was used rapidly for interpre-
tation. In addition, differences between both determiners 
were observed. Inferences based on the use of the indefinite 
determiner were drawn to a much lesser degree than those 
evoked by the use of the definite determiner, as demonstrated 
by fewer target choices for the indefinite than for the defi-
nite determiner. Further differences between the determiners 
3 The authors describe the N400 effect as a detection of a semantic 
mismatch (see, e.g., Kutas, Petten, & Kluender, 2006) and the P600 
as an index for a subsequent reanalysis process (see, e.g., Kuperberg, 
2007).
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were observed in eye-tracking patterns for the cases where 
the target was chosen. Overall, these results are in line with 
the “anti-presupposition theory”, which predicts differences 
in processing patterns associated with the anti-uniqueness 
inference and the uniqueness presupposition.
Finally, mouse-tracking data from Schneider et al. (2019) 
also support this view. In two experiments, participants were 
asked to judge the appropriateness of sentences like “Of 
these, Jan received the/a banana.” in contexts showing that 
Jan’s mother bought three pieces of fruit (e.g., one banana 
and two pears, or two bananas and one pear). Participants 
made their judgment by moving the mouse cursor into 
response boxes located in the top right and left corners of the 
computer screen. The indefinite determiner was associated 
with more difficulty in processing (reflected in longer move-
ment times and a larger area under the curve). Most impor-
tantly, the data of Schneider et al. (2019) also revealed an 
initial deviation into the direction of the non-target response 
(i.e., the competitor) for the indefinite determiner. This was 
predicted by the “anti-presupposition theory” exploiting 
Maximize Presupposition (Heim, 1991), which suggests 
that participants first consider the uniqueness presupposition 
of the definite alternative when encountering an indefinite 
determiner.
In sum, there is evidence for early processing of presup-
positions introduced by definite determiners, as demon-
strated by effects observed on the trigger and briefly there-
after, when the content of the presupposition is known. 
Furthermore, additional processing costs were observed 
when the presupposition is not met by the context. This 
effect may, however, be modulated by additional cognitive 
load (see Clifton, 2013). Finally, the available evidence sug-
gests processing differences between determiners.
Overall, the existing experimental literature on presup-
positions focused on the processing costs associated with 
presuppositions of different triggers in different contexts. 
One question that this research concentrated on was whether 
presuppositions are more difficult to process in contexts in 
which their use is infelicitous (i.e., when the presupposi-
tion was not verified). Another focus was on the question, 
when these effects occur. With the exception of Bade and 
Schwarz (2019a, b) previous research did not address the 
issue of whether early information about uniqueness and 
anti-uniqueness encoded in determiners is used to make 
predictions about a sentence’s meaning. A weakness of the 
few studies that addressed how inferences associated with 
definite or indefinite determiners affect interpretation (Bade 
& Schwarz, 2019a) is that it was unclear from the task used 
in the experiment whether the information encoded by the 
determiner would be relevant for the choice. In general, it 
was unclear for the participants what was hinging on their 
choice of picture. Another weakness of many experiments 
on definiteness in general is that it only became apparent on 
the noun whether uniqueness or anti-uniqueness was satis-
fied, because more than one referent to which the definite 
or indefinite noun phrase could refer was provided in the 
context.
The experiment reported in the present paper extends the 
still small empirical basis for answering the following ques-
tion: Is interpretation driven by presuppositional informa-
tion encoded in determiners? An advantage of the present 
study over previous ones is that disambiguation was possi-
ble on the determiner itself, and not only on the noun. This 
makes it possible to identify immediate effects of the number 
information encoded in the determiner. Another advantage 
of the study presented here is that participants were directly 
addressed by the speaker. The assumption was that hearers 
would use all available cues given that they had to do a task 
for the speaker. Moreover, participants were informed that 
the speaker shared the same knowledge. As opposed to pre-
vious studies, participants thus had an incentive to draw the 
relevant inferences, and were informed of the epistemic state 
of hearer and speaker they needed to assume.
Experiment
In this section, we will first provide a forecast of the experi-
mental approach followed by a brief introduction into 
mouse-tracking, the method we used to answer our main 
questions. We will then lay out the hypotheses in more 
detail.
The entire experiment comprises two parts. The first part 
is a forced choice production task where participants are 
asked to produce a sentence which appropriately describes 
a given situation. This task has several purposes: First, we 
aim at showing that participants are aware of the uniqueness 
presupposition of the definite determiner, and therefore use 
it predominantly in situations where the described item is 
unique. Second, we aim at testing whether participants sys-
tematically use the indefinite determiner when the object 
they want to refer to is non-unique. Finally, the data from the 
production task will be used to screen participants regarding 
whether they have a sufficient command of the correct usage 
conditions of both determiners in sentence production. We 
will exclude participants who commit more than 20% errors, 
that is, who do not use determiners in the intended way or 
make errors with the color or object choice (these partici-
pants will be replaced with new participants).
The second part is a mouse-tracking experiment with the 
aim to test whether listeners can rapidly integrate potential 
cues about uniqueness or anti-uniqueness in a context to 
achieve early predictive disambiguation, even before hearing 
the lexically disambiguating referent noun.
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Mouse‑tracking
Mouse-tracking has become a common method in cogni-
tive psychology, since recent studies revealed that motion 
trajectories can reflect underlying cognitive processes. In 
fact, simple hand movements offer a continuous stream of 
motor output and provide real-time read-outs of ongoing 
cognitive processes. Spivey et al. (2005) were among the 
first who used mouse-tracking to answer language-related 
questions. Participants were instructed to start a trial via 
moving the mouse into a start box (in the lower center of the 
screen) and then follow the instructions of an auditory stimu-
lus sentence (e.g., “Click on the candle!”) while watching a 
picture with items in the upper left and upper right corners 
of the screen. In one condition, the depicted words were 
similar in their initial phonemes (e.g., “candle” vs. “candy”), 
while in the other condition they were not (e.g., “candle” vs. 
“summer”). The trajectories of the movements towards the 
correct upper corner showed an attraction of the distractor 
word, when both words shared the initial phonemes. Thus, 
during processing of the target word, competing phonologi-
cal representations appear active and influence the exact way 
the hand moves. Similar approaches have since been applied 
to, for example, social cognitive questions (Freeman, Dale, 
& Farmer, 2011), conflict tasks (Scherbaum, Dshemuchadse, 
Fischer, & Goschke, 2010), the effects of irrelevant stimulus 
variation on action execution (Janczyk, Pfister, & Kunde, 
2013), or the influence of actions consequences on action 
execution (Pfister, Janczyk, Wirth, Dignath, & Kunde, 
2014). Furthermore, mouse-tracking has also been used in 
sentence verification tasks to study conversational implica-
tures (Sauerland, Tamura, Koizumi, & Tomlinson, 2015; 
Tomlinson, Bailey, & Bott, 2013), predictive disambiguation 
based on early intonational cues (Roettger & Stöber, 2017; 
Roettger & Franke, 2019), and sentence negation (Dale & 
Duran, 2011).
Several parameters are usually extracted from the trajec-
tories for further statistical testing. We here focus on the 
following parameters (see Fig. 1 for an illustration): (1) area 
under the curve (AUC) is the geometric area between the 
observed mouse-trajectory and an idealized straight line and 
becomes larger, the more the trajectory deviates from the 
straight line. According to Freeman and Ambady (2010), 
AUC provides a general measure of processing difficulty 
(Farmer, Cargill, & Spivey, 2007; Freeman, Ambady, Rule, 
& Johnson, 2008; Spivey, 2008). (2) Movement time (MT) 
is the time from stimulus onset until reaching the target 
box. (3) Turn towards target (TTT) is defined as the point in 
time when participants finally make their decision and turn 
towards the target without any subsequent reversals (Roett-
ger & Franke, 2019).
In the experiment proper, participants were asked to 
hand a named object from a shelf to the speaker. One or two 
items of the named object type were present on the shelf. 
In addition, one or two entities of a different object type 
(the competitor) were present. Stimulus sentences either 
contained the definite or the indefinite determiner. In “early 
disambiguation” conditions, participants could, in principle, 
know which object will be referred to already upon hearing 
the determiner. In contrast, in “late disambiguation” condi-
tions, this is only possible after the target object has been 
named. Conceivably, however, early disambiguation makes 
sense only if a listener knows by experience that sentences 
with definite and indefinite determiners are used in a felici-
tous way. Thus, one group of participants only encountered 
felicitous sentences (the reliable group), a second group was 
presented with infelicitous sentences as well (the unreliable 
group).
An advantage of using German stimuli is that we can 
make sure that the definite description could not be plural, as 
the definite determiner is marked for grammatical gender. As 
the plural determiner for all three genders is form-identical 
with the singular feminine determiner, we only used mascu-
line and neuter nouns in our experiment, which makes the 
definite determiner unambiguously singular. This is not the 
case in English, where “the” could still be followed by plural 
nouns, which would make the sentence completely accept-
able in non-unique scenarios. The presupposition of definite 
determiners is that there is a unique maximal element, which 
is trivially fulfilled for the extension of any plural noun (as 
there always must be a unique maximum) (cf. Heim, 2011). 
Only in combination with the singular does the definite noun 
phrase presuppose uniqueness of an atomic individual with 
the described property. It is thus possible to predict on the 
(singular marked) definite determiner that the reference will 
fail if there are only non-unique referents in German, but 
not in English, where plural/singular marking only becomes 
obvious on the noun. The general expectation is thus that 
Fig. 1  Illustration of parameters extracted from the mouse-trajecto-
ries used for further statistical analyses
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participants in our experiment could use the information of 
number encoded in the determiner right away and make the 
according choices rapidly.
Hypotheses
The first question we ask is whether people utilize the rel-
evant meaning components of a determiner (uniqueness and 
anti-uniqueness) to form expectations about the likely ref-
erent, even before this referent is lexically given (and thus 
disambiguated). This is supported by previous experiments 
showing that presupposition processing starts on the trigger 
itself (e.g., Tiemann et al., 2011; van Berkum et al., 1999, 
2003). Thus, for the “reliable group”, we hypothesize that 
conditions with unequal amounts of different objects on 
the shelf (i.e., the early disambiguation conditions) allow 
faster decisions already upon encountering the determiner 
in comparison with those conditions with equal amounts of 
different objects on the shelf (i.e., the late disambiguation 
conditions; Hypothesis 1).
A second question is whether there are processing dif-
ferences between the definite and the indefinite determiner. 
The three theories introduced in Sect. “Presuppositions” 
allow three different predictions: (1) according to the “pre-
supposition theory”, both determiners come with their own 
presuppositions. In this case, the prediction would be that 
both the uniqueness and the anti-uniqueness presupposition 
are accessed equally fast and cause comparable processing 
difficulties. Thus, no differences are expected in this case 
(Hypothesis 2a). (2) According to the “anti-presupposition 
theory”, processing the indefinite determiner requires an ini-
tial consideration of the uniqueness presupposition of the 
definite determiner and its subsequent negation. This pre-
dicts more processing difficulties for the indefinite than for 
the definite determiner (Hypothesis 2b; see also Schneider 
et al., 2019). (3) Finally, the “implicature theory” assumes 
that the indefinite determiner activates a different type of 
competition, namely on the level of assertion. This would 
make the associated inference an implicature, which is pro-
cessed more rapidly than a presupposition. Accordingly, 
less processing difficulties are predicted for the indefinite 
than for the definite determiner (Hypothesis 2c; see also Bill 
et al., 2018).
A final question is whether the potential early effects of 
information about uniqueness and anti-uniqueness (as sug-
gested in Hypothesis 1) are affected by occasionally infelici-
tous uses of the determiner.
The theories spelled out above make different predictions 
regarding how processing of either determiner is influenced 
by occasional infelicitous uses. According to the anti-pre-
supposition theory, the definite determiner comes with a 
lexically stored presupposition whereas the indefinite deter-
miner’s inference is the result of pragmatic reasoning. As a 
consequence, the definite determiner should be less affected 
by infelicitous uses than the indefinite determiner given the 
assumption that lexical information is generally harder to 
overwrite. Following the presupposition theory, both deter-
miners come with lexically encoded information regarding 
number. Therefore, they should be equally affected by infe-
licitous uses. Finally, in the case of the implicature theory, the 
indefinite determiner should be more affected than the definite 
determiner. This is because implicatures are highly context-
dependent expressions, easily affected by speaker reliability 
(Bott & Noveck, 2004), as opposed to lexical presupposi-
tions.4 These hypotheses will be referred to as Hypothesis 3.
Method
Participants
The intended sample size was n = 60. In total, data were 
collected from 76 people from the Tübingen (Germany) 
area. We excluded 14 participants that committed more than 
20% errors in the production task, one participant was not 
a native speaker of German, and one additional participant 
was excluded because of technical problems during data 
recording (final sample: mean age = 23.6 years, 48 females, 
12 males). All participants in the final sample were native 
speakers of German, reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision and hearing abilities, and signed written informed 
consent prior to data collection. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either the reliable group or the unreliable group 
of the mouse-tracking part of the experiment, with n = 30 
per group.
Apparatus and stimuli
Stimulus presentation and response collection was con-
trolled by a notebook connected to a TFT-screen (resolu-
tion: 1280 × 1024 px.; visible screen size: 53 × 30 cm). A 
standard computer mouse was used with slightly reduced 
cursor speed and non-linear acceleration turned off.
At the top of each screen, a shelf with ten compartments 
was visualized. The left- and the rightmost compartment 
contained either one or two objects (the same within one 
compartment, but different objects on the left and right side). 
A total of 19 different objects was used, each object in two 
different colors.
4 A preregistration report including the hypotheses, the planned 
design of the experiment, the stimulus material, and the planned anal-
yses is available at OSF: https ://osf.io/aym9p /. Parts of the preregis-
tration were written in past tense, as if the text were a method section 
proper. We regret that this is somewhat unfortunate but confirm that 
data were collected only after posting the preregistration.
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During the production task, additional elements were vis-
ible on the screen on each trial (see Fig. 2). First, either the 
left- or the rightmost compartment was outlined in green 
color to indicate the relevant type of object in the current 
trial. Second, the German words “Gib mir” (Engl.: “Give 
me”) indicated the start of the to-be-completed sentence. 
Third, three rows of boxes contained the words the partici-
pants were to choose to complete the required sentence (left 
row: determiner; middle row: adjective (i.e., color of the 
object); right row: noun (i.e., the object)). In the produc-
tion task, objects were (white or pink) donuts and (green 
or white) buckets. An additional box below contained the 
German word “Fertig” (Engl.: “Done”). Clicking on a box 
turned the frame bold to indicate selection.
Four different conditions of required sentences were 
constructed (see Table 1), resulting from combining two 
variables. (1) The variable determiner captures whether 
the correct determiner would be the definite or the indefi-
nite determiner. (2) The variable disambiguation indicates 
whether an early part of the sentence (i.e., the determiner) 
can be used to disambiguate the sentence meaning, or only 
a late part (i.e., the noun). Early disambiguation is possi-
ble when different numbers of target and of the competitor 
are present; only a late disambiguation is possible when the 
same number of target and competitor is present.
For the mouse-tracking task, an additional box was pre-
sent centrally at the bottom part of the screen as the start 
box (see Fig. 3). The left- and rightmost compartments of 
the shelf served as the response boxes. The remaining 17 
objects (i.e., excluding the donut and bucket, see Table 5 
in the Appendix) were used in the mouse-tracking task. In 
the following, we will refer to the object mentioned in the 
auditory stimulus sentence as the target. The other object, 
appearing in the opposite compartment of the shelf, will 
be referred to as the competitor. Some restrictions apply to 
the construction of the possible trials. First, the common 
nouns for all competitors had the same grammatical gender 
as those for the target, to avoid early disambiguation by this 
information. Second, for the same reason, targets and com-
petitors were always presented in the same color. Third, no 
nouns with feminine gender were used, because the German 
feminine determiner “die” could also occur in combination 
with a plural object (e.g., “die roten Kerzen”; Engl.: “the 
red candles”).
Stimulus sentences as in (17) were pre-recorded and deliv-
ered via headphones. These auditory stimuli were constructed 
in a way to keep prosodic characteristics as constant as pos-
sible. To this end, in a first step, all sentences were recorded. 
Then the sentences were cut and put back together, with the 
same initial part (“Gib mir den/das”; Engl.: “Give me the”) 
for all stimuli including the definite determiner and the same 
initial part (“Gib mir ein/einen”; Engl.: “Give me a”) for all 
Fig. 2  Example of the stimulus 
setup for a trial in the produc-
tion task
Table 1  Summary of all four types of conditions for the production 
task. In the examples, we assume that the required object is located in 
the leftmost compartment of the shelf. (Note: determ. = determiner; 
disamb. = disambiguation; def. = definite; indef. = indefinite)
determ. disamb. target competitor sentence
1 def. early 1 bucket 2 donuts Give me the green 
bucket
2 def. late 1 bucket 1 donut Give me the green 
bucket
3 indef. early 2 buckets 1 donut Give me a green 
bucket
4 indef. late 2 buckets 2 donuts Give me a green 
bucket
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stimuli including the indefinite determiner. The remainder of 
the sentence—for example, “grünen Apfel” (Engl.: “green 
apple”)—was the same for definite and indefinite conditions. 
It was combined with each of the beginnings to keep pho-
nological differences between sentences with definite and 
indefinite determiners minimal. For every second item, either 
the sentence with the definite determiner or the sentence with 
the indefinite determiner was used as the basis of cutting and 
pasting. An example of the setup for the mouse-tracking is 
given in Fig. 3. 
 17. Gib mir den / einen grünen Apfel!
  Give me the / a green apple!
Each relevant pairing of visual display and sentence can 
be classified along three variables with two levels, thus 
resulting in eight possible conditions (see Table 2 for a 
summary). (1) The variable determiner captures whether 
the sentence comprises a definite or indefinite determiner. 
(2) Based on the objects in the shelf, the number information 
carried by the determiner can either be used to disambiguate 
early or not; this is captured in the variable disambiguation: 
disambiguation could, in principle, happen early (on the 
determiner) or only late (on the noun). (3) Finally, the vari-
able felicity captures whether the use of determiner and head 
noun was felicitous given the objects in the shelf, that is, 
whether the number information carried by the determiner 
about the head noun was actually true.
To create different instances of these relevant experimental 
conditions, we took the 17 objects, 5 of which were neuter and 
12 were male in gender, and each was instantiated in one of 
two colors. We then created all possible instances of each of 
the eight experimental conditions by picking one object as tar-
get and another as the competitor, such that target and competi-
tor had the same gender and the same color. Pictures instantiat-
ing the relevant experimental conditions were then created by 
showing one or two pictures of the target object together with 
one or two objects of the competitor object, depending on the 
requirements of the condition to be instantiated. We then cre-
ated the sentence belonging to this condition, using either the 
definite or indefinite determiner, always including the name of 
the target object, of course. In this way, 138 instances of each 
condition were created. In the experiment, participants saw 
random instances of each condition, such that no participant 
saw the same instance of a condition twice. 
Task and procedure
All participants started with the production task and then 
performed the mouse-tracking task. For the production 
task, participants had to build a sentence to describe the 
item in the box, which was highlighted by a green frame. In 
other words, they were to provide an accurate description 
of the highlighted object. To this end, they were instructed 
to describe the picture to a second interlocutor, who views 
the same shelf with objects, but who is not able to see the 
highlighted box. In addition, participants were told that it is 
only possible to take one object out of the shelf.
Participants selected words with a left mouse-click within 
the respective boxes. When a word from all three columns 
was selected, a click on the “Fertig”-box initiated the next 
trial. Once made, a selection could not be changed. The 
two objects, their colors, and the different possible quanti-
ties resulted in 32 different trials, which were presented in 
randomized order. The position of the target (i.e., the left- 
or rightmost compartment of the shelf) was determined 
randomly for each trial with the restriction that the target 
appeared 16 times on each side.
The participants’ task in the mouse-tracking task was to 
select one of the two potential referents presented in the left- 
and rightmost shelf compartment according to the auditorily 
presented stimulus sentence. To this end, the participants 
Fig. 3  Example of the stimulus 
setup for a trial in the mouse-
tracking task
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were to move the mouse-cursor from the start box into the 
corresponding response box, that is, into the corresponding 
shelf compartment as soon and as fast as possible.
Each trial started with the presentation of the empty 
shelf and the starting box. When the mouse cursor remained 
within the start box for 500 ms, the target and competitor 
objects appeared in the shelf. From then on, participants 
were to start their mouse movement within 5000 ms and to 
finish it within 12,000 ms. Stimulus presentation was ini-
tiated when the mouse cursor was moved a minimum of 
60 px. outside the start box in the upper direction, within 
a corridor of 60 px. horizontally centered. This was done 
to avoid that participants leave the start box in a diagonal 
direction and to ensure that they were already moving the 
mouse when they had to make their decision. Participants 
were instructed to select the correct referent as soon as pos-
sible, and to pursue a smooth movement without stops and 
movement direction reversals.
All participants received 48 experimental trials of each of 
the Conditions 1–4 (see Table 2). In these trials, the deter-
miner was always used felicitously. Participants in the unre-
liable group received additional 48 trials of Conditions 5 and 
6 (although the main analyses focus on those sentences of 
Conditions 1–4). Thus, the unreliable group saw more items 
in total than the reliable group did, and as a consequence, 
the experiment took slightly longer. The experimental trials 
were divided into four blocks of 12 trials of Conditions 1–4 
(for both groups) and the additional 12 trials of Conditions 5 
and 6 in the unreliable group. In sum, each block comprised 
48 trials for the reliable group and 72 trials for the unreli-
able group, presented in random order.5 In half of the trials, 
the target appeared in the leftmost unit of the shelf; in the 
other half it appeared in the rightmost unit. Participants were 
instructed that they are interacting with another cooperative 
speaker who is in the same situation as they are, that is, who 
sees the same picture as the participants.
Prior to the experimental blocks, the experimenter dem-
onstrated proper use of the mouse (i.e., without stopping or 
reversing the movement) with two trials from Conditions 
1–4 each, that is, with eight trials in total. Subsequently, 
participants practiced the task on twelve trials. For the reli-
able group, these were three trials from Conditions 1–4; for 
the unreliable group, these were two trials from Conditions 
Table 2  Summary of all 
eight possible experimental 
conditions for the mouse-
tracking task
determ. disamb. felicity sentence #tar-
get
#com-
petitor
picture
1 def. early fel. Give me
the green
apple!
Give me
a green
apple!
Give me
a green
apple!
Give me
a green
apple!
Give me
a green
apple!
1 2
2 indef. early fel. 2 1
3 def. late fel. Give me
the green
apple!
1 1
4 indef. late fel. 2 2
5 def. early infel. Give me
the green
apple!
2 1
6 indef. early infel. 1 2
7 def. late infel. Give me
the green
apple!
2 2
8 indef. late infel. 1 1
The actual experiment used conditions  1–6. The target in this example is always “green 
apple”, and “green umbrella” is the competitor. (Note: determ.  =  determiner; def.    =  definite; 
indef. = indefinite; disamb. = disambiguation; fel. = felicitous; infel.  = infelicitous; # = number 
of)
5 This is a slight deviation from the pre-registered procedure, 
because we decided to use unreliable items of Condition 5 and 6 
equally often as the reliable items in Condition 1 and 2, and, there-
fore, increased the number of items in Conditions 5 and 6.
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1–6. (This procedure also ensured that participants in the 
unreliable group already encountered unreliable conditions.)
Design and analyses
The independent variable of interest in the production task 
is the type of the determiner (definite vs. indefinite). We 
analyzed the percentage of infelicitous uses of the deter-
miners, as well as erroneous choices of color and object 
separately. In addition, the total percentage of errors (i.e., 
infelicitous uses of determiners and wrong color/object 
choices) were analyzed. All comparisons were done with 
paired t-tests. Participants with more than 20% errors in total 
were replaced with new participants.
For the mouse-tracking task, erroneous trials (selection of 
the wrong object, initiation time too long, response too slow), 
trials with stops of the mouse movement (no movement within 
200 ms) or backwards movements on the y axis (> 2 px.) 
were excluded from the data set first. Trajectories were then 
aligned to a common starting point ( x = 0, y = 120 ). Trajec-
tories ending in the right response box were mirrored such 
that all trajectories ended in the left response box. Calculation 
of the dependent measures AUC, MT, and TTT was based on 
raw trajectories (Kieslich & Henninger, 2017). To remind the 
reader of what these measures represent: AUC is area under 
the curve, MT is movement time, TTT is turn towards tar-
get.6 To plot mean trajectories, data was time-normalized to 
101 time steps. All screening and pre-processing was done by 
custom R-scripts and the R-package mousetrap (Kieslich 
& Henninger, 2017). For analyses of AUC, MT, and TTT, the 
data were screened for outliers, and trials were excluded if 
the respective value deviated more than 2.5 standard devia-
tions from the design cell mean (calculated separately for each 
participant).
The main analyses focused on trials from Conditions 1–4, 
which were administered in both groups. Thus, mean AUC, 
MT, and TTT values were submitted to 2 × 2 × 2 mixed 
ANOVAs with determiner (definite vs. indefinite) and dis-
ambiguation (early vs. late) as repeated-measures, and group 
(reliable vs. unreliable) as a between-subject variable. Error 
percentages (based on selection of the wrong response box) 
were submitted to the same ANOVA to exclude trade-offs 
with speed-based measures (Liesefeld & Janczyk, 2019).
Results
Production task
Descriptively, participants used the indefinite determiner 
infelicitously more often, and also made more errors for 
color and object choice in sentences demanding the indefi-
nite determiner (see Table 3). However, none of the differ-
ences was significant. Participants who made more than 20% 
errors in total were replaced with new participants. This pro-
cedure lead to exclusion of 14 participants.
Mouse‑tracking task
Mean trajectories are visualized in Fig. 4 as a function of 
sentence type and determiner: for the reliable group (see 
Panel (a)), mouse trajectories show earlier deviations into 
the final response locations for the early compared with the 
late disambiguation conditions for both types of determin-
ers. For the unreliable group, in contrast (see Panel (b)), no 
such difference is readily observable. The impression thus is 
that participants indeed used the determiners to disambigu-
ate sentence meaning, but only when all sentences were used 
felicitously, that is, in the reliable group. This impression is 
also reflected in AUC, MT, and TTT measures (see Fig. 5).
The ANOVA on AUC (1.57% outliers) revealed no sig-
nificant main effect of group, F(1,58) < 0.01, p = .974, 2
p
 < 
.01. AUC was slightly larger for the indefinite determiner, 
F(1,58) = 7.21, p = 0.009, 2
p
 = 0.11, but determiner did 
not interact with either group, F(1,58) = 0.70, p = 0.406, 

2
p
 = 0.01, nor disambiguation, F(1,58) = 1.99, p = 0.164, 

2
p
 = 0.03. AUC was overall larger with late compared with 
early disambiguation, F(1,58) = 47.72, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 
0.45; however, this was mainly true for the reliable group, 
hence a significant interaction occurred, F(1,58) = 65.09, 
p < .001, 2
p
 = 0.53. The three-way interaction was not 
significant, F(1,58) = 0.07, p = 0.789, 2
p
 < 0.01.
Concerning MTs (1.65% outliers), all effects of the 
ANOVA were significant, all F ≥ 10.20, all ps ≤ 0.002. 
Because this included the three-way interaction, we ran 
separate 2 × 2 ANOVAs for each group. For the reliable 
Table 3  Percentages of infelicitous uses and errors in the production 
task
Determiner  t-test
Definite Indefinite
Determiner 4.69 5.62 t(59) = 0.82, p = 0.414, d = 0.11
Color 1.67 2.50 t(59) = 1.43, p = 0.159, d = 0.18
Object 1.46 1.67 t(59) = 0.44, p = 0.659, d = 0.06
Total 6.15 7.50 t(59) = 1.10, p = 0.274, d = 0.14
6 In the preregistration report, we also included an analysis of an 
additional trajectory measure—Xneg—to compare reliable versus 
unreliable conditions. We did not include this analysis in the main 
text, because the observed data pattern does not match with the origi-
nally formulated hypothesis. The hypothesis and results are reported 
in an Online Supplement.
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group, MTs were longer with late compared with early dis-
ambiguation, F(1,29) = 85.20, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.75, and 
overall longer for the indefinite compared with the definite 
determiner, F(1,29) = 68.34, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.70. This 
latter effect was, however, much more pronounced for late 
disambiguations; hence, a significant interaction, F(1,29) 
= 57.38, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.66. For the unreliable group, 
MTs were comparable for both disambiguation conditions, 
F(1,29) = 0.32, p = 0.577, 2
p
 = 0.01, but longer for the 
indefinite compared with the definite determiner, F(1,29) 
= 509.02, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.95. This effect was again 
(slightly) larger for late disambiguations; hence, a signifi-
cant interaction, F(1,29) = 8.14, p = 0.008, 2
p
 = 0.22.
Regarding TTTs (3.01% outliers), only the interaction of 
group and determiner was not significant, F(1,58) = 3.57, p = 
0.064, 2
p
 = 0.06. All other effects were significant, all F ≥ 5.01, 
all ps ≤ 0.029. Because this included the three-way interaction, 
we ran separate 2 × 2 ANOVAs for each group. For the reliable 
group, TTTs were longer for late compared with early disam-
biguations, F(1,29) = 96.89, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.77, and overall 
longer for the indefinite compared with the definite determiner, 
F(1,29) = 8.18, p = 0.008, 2
p
 = 0.22. This latter effect was, 
however, only present for late disambiguations; hence, a signifi-
cant interaction, F(1,29) = 22.74, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.44. For the 
unreliable group, TTTs were slightly longer for late compared 
with early disambiguations, F(1,29) = 6.57, p = 0.016, 2
p
 = 
0.18, and longer for the indefinite compared with the definite 
determiner, F(1,29) = 32.73, p < 0.001, 2
p
 = 0.53. The interac-
tion was not significant, F(1,29) = 1.77, p = 0.194, 2
p
 = 0.06.
Error percentages are summarized in Table 4. No effect 
was significant, all F ≤ 2.56, all ps ≥ 0.115.
Discussion
We investigated whether listeners use information about 
uniqueness or anti-uniqueness encoded in definite and 
indefinite determiners to disambiguate sentence meaning 
as early as possible, that is, already before the noun. Par-
ticipants first performed a production task in which they 
chose a determiner to form a contextually adequate request 
for one of several visually presented objects. Subsequently, 
they performed a mouse-tracking task where they were to 
select an object according to an auditorily presented stimulus 
sentence.
Summary of results
Error rates in the production task were overall low and par-
ticipants generally used the determiners as expected. Thus, 
the results of the production task reveal that participants are 
aware of the uniqueness presupposition of the definite deter-
miner, and that they associate the indefinite determiner with 
anti-uniqueness. As error rates were comparable for both 
determiners, choosing one or the other in forming contextu-
ally adequate object requests appears to be equally difficult.
For the reliable group, mouse-trajectories were affected 
by whether a sentence allowed for an early disambiguation 
on the determiner or not: AUC values were smaller and MTs 
and TTTs were shorter for the early compared to the late 
disambiguation condition. This suggests that participants 
use the information encoded in the determiner to disam-
biguate sentence meaning as soon as possible, that is, on 
the determiner. Further, the number information appears to 
be encoded in both determiners and is rapidly accessible. 
This result fits well with results from a study on the French 
Fig. 4  Mean trajectories of the reliable group (a) and the unreliable 
group (b). Note that early, unreliable conditions were only imple-
mented in the unreliable group
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language that demonstrated that gender information encoded 
in the determiner is also exploited immediately (Dahan et al., 
2000).
However, the same was not true for the unreliable group, 
for which determiners were occasionally used infelici-
tously, and early versus late disambiguation did not affect 
trajectories. We conclude that exposure to infelicitous uses 
of determiners made participants stop using them as early 
cues. This suggests that deriving (anti-)uniqueness infer-
ences must, at least in part, be a context-sensitive (prag-
matic) process. In sum, the results from the mouse-tracking 
task yield supportive evidence for Hypotheses 1 and 3.
The results regarding Hypothesis 2 (differences between 
the definite and the indefinite determiner) are less clear. To 
start with, the data do not support Hypothesis 2c accord-
ing to which the inference associated with the indefinite 
Fig. 5  Dependent measures area under curve (AUC), movement time 
(MT), and turn toward target (TTT) as a function of disambiguation 
and determiner separately for the reliable group (a) and the unreliable 
group (b). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals calculated sepa-
rately for each comparison of the determiners (see Pfister & Janczyk, 
2013)
Table 4  Error percentages in the mouse-tracking task
Group
Reliable Unreliable
Disambiguation Disambiguation
Determiner Early Late Early Late
Definite 0.50 1.06 1.41 1.12
Indefinite 1.02 0.85 1.17 1.38
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determiner are viewed as an implicature (Bill et al., 2018). 
In this case, sentences with indefinite determiners should 
yield less processing difficulties than sentences with definite 
determiners. However, no dependent variable analyzed had 
smaller values for the indefinite compared to the definite 
determiner. Considering AUC as the dependent variable, no 
obvious differences between the definite and the indefinite 
determiner are apparent, a pattern in line with Hypothesis 
2a: following “the presupposition theory”, both determiners 
come with their own uniqueness/anti-uniqueness presuppo-
sition, and we predicted no difference in processing accord-
ingly. Note that we also observed no significant difference 
in error rates between determiners in the production task.
However, not all the results are consistent with Hypoth-
esis 2a. First, for the time-based measures MT and TTT, we 
observed longer times for the indefinite than for the definite 
determiner in the late disambiguation condition. This sup-
ports Hypothesis 2b (the anti-presupposition theory) accord-
ing to which the indefinite determiner causes more processing 
difficulties than the definite determiner due to the additional 
reasoning processes involved in deriving its inference. It is 
noteworthy that, qualitatively, we obtained the same pattern 
for the early disambiguation condition within the unreliable 
group. Thus, when the information encoded in the determiner 
is no longer used for immediate disambiguation, the indefinite 
determiner induces more processing difficulties than the defi-
nite determiner. Second, that the determiners both encode pre-
suppositions is unlikely given the results regarding Hypothesis 
3. Presuppositions should be harder to override given that they 
are assumed to be lexical information, whereas implicatures 
are (to a certain degree) optional inferences which participants 
can be trained to ignore (Bott & Noveck, 2004). In sum, it 
appears that the results are partly in line with Hypothesis 2b 
and thus support the anti-presupposition theory (see also Sch-
neider et al., 2019), although we contend that some aspects of 
the data are in line with Hypothesis 2a as well.
Theoretical implications
According to the anti-presupposition theory, processing 
indefinite determiners involves an initial consideration of the 
uniqueness presupposition of the definite determiner (its alter-
native) and its subsequent negation. This should then result 
in more processing difficulties for the indefinite determiner 
compared to the definite determiner (see also Schneider et al., 
2019). Why, then, was this pattern much more pronounced for 
the late compared to the early disambiguation condition, espe-
cially in the reliable group? One possible explanation is that 
in the late disambiguation condition of the reliable group, the 
indefinite determiner does not reduce uncertainty about which 
of the two non-unique objects the speaker refers to. This prob-
lem does not occur for the definite determiner because the two 
different objects on the shelf are unique, respectively. In the 
early disambiguation condition, this consideration may have 
played less of a role given that decisions were made already 
before the information from the subsequent disambiguating 
noun was processed. A further alternative explanation will be 
discussed in Sect. “Limitations and future work”.
Moreover, it is in line with Hypothesis 2b that early cues 
are not used anymore for the indefinite determiner in the 
unreliable group. Given that the inference is a result of prag-
matic reasoning over alternatives, it should be affected by 
reliability of the speaker (Rouillard & Schwarz, 2017). It 
remains surprising and unexplained, however, why this is 
not different for the definite determiner, which should be 
stronger in meaning according to Hypothesis 2b.
The observed pattern of performance with both definite 
and indefinite determiners may also partially result from par-
ticular properties of the experimental setup. From our experi-
mental setup, it was likely clear that (1) definite and indefinite 
determiners are in competition, (2) the information given by 
the speaker was crucial to fulfill the task, and (3) the number 
of objects played a role. These factors combined may have 
led to a more parallel treatment of the two determiners than 
predicted by the anti-presupposition theory. In particular, the 
experimental setup differs from previous work in that the 
speaker directly addressed the participants with an order (“Gib 
mir...!”, Engl.: “Give me ...!”). Previous experiments either 
asked people to evaluate statements with definite and indefi-
nite determiners by choosing a picture fitting their interpreta-
tion (Bade & Schwarz, 2019a) or by judging sentences as true 
or false (Schneider et al., 2019). It was unclear in these earlier 
studies who the speaker was and what his/her knowledge state 
was. Furthermore, it was underspecified what consequences, 
especially for the speaker, the participants’ decision had in 
these experiments. These factors may have contributed to the 
lower percentage (around 30%) to which participants actu-
ally drew the inference associated with the indefinite deter-
miner compared to the definite determiner (92%) in Bade and 
Schwarz (2019a). In other words, participants did not rely on 
the information encoded in the indefinite determiner for their 
choices. The reason for this may be uncertainty about which 
interpretation of the indefinite determiner was intended in the 
experiment, given that it is ambiguous between referential and 
quantificational uses. This consideration may have given rise 
to the clear differences between the two determiners observed 
with eye-tracking by Bade and Schwarz (2019a). In contrast, 
participants in the present experiment had a clearer idea of the 
goals and knowledge of the speaker, and that may have driven 
them to use the inferences of both determiners as early as pos-
sible to predict eventual sentence meaning. Especially in the 
reliable group, the use of the indefinite determiner as refer-
ring to non-unique objects was very clear and unambiguous. 
As a result, the anti-uniqueness inference may have become 
more salient and thus less easily distinguishable from the pre-
supposition of the definite determiner in processing. Further 
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support for this view comes from a follow-up experiment of 
Bade and Schwarz (2019a) reported in Bade and Schwarz 
(2019b) which suggests that (1) target choices for the indefi-
nite determiner are boosted by exposure to the alternative (the 
definite determiner) and (2) if the anti-uniqueness inferences 
can reliably be drawn, the processing patterns of definite and 
indefinite determiners do not differ.
A further factor that may have helped in stabilizing the 
anti-uniqueness inference associated with the indefinite deter-
miner is the production task that preceded the mouse-tracking 
task. With the production task, we evaluated whether par-
ticipants are aware of the (anti-)uniqueness of determiners. 
Participants that did not reliably use the number information 
were replaced. Conceivably, the production task has already 
shifted participants’ attention to the inferences associated 
with both determiners and presented them as alternatives. In 
line with this, Bade and Schwarz (2019b) demonstrated that 
this affects the percentage of anti-uniqueness inferences. The 
authors varied the order of comprehension and production 
blocks between two groups. The choice of target pictures 
(with non-unique objects) for the indefinite determiner was 
much higher when the production block preceded the com-
prehension block than when it only followed the comprehen-
sion block. Bade and Schwarz thus hypothesized that making 
the alternatives explicit (with the production task) makes the 
anti-uniqueness inference more salient. Similar sensitivity to 
salient alternatives have been observed for scalar implicatures 
(e.g., Franke, 2014; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015).
In sum, both (1) having very clear unambiguous uses of 
the indefinite determiner in the comprehension task and (2) 
presenting the definite determiner as an alternative in the 
preceding production task may have stabilized the anti-
uniqueness inference and thus blurred the distinction between 
definite and indefinite determiners in the current experiment.
Limitations and future work
One clear limitation of the present study is that it focuses only 
on determiners in only one language (German). Given that 
determiner systems show high variability cross-linguisti-
cally, it would be unwarranted to draw very strong conclu-
sions from our findings for the processing of (indefinite) 
determiners in general. This is especially the case given that 
the indefinite determiner in German, as in many other lan-
guages, can fulfill more than one function, for example, can 
refer to specific objects, can be an existential quantifier, or 
can be a numeral. The interpretation of the indefinite deter-
miner cross-linguistically may also depend on what kind 
of indefinite competitors the language offers. German, for 
example, has the free choice item “irgendein” (Engl.: “any-
one”) as an alternative, English has “some” and the numeral 
“one”. Given the complexity of the empirical situation, it 
is unclear whether all uses of the indefinite determiner (and 
all indefinites) are associated with the inference of interest 
here, and what additional factors may play a role. To test the 
predictions of the anti-presupposition theory, it may thus be 
worthwhile to test more phenomena it has been applied to 
(e.g., mood, tense, number, competition between “all” and 
“both”) to avoid this additional complexity.
A potential problem for interpreting differences between 
determiners results from the fact that the sequence of the 
indefinite determiner and the following adjective is longer 
than the sequence of the definite determiner and the following 
adjective (693 ms vs. 575 ms on average). This is because the 
two determiners in the German accusative differ in number of 
letters and syllables when the noun is masculine. Addition-
ally, the corresponding adjective differs due to declension. This 
may also explain differences between both determiners for the 
time-based measures MT and TTT in the late disambiguation 
conditions, where participants have to wait until the onset of 
the noun to make their decision. However, if this was the only 
explanation, one would expect this difference to be present in 
all conditions, including the early disambiguation condition 
within the reliable group: conceivably, participants need to 
process the whole determiner for its identification, and this 
should also differ in duration. Consequently, the same results 
would be expected as well. Admittedly, we cannot exclude that 
the mere onset of the determiner sufficed to distinguish both 
determiners in this particular condition. In this case, results 
should indeed be similar for both determiners. Accordingly, we 
should also qualify the conclusions made above and we concur 
that this would favor Hypothesis 2a more than Hypothesis 2b. 
On the basis of our data, we cannot clearly decide on this issue. 
One way to address this issue is to design a similar experiment 
in the English language, where the definite determiner “the” is 
not shorter compared to the indefinite determiner “a” and the 
adjective is morphologically equally complex. Finally, how-
ever, it should be noted that the important differences between 
the early and late disambiguation condition are not affected by 
this potential problem.
An interesting question which the present data cannot 
answer is whether participants learn to use cues associ-
ated with determiners during the experiment when they are 
exposed to reliable uses or whether participants use such cues 
from the very beginning, but “unlearn” to use them when 
confronted with infelicitous uses (i.e., in the unreliable group). 
It is unclear from the current experiment what role, if any, 
the production task played in this (un)learning. Clearly, par-
ticipants’ attention was already drawn to the fact that number 
information encoded in the determiners, as well as competi-
tion between them, may play a role. To tackle this issue, future 
research should consider to either not include a production 
task, or apply this task before or after the main experiment in 
two separate groups. If exposure to alternatives does play a 
role, this should affect the processing of determiners. Moreo-
ver, to address the issue of (un)learning, the number and order 
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of infelicitous/felicitous uses of determiners could be manipu-
lated in follow-up studies. If number information is encoded 
in the lexicon for both determiners, then a gradient unlearning 
effect should be observed for both of them.
Conclusion
In sum, it appears that the uniqueness and anti-uniqueness 
inferences associated with definite and indefinite determin-
ers, respectively, are used rapidly to disambiguate sentence 
meaning and to make contingent decisions. The robustness 
of this is, however, affected by occasional infelicitous uses of 
determiners. We find that it is thus important to consider the 
reliability of the speaker when investigating these inferences. 
Regarding differences between determiners, our results are 
less conclusive and we refrain from drawing strong conclu-
sions. However, the conclusion that participants used the 
information of the determiners to disambiguate sentence 
meaning as soon as possible is not undermined by this.
Supplementary material
A preregistration report including the hypotheses, the 
planned design of the experiment, the stimulus material, 
and the planned analyses was uploaded OSF prior to data 
collection (2018-08-03 01:53 PM; https://osf.io/aym9p/).
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Appendix
Items used in the mouse‑tracking experiment
Table 5  Overview of the items employed in the mouse-tracking task
item color 1 color 2
apple
ball
book
cellphone
cup
dress
fur coat
hoodie
knife
pencil
raincoat
scarf
shirt
sneaker
sweater
teddy bear
umbrella
Each item is depicted in its two colors
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1 Introduction 
The present paper investigates a fundamental issue of presupposition (PSP) processing, 
that is, the validation of PSPs in a given context. To that end, we compare test sentences that 
trigger PSPs in contexts that either falsify or verify them. We focus on two particular triggers, 
namely the definite determiner “the” (German der/die/das) and “again” (German wieder).  
Overall, we pursue four goals. First, we aim to replicate results indicating an early pro-
cessing of PSPs starting as soon as the presuppositional content is fully known (Tiemann et al., 
2011) with a larger sample size. Second, we aim to investigate classifications of triggers offered 
in the theoretical literature by comparing two PSP triggers assumed to belong to different clas-
ses. Third, we investigate how scalar implicatures (SIs) are processed, and fourth, we compare 
the time-course of processing PSPs and SIs in verifying/falsifying contexts, to further explore 
the current theoretical distinction of different types of pragmatic content more generally. 
2 
2 Theoretical approaches to Presuppositions and Implicatures 
2.1 Presuppositions   
Theoretical approaches to PSPs. According to a traditional semantic approach, PSPs 
are encoded in the lexical entry of a PSP trigger, that is, in a lexical item. PSPs are regarded as 
“definedness conditions”: a sentence s presupposes p just in case p must be true in order for s 
to have a truth value at all (Strawson, 1952). If the PSP is not met, the sentence is undefined 
rather than true or false (Heim & Kratzer, 1998). Formally, this is captured by making sentences 
with PSPs denote partial functions, and a sentence like (1) is considered true if Joan scored and 
scored before, false if she did not score but scored before, and undefined otherwise. 
(1) Joan scored, again. 
Semantic undefinedness is mapped onto pragmatic inappropriateness through “Stalnaker’s 
Bridge” (von Fintel, 2004).  
At least some PSPs have been argued to have a pragmatic source (Abusch, 2002, 2010; 
Schlenker, 2010; Simons, 2001; Stalnaker, 1973) (=pragmatic approach), that is, they are not 
conventionally (=lexically) encoded but are derived contextually. Based on different triggering 
mechanisms, Abusch (2002) introduced the distinction of hard and soft PSP triggers. The two 
types behave differently in contexts where the speaker is ignorant with regard to the truth of the 
PSP. For example, soft triggers can be uttered in explicit ignorance contexts1 without leading 
to infelicity, but hard triggers cannot be. Examples for soft triggers are aspectual verbs as stop 
and continue (see Simons, 2001), know, and achievement verbs as win. Hard triggers are, for 
example, too, also, even, again, the negative polarity item either, and it-clefts (see also Abusch, 
2010). Soft triggers share certain properties like suspendability and non-detachability, which 
are typical of conversational inferences like implicatures. Based on that observation, Romoli 
(2011) proposed that PSPs of soft triggers are SIs, which come out as entailments in certain 
                                               
1Simons (2001) introduced the term explicit ignorance contexts to describe situations in which it is apparent to the addressee that the speaker 
is ignorant with respect to the proposition that would normally be presupposed. 
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environments. It is still under debate which trigger belongs to which class, and the resulting 
effects discussed in this regard are quite subtle.  
From both the pragmatic and semantic approach one can derive the hypothesis that the 
listener is confronted with increased cognitive workload in cases where the PSP is false or 
unfulfilled. However, both approaches diverge in their predictions about when this increase 
becomes apparent. According to the semantic approach, the PSP is encoded in the trigger. Dif-
ficulties are expected to arise upon encountering the trigger and should persist until the content 
of the PSP is known. According to the pragmatic approach, the sentence is first interpreted 
compositionally, and only then is the context checked for whether it is appropriate given its 
PSP. The distinction need not be this clear cut though, and it is possible to assume that prag-
matic information is taken into consideration at every given point during computation, for ex-
ample, with the assumption of local contexts (see Schlenker, 2011). 
Experimental evidence. Recent years came with an increasing amount of experimental 
studies on PSP processing (see Schwarz, 2016, for a review). Results from some studies support 
the semantic approach. For example, Tiemann et al. (2011) reported effects on the trigger, when 
comparing presuppositional sentences to plainly grammatical and ungrammatical ones (see also 
Schneider, Bade, & Janczyk, 2020).  Further, Tiemann (2014) and Tiemann et al. (2015) dis-
cussed processing difficulties on the trigger when the PSP is not met in the context. Similar 
results are discussed for reading time (RT) studies on German auch (Engl. also; Schwarz, 
2007), and the definite determiner (van Berkum et al., 1999; van Berkum et al., 2003).  Early 
or immediate processing of the uniqueness PSP of the definite determiner has furthermore been 
suggested by EEG studies comparing definite and indefinite determiners (Kirsten et al., 2014), 
as well as mouse- and eye-tracking studies (Bade & Schwarz, 2019b; Schneider, Bade, Franke, 
& Janczyk, 2020; Schneider, Schonard, Franke, Jäger, & Janczyk, 2019).   
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While many of the aforementioned studies focused on one or two PSP triggers, some 
studies also suggest that different types of PSP triggers may differ in processing (Abrusan, 
2011; Domaneschi et al., 2013; Domaneschi & Di Paola, 2018), especially in the verbal domain. 
Along these line, Tiemann (2014) discussed the and again as falling into two different classes, 
especially regarding accommodation. 
2.2 Scalar implicatures 
Another prominent example of pragmatic inferences are SIs, which are theoretically distin-
guished from PSPs  based on their properties. An example is given in (2).  
(2) Some elephants are mammals. 
SI: Not all elephants are mammals. 
Theoretical approaches. Under a Gricean (or pragmatic) view (Grice 1989), implica-
tures arise as a result of pragmatic reasoning based on the Cooperative Principle and the four 
Gricean maxims of conversation. The SI in (2) is the result of reasoning with quantity: as the 
sentence with all is strictly more informative, the speaker deduces that the hearer would have 
used it if s/he believed it to be true. As s/he did not, the hearer can safely assume that the speaker 
does not believe the all alternative to be true. According to Grice, the process is highly context-
dependent, and the resulting inferences are weak and cancelable.2 
Under a lexical approach (Chierchia, 2004; Levinson 2000), a lexical ambiguity is es-
sentially argued for. The implicature is added to the lexical meaning of the scalar term in such 
a way that some has a meaning some and not all, which is claimed to be more efficient than 
assuming reasoning over alternatives in several steps. Levinson (2000) proposed that the SI is 
marked as defeasible in the lexicon, whereas Chierchia (2004) slightly deviated from Levinson 
                                               
2 Under so called Neo-Gricean approaches (Sauerland, 2004), the basic idea of SIs as the result of pragmatic reasoning is kept, but a strength-
ening mechanism is introduced, as well as the notion of local implicatures. We won’t discuss this approach in much detail here, as it is not 
relevant for the predictions we tested. 
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and introduced a scalar term with a weak (implicature-free) meaning and with a strong (impli-
cature-laden) meaning.  
To explain how listeners arrive at an interpretation of the pragmatic some (some, but 
not all), Huang and Snedeker (2009) introduced a processing model based on the Gricean and 
lexical approach. This Literal-First view assumes that the lower-bound semantic interpretation 
(some and possibly all) is computed rapidly as part of the basic sentence meaning. All infer-
ences including an SI and the upper-bound meaning require extra time and resources, and pro-
cessing takes place in two steps: First, the semantic meaning (some and possibly all) is con-
structed, and second, the pragmatic meaning (some, but not all) is computed. Two steps are 
necessary, because the pragmatic interpretation cannot exist without the semantic one. Accord-
ingly, the pragmatic (or upper-bound) meaning of some requires more processing resources and 
thus takes longer than the processing of the semantic (or lower bound) meaning of some. 
Finally, according to the grammatical approach, SIs arise as entailments of exhausti-
fied sentences (see, e.g., Chierchia, 2006; Fox, 2007; Magri, 2010). The exhaustivity operator 
EXH that derives the exhaustification is similar in meaning to overt only (modulo presupposi-
tions). It applies to a proposition p and its alternatives and affirms the proposition while negat-
ing the subset of relevant alternatives.  
Processing of SIs under this Default view (Levinson, 2000) is predicted to be effortless 
and immediate, because of their status as default inference, and only cancellation of the impli-
cature incurs processing recourses. This view is motivated by the articulatory bottleneck, which 
claims that communication proceeds remarkably quickly although humans can only produce a 
highly limited number of phonemes per second. It predicts that the upper-bound interpretation 
SI (i.e., some, but not all) precedes the lower-bound interpretation (some, and possibly all) and 
thus the semantic (or lower bound) meaning of some should require more processing resources 
and take longer than processing of the pragmatic (or upper-bound) meaning of some. 
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Experimental evidence. The empirical picture on implicatures is complex, as they have 
been shown to be influenced by a variety of factors and have been investigated extensively with 
a variety of methods. Due to space limitations, we cannot discuss the experimental literature in 
detail here. An overview of the historical development of the experimental literature on impli-
catures can be found in Noveck (2018). Broadly speaking, implicature derivation has been 
shown to be more costly than accessing literal meaning, supporting a literal-first view. Results 
diverge with regard to when effects occur. Some studies reported delayed processing of impli-
catures associated with or and some (e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004; Bott et al., 2012; Breheny et 
al., 2006; Chevallier et al., 2008; Huang & Snedeker, 2009, 2011; Noveck & Posada, 2003).  
However, other experimental data, for example from eye tracking (Breheny et al., 2013; Fop-
polo & Marelli, 2017, Grodner et al., 2010), suggest that implicatures are immediately available 
(see also Sedivy et al., 1999). Crucially for our purposes, differences in processing between 
PSPs and SIs seem to confirm their different theoretical status (Bill et al., 2018). 
3 The Experiment 
Our experiment is a conceptual replication of Tiemann et al.’s (2011) Experiment 2. As 
these authors, we employed self-paced reading to investigate at which point in time a PSP ver-
ification with the context takes place. Tiemann et al. included five different PSP triggers in their 
experiment (German wieder, Engl. again; auch, Engl. also; aufhören, Engl. stop; wissen, Engl. 
know; and definites in the shape of possessive noun phrases [German sein/ihr, Engl. his/her]), 
and compared sentences in contexts that either (i) verified the PSP or (ii) falsified it. RTs at the 
positions of the trigger, the word following the trigger, and the evaluation word (the word where 
the content of the PSP is known) were analyzed. The results supported the view that a validation 
process of the PSP starts as soon as the PSP is known, and before the end of the sentence. In a 
falsifying context this validation process took longer compared to a context that verified the 
PSP. However, because recent studies suggested that different types of PSP triggers may differ 
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in processing (Abrusan, 2011; Domaneschi et al., 2013; Domaneschi & Di Paola, 2018; Tie-
mann et al., 2015), it is unfortunate that Tiemann et al. (2011) did not report separate analyses 
of PSP triggers.  
Here, we focus on two PSP triggers, the definite determiner the (German der/die/das) 
and its uniqueness-PSP and again (German wieder). This focus allows for using a larger number 
of items per participants and condition and, as a result, meaningful analyses of differences be-
tween the two PSP triggers. We additionally included SIs to contrast their processing with that 
of PSPs. Sentences with scalar some (German einige) were used for the implicature condition, 
and sentences with all (German alle) were included as a control. They should not evoke an 
implicature as they are already most informative, and can only be either literally true or false.  
3.1 General approach and procedure 
For each sentence type (determiner, again, SI), we created 40 sets of experimental sen-
tences, thus 120 sets in total, with two different context sentences each (see (A) and (B)). Each 
context sentence was paired with two test sentences, in such a way that the context sentence 
either verified the PSP/SI of the test sentence or falsified it. If context (A) verified the content 
of the PSP/SI, then context (B) falsified it and vice versa. We tested participants in one session 
(in contrast to Tiemann et al., 2011). Participants saw each item in only one context condition 
(A or B), but saw both test sentences for that context, one falsified and one verified by the 
context (see Table 1 for example items). 
To facilitate the comparison of the different regions of interest we refer to the words of 
interest via the region they appear in: P1 is the “trigger word” (scalar term for SIs and lexical 
trigger for PSPs; underlined in Table 1). P2 is the critical word, that is, the point when the 
complete content of inferences was known, and P3 is the final word. The additions +1/+2 refer 
to the words following P1, P2, and P2, respectively (see also Table 2 in the Appendix).  
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Table 1. Example items with the two context variations in the verifying and falsifying condition. 
 
3.2 Purpose of the present study and hypotheses 
The present study pursued four major goals. First, we aimed to replicate the results of 
Tiemann et al.’s (2011) Experiment 2. We therefore expect that falsification of a PSP causes 
Example item: determiner 
(A) Manuel hat ein Ticket für ein Baseball-
spiel gekauft. 
(B) Manuel hat mehrere Tickets für ein Base-
ballspiel gekauft. 
 Manuel bought a ticket for a baseball 
match. 
 Manuel bought several tickets for a base-
ball match. 
 1 Manuel holt das Ticket und freut sich.  3 Manuel holt die Tickets und freut sich. 
  Manuel collects the ticket and he is 
happy. 
  Manuel collects the tickets and he is 
happy. 
 2 Manuel holt die Tickets und freut 
sich. 
 4 Manuel holt das Ticket und freut sich. 
  Manuel collects the tickets and he is 
happy. 
  Manuel holt das Ticket und freut sich. 
 
Example item: again 
(A) Lukas hat schon oft Pizza bestellt. (B) Lukas hat noch nie Pizza bestellt. 
 Lukas has often ordered pizza before.  Lukas has never ordered pizza before. 
 5 Heute hat Lukas wieder Pizza bestellt 
und wartet freudig. 
 7 Heute hat Lukas wieder keine Pizza 
bestellt und hat nichts zu essen. 
  Today, Lukas ordered pizza again 
and waits happily. 
  Today, Lukas didn’t ordered pizza 
again and has nothing to eat. 
 6 Heute hat Lukas wieder keine Pizza 
bestellt und hat nichts zu essen. 
 4 Heute hat Lukas wieder Pizza bestellt 
und wartet freudig. 
  Today, Lukas didn’t ordered pizza 
again and has nothing to eat. 
  Today, Lukas ordered pizza again and 
waits happily. 
 
Example item: SI 
(A) Zwei von vier Schrauben sind kaputt. (B) Vier von vier Schrauben sind kaputt. 
 Two of four screws are broken.  Four of the four screws are broken. 
 9 Weil einige Schrauben kaputt sind 
müssen neue gekauft werden. 
 11 Weil alle Schrauben kaputt sind müs-
sen neue gekauft werden. 
  Because some of the screws are bro-
ken they have to buy new ones. 
  Because all of the screws are broken 
they have to buy new ones. 
 10 Weil alle Schrauben kaputt sind 
müssen neue gekauft werden. 
 12 Weil einige Schrauben kaputt sind 
müssen neue gekauft werden. 
  Because all of the screws are broken 
they have to buy new ones. 
  Because some of the screws are broken 
they have to buy new ones. 
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higher processing difficulties than its verification, being reflected by longer RTs in the falsifi-
cation than in the verification condition (see also Altmann & Steedman, 1988; Hertrich et al., 
2015; Kirsten et al., 2014; Schwarz, 2007) (=Hypothesis 1, H1).  These  difficulties are expected 
in different regions depending on the process being semantic (early effects) or pragmatic (late 
effects).  
Second, we aimed at comparing processing of Class 1 with the Class 2 PSP triggers (see 
Glanzberg, 2005, or Tiemann et al., 2015, for this distinction) and Hypothesis 2 (H2) states to 
observe differences in processing of the two PSP triggers (see also Abrusán, 2011; Domaneschi 
et al. 2014; Domaneschi et al., 2018; Domaneschi & Di Paola, 2018; Jouravlev et al., 2016; 
Tiemann et al., 2015). For example, the effect of context condition might be larger for definite 
determiners than for again, because in the latter sentences, the PSP can be ignored without 
making the sentence entirely senseless, that is, assertion and PSP are not dependent on each 
other (see Tiemann, 2014, and Tiemann et al., 2015) for a theoretical discussion and experi-
mental data).   
Third, we explored processing of SIs in comparison to PSPs. For SIs, processing diffi-
culties are expected (H3) and, depending on the theoretical approach, these difficulties appear 
in different conditions: we expect longer RTs in the falsifying condition under the Default view, 
but in the verifying condition under the Literal-First view. Furthermore, we expect differences 
between PSPs and SIs. Hypothesis 4 (H4) reflects our expectation of early effects starting on 
the trigger for the PSPs (see, e.g., Bade & Schwarz, 2019a; Burkhardt, 2006;  Kirsten et al., 
2014; Schneider et al., 2020;  Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Tiemann, 2012; Tiemann et al., 2011), 
while for SIs slower and/or delayed processing is expected (see e.g., Bott & Noveck, 2004; 
Chevallier et al., 2008; Chierchia et al., 2001; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Feeney et al., 2004; 
Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Noveck & Posada, 2003; Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide, 
2007).  
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4 Method 
4.1 Participants 
 The intended sample size in this experiment was n = 48 native speakers of German. 
Data were collected from 52 participants from the Tübingen (Germany) area. Two participants 
were excluded because of 30% or more errors in the final comprehension questions (see below). 
Another participant was excluded because German was not his/her mother tongue, and one 
participant was excluded due to technical problems during the experiment (final sample: mean 
age = 23.1 years, 39 females, 9 males). Participants signed informed consent prior to data col-
lection and were paid 8€ or received course credit for participation. 
4.2 Apparatus and Stimuli 
Stimulus presentation and response collection were controlled by a standard PC con-
nected to a 17-inch CRT monitor. A trial started with a context sentence presented as a whole 
in the upper half of the screen. After reading the context sentence, participants requested the 
test sentence with a button press of the right index finger on an external response button placed 
to the right of them. The test sentence was presented word-by-word in a self-paced reading 
manner, that is, the letters of the test sentences’ words were first substituted by underscores as 
placeholders. Pressing the external key revealed the first word. To continue reading, partici-
pants had to press the button again to reveal the next word while the previous word disappeared 
and was again substituted with underscores. For again sentences, we presented again not 
(wieder keine) together to facilitate a comparison of the respective regions. Effects of word 
length did not play a role because we analyzed RT per letter (see Schneider et al., 2020; Tie-
mann et al., 2011). After participants finished reading the test sentence, they had to rate its 
appropriateness according to the presented context via the number keys 1-4 on a standard 
QWERTZ keyboard ranging from very unnatural (1) to very natural (4). Participants were asked 
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to pay attention to the content, because after the experiment they had to answer 10 yes/no com-
prehension questions (on the basis of which two participants were excluded). 
Participants started with reading instructions. This was followed by a short practice 
block of 24 trials, four of each sentence type in both conditions. The order of these practice 
trials was determined randomly, but then kept constant for all participants. Subsequently, the 
240 test trials were administered in three blocks of 80 trials each. The trials were presented in 
random order with the restriction that sentences of the same item did not appear in different 
conditions in direct succession. All participants were tested individually in a single session of 
about 45 minutes.  
4.3 Design and Analyses 
The independent variables of interest were (1) context condition (verifying, falsifying) 
and (2) sentence type (determiner, again, some, all). Mean acceptability ratings were submitted 
to a 2 × 4 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with context condition and sentence type as repeated-
measures.  
There are three regions of interest (see also Table 2 in the appendix): The position of 
the PSP trigger or the scalar term (Position 1; P1), the word of evaluation, which is the word 
where the content of the PSP or the SI could be evaluated (Position 2; P2), and the final word 
of the sentence (Position 3, P3). To be able to uncover spillover effects, we additionally ana-
lyzed one word following the trigger/scalar term (P1+1), one word following the evaluation 
word (P2+1), and two words following the evaluation word (P2+2). In case of the determiner, 
the word following the PSP trigger (P1+1) is already the evaluation word (P2) (except for two 
items which were excluded from the analysis). Therefore, we used the same data in the ANOVA 
for both positions. Trials in which RTs deviated more than 2.5 SDs from the respective design 
cell in any of the analyzed positions (calculated separately for each participants) were excluded 
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as outliers (15.0% of the trials). For each region, mean RTs were submitted to the same 
ANOVA as acceptability ratings. In case of a significant interaction, we analyzed the sentence 
types separately with follow-up ANOVAs with context condition as a repeated measure. 
5 Results 
5.1 Acceptability rating 
Results of the acceptability ratings are visualized in Figure 1. Verifying conditions were 
clearly rated better than falsifying conditions for all four sentence types, F(1, 47) = 676.46, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .94. The main effect of sentence type was also significant, F(3, 141) = 27.74, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .37, reflecting the slight differences between the sentence types. The high ratings in 
the verifying condition suggest that participants perceive them as appropriate.  In contrast, the 
falsifying condition received low ratings which indicates that inappropriateness was detected. 
The interaction was also significant, F(3, 141) = 31.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, but the effect of 
context condition was significant for all sentence types, all ps < .001. 
Figure 1. Mean acceptability ratings in as a function of context condition and sentence type. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals for the means (SI = scalar implicature) 
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5.2 Reading times 
RTs per letter are visualized in Figure 2 for all sentence types. Details on inferential 
statistics are summarized in Table 3 in the Appendix. In short, the ANOVAs revealed signifi-
cant differences between the four sentence types for all analyzed positions, indicating that dif-
ferent processing difficulties were evoked by these sentence types. 
Figure 2. Reading times (RT; in milliseconds per letter) separately for the four sentence types determiner in (a), 
again in (b), implicatures with some in (c) and for true/false assertion with all in (d) for the respective regions. 
The asterisk marks significant differences between the sentence conditions (P1 reflecting the trigger/scalar term, 
P1+1 the word following the trigger/scalar term, P2 the word of evaluation where the PSP/SI can be evaluated, 
P2+1 one word following the word of evaluation, P2+2 two words following the word of evaluation, P3 the final 
word of the sentence, SI = scalar implicature). 
 
For the PSP trigger/scalar term (P1), the main effect of context condition was not sig-
nificant. However, we observed a significant interaction of context condition and sentence type. 
Context condition only had a significant impact for some sentences (with longer RTs in the 
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verifying context condition) and all sentences (with longer RTs in the falsifying context condi-
tion), but not for the two PSP triggers. 
For the word following the PSP trigger/scalar term (P1+1), additionally the main effect 
of context condition and the interaction were significant. The effect of context condition was 
only significant for determiner sentences (longer RTs in falsifying contexts) and for some sen-
tences (longer RTs in verifying contexts). 
 At the evaluation word (P2), the main effect of context condition was not significant, 
but the interaction was. Context condition had an effect for determiners (longer RTs in falsify-
ing contexts) and for some and all sentences (longer RTs in verifying contexts) 
 For the word following the evaluation word (P2+1) the main effect of context condition 
and the interaction were significant as well. Effects of context condition were observed for 
determiner (with longer RTs in the falsifying condition) and for some and all sentences (with 
longer RTs in the verifying condition). For all sentences this could reflect the point where the 
sentence stopped to make sense to the participants (i.e., where they know the assertion is false). 
For the next word of interest (P2+2), the main effects of context condition and the in-
teraction were significant. Context condition only had a significant impact on some and all 
sentences (with longer RTs in the verifying condition). 
For the final word (P3), neither the main effect of context condition nor the interaction 
were significant. Descriptively, RTs for again were longer in the falsifying than in the verifying 
condition, while the opposite was true for the other three sentence types (with a slightly larger 
difference for some and all sentences as compared to determiner sentences). 
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6 Discussion 
The results of the acceptability rating replicate those of Tiemann et al. (2011) by and large. The 
ratings for all sentence types are high in the verifying condition and low in the falsifying con-
dition. Accordingly, when the context does not verify the PSP/SI, it is perceived as inappropri-
ate or unnatural. The SI all sentences can be regarded as a baseline, because in these sentences 
verifying/falsifying means literally true vs. false. Thus, without requiring pragmatic enrich-
ment, the verifying condition was perceived as natural.  
RT results are only partly in line with Tiemann et al.’s (2011) observations. For the 
trigger position, we observed the same pattern as in the original study, namely that RTs did not 
differ between the two context conditions. Regarding performance on the evaluation word, our 
observations differed from Tiemann et al.’s results. For determiner sentences, we observe 
longer RTs in the falsifying condition than in the verifying condition. This result suggests an 
immediate verification process of the PSP as soon as the content of the PSP is fully known and 
thus supports the semantic approach to PSPs (H1). If the content of the PSP is not supported by 
the context, this process fails, leading to processing difficulties which become reflected in 
longer RTs at the evaluation word (but not at the end of the sentence). Thus, the data provide 
evidence for the semantic approach to PSPs triggered by definite determiners and rather is not 
in line with the pragmatic approach.3 However, we do not see this difference for again sen-
tences. This difference highlights the necessity to analyze different PSP triggers separately, just 
as is suggested by the classifications of Tiemann et al. (2015) and Glanzberg (2005). As the 
processing of the two triggers under investigation here differs, the data are in line with H2. 
For SIs there is a significant difference between the two context conditions already at 
the position of the scalar term. The longer RTs in the verifying condition for the some sentences 
                                               
3 At least one that does not assume local contexts to play a role for pragmatic processing/context integration. 
16 
support the idea that SIs are only calculated in context conditions that support the implicature 
(see also Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006; Hartshore, 2015). Regarding H3, the data thus 
provide evidence for the Literal-First view: sentences with the weaker scalar term led to pro-
cessing difficulties in the verifying condition, when the implicature had to be calculated, not in 
the falsifying condition, where no implicature needed to be derived. Furthermore, contrary to 
previous work by Noveck and Posada (2003) and Huang and Snedeker (2011), this process 
starts quite early, and thus is in line with work by Grodner et al. (2010), Breheny et al. (2013) 
and Foppolo and Marelli (2017) who suggested that implicatures are immediately available. 
Last, we can see that processing of SIs differs from processing PSPs (H4), because for 
SIs the effect of context condition persists longer, until the end of the sentence. Thus, in contrast 
to PSPs the evaluation process of SIs appears to be a long-lasting process. 
There are two unexpected and interesting results. First, the reversed effect of context 
condition for the all sentences requires attention. Tentatively, we suggest the following expla-
nation: The longer RTs for the falsifying context at the beginning of the sentence suggest that 
false assertions are detected rapidly by participants. This leads to processing difficulties at the 
scalar term and at the following word. At that point, participants realized that the sentence 
stopped making sense and consequently they did not process the assertion in the falsifying con-
dition properly. This could then explain the shorter RTs in the falsifying condition in the later 
parts of the sentence. 
Second, we did not observe a strong effect of context for the trigger again, contrary to 
previous findings. This may be either due to the material we used, which is possibly too unspe-
cific with regard to the truth of the PSPs. It may also be due to the very complex interaction of 
again with negation, which makes verification and falsification more complex, (see Schwarz 
& Tiemann, 2017 for more discussion). We have to leave it to further research to address these 
issues in more detail. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2: Regions of interest for the respective conditions 
 
 
 
Table 3. Inferential statistics for Experiment 1. The first rows are the statistics for the 4×2 ANOVA for each 
region. In case of a significant interaction, separate ANOVAs with context condition as a repeated measure were 
run. 
    P 1 P 1 +1  P 2 P 2+1 P 2+2    P 3 
determine  Manuel holt das/die   Ticket/
s 
und freut   sich. 
again Heute hat  Lukas wieder 
(keine) 
Pizza  bestellt und hat  nichts zu essen. 
SI 
all   Weil einige Schrau-
ben 
kaputt sind müssen neue gekauft  werden.. 
some   Weil alle Schrau-
ben 
kaputt sind müssen neue gekauft  werden.. 
Note: P1 = PSP trigger/scalar term; P2 = word of evaluation, P3= final word 
 
 P1:  
PSP trigger/sca-
lar term 
P1+1:  
post-trigger 
P2:  
evaluation 
P2+1:  
post-evaluation 
P2+2:  
post-evaluation 
2 
P3:  
final word 
Context F(1,47) = 0.71 
p = .405, ηp2 < 
.01 
F(1,47) = 6.91. 
p = .012, ηp2 = 
.13 
F(1,47) = 0.00, 
p = .980, ηp2 < 
.01 
F(1,47) = 4.59, 
p = .037, ηp2 = 
.09 
F(1,47) = 9.44 
p = .004, ηp2 = 
.17 
F(1,47) = 3.69, 
p = .061, ηp2 = 
.07 
Sentence 
type 
F(3,141) = 
79.51,  
p < .001, ηp2 = 
.63, ε = .69 
F(3,141) = 
180.70,  
p < .001, ηp2 = 
.79, ε = .58 
F(3,141) = 
174.55,  
p < .001, ηp2 = 
.79, ε = .47 
F(3,141) = 
30.74, 
p < .001, ηp2 = 
.40, ε = .75 
F(3,141) = 
52.00,  
p < .001, ηp2 = 
.53, ε = .80 
F(3,141) = 
42.91, 
p < .001, ηp2 = 
.48, ε = .62 
Interaction F(3, 141) = 4.60  
p = .012, ηp2 = 
.09 
F(3,141) = 5.35  
p = .004, ηp2 = 
.10, ε = .76 
F(3,141) = 
10.36,  
p < .01, ηp2 = 
.18, ε = .55 
F(3,141) = 9.66, 
p < .001, ηp2 = 
.17, ε = .84 
F(3,141) = 6.69  
p = .001, ηp2 = 
.12, ε = .75 
F(3,141) = 1.93, 
p = .128, ηp2 = 
.04 
determiner F(1,47) = 0.32, p 
= .576, ηp2 = .01 
F(1,47) = 6.99, p = .011, ηp2 = .13 F(1,47) = 13.94, 
p < .001, ηp2 = 
.23 
F(1,47) = 3.13, p 
= .083 ηp2 = .06 
 
again F(1,47) = 0.34, p 
= .562, ηp2 = .01 
F(1,47) = 0.55, p 
= .464, ηp2 = .01 
F(1,47) = 0.98, p 
= .328, ηp2 = .02 
F(1,47) = 1.21,  
p = .277, ηp2 = 
.03 
F(1,47) = 2.74, p 
= .105, ηp2 = .06 
 
SI some F(1,47) = 5.58, p 
= .022, ηp2 = .11 
F(1,47) = 4.96, p 
= .031, ηp2 = .10 
F(1,47) = 17.50, 
p < .001, ηp2 = 
.27 
F(1,47) = 6.77, p 
= .012, ηp2 = .13 
F(1,47) = 5.50, p 
= .023, ηp2 = .10 
 
SI all F(1,47) = 5.55, p 
= .023, ηp2 = .11 
F(1,47) = 3.69, p 
= .061, ηp2 = .07 
F(1,47) = 7.79, p 
= .008, ηp2 = .14 
F(1,47) = 9.55, p 
= .003, ηp2 = .17 
F(1,47) = 13.44, 
p = .001, ηp2 = 
.22 
 
